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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines online spoof videos in China. It shows the relationship 
between user-created content and change and how such videos are impacting on 
social memory. 
 
In the West, we are witnessing two outstanding trends in media. On the one hand, 
media are turning more “demotic” (Turner, 2006) and “participatory” (Jenkins, 
2006), whereby lay audiences use popular media for identity formation, 
representation and association, reconfiguring the media and cultural landscape, 
and rendering invalid the old paradigm based on the dichotomy of audience and 
author, creator and consumer, expert and amateur. On the other hand, in both 
mainstream media and user-creation online there is a trend towards “silly 
citizenship”, with comedy, send-ups and spoofs that used to reside in the margin 
propelled to the central stage in both pleasure and politics (Hartley, 2010), as is 
shown in the rising popularity of the Daily Show, Colbert Report, and spoof videos 
in elections ,e.g. the 2008 presidential election in US (Gray, Jones, & Thompson, 
2009; Tryon, 2008).  
 
User generated content—and spoof subcultures—is now much a debated 
phenomenon in China. However, with different political (one party rule and 
censorship) and cultural (media regarded mainly as instrument for education and 
social stabilization instead of a critical fourth estate) configurations, will the social 
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and cultural impacts of the two trends in the West be as the same in China? If not, 
what will be the specificities in the China context? 
 
The project starts with a historical review of popular culture and user-created 
content in China, before turning to spoof videos and looking at how they are 
produced and shared, travel and diffused on the Internet, and how the 
communities and sub-cultures forming and emerging around spoof videos are 
changing the overall cultural landscape in China. 
 
By acting as a participant observer in online video sharing sites and conducting 
face-to face as well as online interviews, I identify lead users and creators of spoof 
videos and the social networks emerging around them. I call these lead users “skill 
hubs” and their networks “liquid communities”, foregrounding the fact that their 
appeal doesn’t come from their amicable personality, but rather from their creative 
skills; and that the networks surrounding them are in a permanent flux, with 
members coming and going as they see fit. I argue that the “liquidness” (Bauman, 
2000) of these communities is what makes them constantly creative and appealing. 
Textual analysis of online videos, their comments and derivatives are conducted to 
tease out the uses that that can be made of spoof videos, namely as phatic 
communication, as alternative memory and as political engagement. Through these 
analyses I show that spoof videos constitute not only a space where young 
generations can engage with each other, communicate their anger and 
dissatisfaction, fun and hope, and where they participate in socio-cultural and 
political debates, but also create a space where they can experiment with their new 
skills, new ideas, and new citizenship. The rise of spoof videos heralds the 
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beginning of a trend in popular culture in contemporary China towards the 
“canonization of the jester” and the dethroning of the establishment. 
 
I also argue that a historical perspective is needed to understand the current surge 
of use creativity and user activism in China, and that many forms of popular media 
we experience today have their antecedents in various stages of Chinese history. 
The entrenched “control-resistance” binary is inadequate in interpreting the rich, 
flux and multilayered Internet space in China. 
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Introduction: Internet, innovation and spoof 
videos 
 
 
Jesters are nothing if not creative, innovative, flexible, and 
challenging—these qualities are at the core of their being, and 
humour is often simply the wrapping they use to dress it up and 
make it acceptable.  
                             Beatrice Otto (2001, p. 269) 
 
China won the FIFA World Cup! Not the 2010 South Africa World Cup, but the 
2006 tournament in Germany. Well, it is not a fact, but a spoof, and one of the 
most viewed spoof videos ever2. According to the video, “China won the FIFA 
World Cup”, the national soccer team of China won the tournament with an 
extraordinary string of good luck and foul play. Spliced together with clips from 
Hollywood movies such as the Godfather, Forest Gump and Ghost, Stephen 
Chow’s spoof movies3 and Jack Chan’s Kongfu movies, and footage of CCTV 
programs, the video pokes fun at an easy target of ridicule in public life—the 
National Football Team, a constant theme of jokes because of its consistently 
poor and ungraceful performance, and negative media coverage, including pub 
                                                        
2 The video is available at http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/YMQ47RWrgpA/. As of 
September 7, 2008, the video had 5,404,840 viewings on Tudou.com. This was the number for a 
single copy of the video. The actual number should be much bigger, as the same video was 
uploaded by many users and there have been multiple duplicate copies online. Since July 2009 
the interface of Tudou.com has changed dramatically and historical data about viewing is 
virtually impossible to obtain.  
3 The influence of Stephen Chow’s movies on today’s spoof video is discussed in Chapter Two of 
this thesis.  
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orgies, drugs, and sexual scandals. On the sidelines it is spiced with in-jokes and 
social comments on such issues as corruption and rampant illegal sexual 
services. The video was made right after the World Cup in July 2006, a year 
when spoof videos made their debut into public life and began to take flight. It 
became an instant hit and attracted over one million viewings in less than a 
fortnight, and made it into national media(People.com.cn, 2006). Since then 
spoofing culture has moved slowly from the periphery to the centre of cultural 
life and has achieved a status of normality, with a bigger community of spoofers 
and Internet users. The rise of spoof videos, and the mainstreaming of spoofing 
culture, or what I call “the canonization of the jester”, is the subject matter of the 
thesis.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MAIN ARGUMENTS 
This study aims to study video spoofs, a locus of both amateur and professional 
creativity, and their creators—the spoofers, trying to understand the 
socio-cultural context of spoofing culture, the uses, production and diffusion of 
spoofs, and their implication for cultural renewal.  
 
Specifically, the thesis tries to answer the following questions. 
 What is the socio-cultural context behind the rise of spoof videos in 
China? 
 What are the uses of spoof videos; and what is their social and cultural 
impact? 
 How are spoof videos created and diffused?  
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 How does the rise of spoof video inform our understanding of cultural 
renewal? 
 
By acting as a participant observer in online video sharing sites and conducting 
face-to face as well as online interviews, I identify lead users and creators of 
spoof videos and the social networks emerging around them. I call these lead 
users “skill hubs” and their networks “liquid communities”, foregrounding the 
fact that their appeal doesn’t come from their amicable personality, but rather 
from their creative skills; and that the networks surrounding them are in a 
permanent flux, with members coming and going as they see fit. I argue that the 
“liquidness” (Bauman, 2000) of these communities is what makes them 
constantly creative and appealing. Textual analysis of online videos, their 
comments and derivative are conducted to tease out the uses that that can be 
made of spoof videos, as phatic communication, as alternative memory and as 
political engagement. Through these analyses I show that spoof videos are not 
only a space where young generations engage with each other, communicate 
their anger and dissatisfaction, fun and hope, a space where they participate in 
socio-cultural and political debates, it is also a space where they experiment 
their new skills, new ideas, and new citizenship. The rise of spoof videos heralds 
a trend in popular culture in contemporary China towards the “canonization of 
the jester” and the dethroning of the establishment. 
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KEY WORDS: INTERNET, SPOOF VIDEOS, AND INNOVATION 
This is a study of innovation in Internet-mediated nonofficial cultures, with 
empirical evidence from a special form of user-created content (UCC), 
networked spoof videos. Standing alone, Internet, spoof videos and innovation 
are all contested topics in China, and each of them merits a separate set of 
research. Given this, their combination into a single topic of study might seem 
not only strange and counterintuitive, but also ambitious, inviting scepticism 
and calling for an account of the genesis of the topic and an elaboration of its 
viability. In what follows I will briefly review of each of the three terms. In the 
process I will present the case of how and why their combination is not only 
possible, but also gains insights that each of them studied separately would not 
be able to yield. 
 
Internet  
My first computer was a joint venture with two of my roommates in my 
master’s program in Beijing. We bought all the parts from the famous 
Zhongguancun computer market after long hours of haggling. That was around 
the end of year 2002, when we were still not allowed to use any powerful 
electric equipment in our dorm in case it would set our old dorm house alight. 
After we assembled the computer by ourselves, as most students did in those 
years, and plugged it to the wall, the fuse was blown. We had to bribe the 
management of the house to have a strong fuse installed to accommodate the 
computer. With a dial-up modem we managed to have on-and-off Internet 
access and became members of the 59 million Internet users in China (CNNIC, 
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2003). Though connected, there was not much we could do online with the 
meagre bandwidth. Streaming media were off-limits and social network sites 
were still to emerge. What we usually did was to surf online for latest news. 
When there were important NBA basketball games during the weekends, we 
would refresh the page every few seconds to get box scores “live”. It was those 
tiny moments of fun that helped us tide over through the SARS outbreak in 
2003, when we were quarantined on campus for two and half months. 
 
A lot has changed since then. The Internet has been part of my work and I have 
had a few desktops and laptops rolled over. It has become a venue where more 
and more people are publishing, learning, playing, befriending and networking, 
having fun and airing grievances, participating and engaging in social and 
political affairs. As an important milestone in the development of the Internet in 
China, in June 2008 the number of Internet users in the country reached about 
253 million, putting it ahead of the United States as the world’s biggest Internet 
user (Barboza, 2008; CNNIC, 2008). And the momentum of growth has shown 
no sign of levelling off, adding another 232 million in the three years to reach 
485 million users by July 2011(CNNIC, 2011). A low penetration rate at 36.2%, 
coupled with solid economic performance, indicates strong potential for future 
growth (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Number of Internet Users in Mainland China. 
Source: CNNIC, 2011 
 
Internet in China as a contested topic 
With the exponential growth of Internet in China, there has been enhanced 
academic interest in China’s changing media landscape (C. Huang, 2007), and a 
growing literature on new media in China(see, for example, Damm & Thomas, 
2006; Hughes & Wacker, 2003; X. Zhang & Zheng, 2009). However, consensus 
has been rare as ever on what the Internet will actually bring to China. Central 
to the debate are the potential socio-political changes it might unleash and how 
state or society is impacted by the Internet (Zheng, 2008, pp. xiii, 8).The 
celebration of its democratic potential is often countered with pessimism and 
scepticism about it malleability as a tool of control (cf.Kalathil, 2002; Kalathil, 
2003; Kristof, 2005; Taubman, 1998; G. Yang, 2003, 2007).  
 
The optimistic side of the debate postulates that there is an inherent ethos 
about the Internet that can be corrosive to non-democracies, and by 
empowering society the Internet will tip the balance of power between the state 
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and society. Geoffrey Taubman (1998) argues that the scope and ease of 
obtaining information on the Web, as well as the communication capabilities 
available to users, provide the means for undermining the incumbent regime in 
China and the decentralized nature of the Internet will make state control of 
media harder and less effective. Guobin Yang’s research finds that the Internet 
has empowered civic organizations in China, by offering new possibilities for 
citizen participation, fostering public debate, and by providing them with a tool 
to share information and network with peer and international organizations (G. 
Yang, 2003, 2007) . Nicholas Kristof (2005) goes as far as to predict that the 
Chinese leadership itself is digging the Communist Party's grave, by giving the 
Chinese people broadband. 
 
Countering this argument, Price points out that “technologies widely thought to 
be inherently democratic are often programmed, designed, built (whether 
successful or not) to maintain lines of strong authority” (Price, 2002, p. 15). 
Following this thread Kalathil (2003)proposes that authoritarian states can 
deploy with a variety of reactive measures to make the Internet politically 
reliable: restricting Internet access, filtering content, and monitoring on-line 
behaviour. Many researchers have provided annotations for these claims, 
focusing on information filtering, media control and censorship regimes 
(Lacharite, 2002; Pan, 2006; J. Zittrain, 2004; J. Zittrain & Edelman, 2003). For 
example, Zittrain and Edelman (2003) provide an empirical analysis of 
information control, showing the blocking pattern of websites can be very 
effective. Zittrain(2004) also explores how is it possible for users to circumvent 
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Internet filtering4. Following new ways of information control in China, 
researchers have exposed ways by which the Party organs try to fill chat rooms 
and Internet forums with postings by Web Commentators they hire to 
neutralize ‘risky’ sentiments (Bandurski, 2008). A more balanced argument is 
provided by Randolph Kluver (2005), who posits that while Internet has 
developed in a way that has enabled China’s government to meet its goals of 
supervision, control and censorship, and while economic leverage can be 
adopted to pressurize Internet businesses into self-censorship, nevertheless the 
advent of information technology is making China’s political system more 
transparent and accountable, and its society more open, even though the 
country is still far from “democratic” as the term usually connotes. 
 
These competing arguments on the affordances of the Internet in China have 
enriched our understanding of the battle-ridden relation between the state and 
society. However, the limitations of these debates are obvious, for three reasons. 
First, they are largely based on “a static image of China” (Keane, 2007, p. 154), 
while both the Internet and China are ever-changing and in a constant state of 
reinvention; Second, Internet in China and its emergent cultures are not 
approached on their terms but on our own. Third, there is an overemphasis on 
top-down control to the neglect of bottom-up convergence and agency, as 
Lokman Tsui (2005) argues, 
 
                                                        
4 For more information about Internet access in China, visit the website of OpenNet Initiative, 
which monitors internet in China on an on-going basis, http://opennet.net/country/china. 
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The short-term nature of reporting individual events leads to a neglect in 
observing whether there is a long-term durable progressive trend... Apart 
from developments in censorship, regulation, and control, other issues are 
left unexamined, e.g. issues which pertain to how the Internet is really 
changing our way of life. 
 
His concern about the dearth of research in the uses of Internet as lived 
experience echoed by Donna Chu (2009), who notes a lack of “concrete details 
and contextualized understandings of how new media are actually used on an 
everyday basis”.  
 
Internet research in China has also fallen short of affording us a nuanced 
understanding, for different reasons. First, Internet doesn’t get as much 
attention in China as the west. According to a review of new media research 
published in Chinese-language scholarly journals from 2000 to 2007 by Ran Wei 
(2009), the new media research agenda in China is dominated by mobile 
telephony rather than the Internet. This is understandable considering the size 
of mobile phone usage in China, which by July 2009 reached 703 million 
(People's Daily Online, 2009). Second, Chinese scholars seem to be interested in 
different issues when it comes to Internet research. The same review shows that 
the focus of Internet research, as in research of new media as a whole, is on 
technological issues rather than political affordances. In the second place are 
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economic and marketing implications and applications5. Cultural issues received 
the least attention. There is no lack of “concrete details” in these research 
outputs. Rather, they are mostly descriptive and full of detail. However, the 
failure to go beyond description and put these details into theoretical 
perspectives, coupled with the lack of “methodological rigour”, has hampered 
the ability of these researches to afford a “contextualized understandings” of 
Internet use in China. As Wei (2009) observes, “As a result, few insights are 
available to shed light on the process of how millions of Chinese adopt, 
consume, apply, and re-invent new media technologies, on the social, political, 
and economic implications of the widespread of new media technologies…”. 
 
Beyond the academic community, attitudes towards the Internet have been 
marked with ambivalence. While recognizing the role of Internet as a boost to 
the economy, political leaders, intellectuals and the mainstream media are 
concerned about the “information pollution” of the Internet. They worry that it 
may entail threats to Chinese traditional culture, youth, and existing value 
orientations (Lagerkvist, 2008). Internet regulators, for many years, have been 
trying to fulfil the seemingly impossible dual task of fostering information 
industries development and controlling, managing and minimizing political 
risks coming with it (Zheng, 2008, pp. 49-69). 
 
                                                        
5 One possible reason for the focus on the technological and economic rather than the social and 
political is the one-party system in China, where political correctness is of top priority in 
academic research. Projects that run against the official discourse find it hard, if possible, to get 
funded and published. 
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Internet and creativity 
Few people today would dispute that Internet fosters, enables and affords a 
venue for user creativity. Reviewing the creative potential of the Internet, 
Kenneth Cukier (2007) observed, “Once the platform existed for 
interconnections among people to take place, new creativity flourished. People 
were not simply accessing information -- they were creating it.” Using digital 
story-telling as a case study, Jean Burgess (2006) shows how creative practices 
in everyday life, which she call “vernacular creativity”, are made more visible 
and ordinary voices are heard through the increased availability and digital 
technologies and the Internet. Bardzell (2007) explores creativity in amateur 
multimedia and discusses the ways in which amateurs make use the Internet to 
disseminate their creative work and practices, through remixing, parodying, 
commenting and tutoring. In response to emergent bottom-up creativity, John 
Hartley (2009) proposes a “revisiting” of the approach towards creativity that 
“favours ‘culture’ and the arts over ‘mass’ media forms, and ‘critique’ over 
‘productivity,’” considering that we are now in a cultural environment where 
innovation arises “out of consumer co-created content or user-led innovation, 
and not just from the corporate lab”(pp. 16-17). 
 
The Internet has also facilitated the fast expansion of user creation in China, 
where according to an OECD (2007) report, “UCC has started to play an 
important role in China. Online video provides users with an outlet to express 
their creativity”, and “[a] popular style of video in China involves spoofs, or 
parody-style remixes of other videos”. 
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By providing a platform for information distribution, facilitating exchange of 
goods and services, sharing and contesting ideas, the Internet not only liberates 
and democratizes, it also enriches, entertains, pluralises and educates. This 
research attempts to provide an alternative to the “top-down” approach to 
studies of Internet in China. Rather than adding new annotations to the 
well-trodden line of research based on the “democratic versus control” binary, 
my research focuses on: bottom-up emergence on the Internet of China; on 
“how the Internet is really changing our way of life”; on the Internet as it is used 
by the people rather than the Party or Government, as emergent subcultures 
and social network; and on the Internet as a creative platform rather than 
power wrangling site. In so doing I hope to shed some light on the values and 
trends that are shaping the future of the Internet in China. 
 
Innovation 
The ambivalence of creativity and innovation 
In the Chinese classic Book of Odes (shijing) there is a chapter dedicated to the 
growth of the Zhou settlement at Mountain Qi (Qishan), the ode goes like this: 
Heaven made the lofty hill,  
And king Da brought [the country about] it under cultivation. 
He made the commencement with it,  
And king Wen tranquilly [carried on the work],  
[Till] that rugged [mount] Qi,  
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Had level roads leading to it. 
May their descendants ever preserve it!  
             (Tianzuo,Book of Odes,etextcenter@virginia.edu, 1998) 
 
There have been many interpretations of the poem; one that is relevant to my 
study is given by Michael Puett (2001): the creative action of kings Dai and Wen 
is put into a continuous line starting with Heaven, thus continuity is valued over 
creativity. In ancient philosophy, kings and sages don’t create anew: they simply 
follow the patterns of the past (pp. 30-35). This preference for continuity and 
the reluctance to be identified as a creator is more obvious in the Analects of 
Confucius, as we can see from a statement of the Master: “A transmitter and not 
a maker, believing in and loving the ancients, I venture to compare myself with 
our old P'ang” (Confucius, 2010).  
 
The ambiguity and ambivalence shown by ancient philosophers has featured the 
discussion of innovation and creativity in traditional China (Puett, 2001). On the 
one hand, there was a permanent need to respect and uphold ritualized patterns 
and existing practices as incarnated by ancient sages to ensure social and 
political order. On the other hand, there was a relentless itch to create, to break 
new ground and bring new possibilities. As Erik Baark (2007: p. 348) rightly put 
it, “The tension between the innovator as a villain, transgressing or breaking up 
existing practices, and the innovator as a hero, bringing in a new era of practical 
order, has been a leading theme in Chinese historiography”. This ambiguity is 
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still shaping the conception of and approach towards knowledge and 
innovation.  
 
“Knowledge is power” 
Most Chinese would remember a famous quote of Francis Bacon from Religious 
Meditations, Of Heresies. The quote, “Knowledge is power” (zhishi jiushi liliang), 
usually calls back beautiful or bitter memories, reminding them of their school 
days or revolutionary years. People recited it as students, workers and farmers, 
mostly without realizing what it entails. However, the hidden message in the 
quote---power generates knowledge---often eludes us. This message might be 
more helpful in understanding innovation in the Chinese context. 
 
Apart from ambivalence towards creativity and innovation, the historical 
legacies of traditional knowledge accumulation, as identified by Baark (2007, p. 
354), also include a “close symbiosis of knowledge and power”. His finding 
echoes what Michel Foucault noted on the knowledge-power relationship, “The 
exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge 
constantly induces effects of power” (Foucault & Gordon, 1980, p. 52). Baark 
(2007) compared the application of knowledge between ancient Greece and 
ancient China. While ancient Greek philosophers sought knowledge for “fame 
and livelihood as teachers”, their Chinese peers pursued knowledge to find their 
way into the imperial court. The pursuit of knowledge as a means to power has 
great implications for creativity and innovation in China: an over-emphasis on 
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the utility of knowledge and the stifling of disruptive innovation. As Baark 
(2007) warns, 
In contemporary institutions of knowledge generation and research, this 
legacy may lead to an exaggerated focus on nationalist priorities in R&D, 
or in the repression of knowledge that does not accord with the views of 
the powerful (Baark, 2007, p. 354). 
 
Economic logic and technology dominance 
All China’s great socialist theorists have talked about innovation. All have been 
keen to get rid of the old and replace it with the new to meet their political 
needs (Keane, 2004). Mao got rid of the nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) 
government and was revered for creating the PRC. Deng Xiaoping got rid of the 
shackles to the “socialist economy” and was respected as the “chief architect” of 
China’s reforms (Geertz, 1975). Zhao Ziyang tried to introduce political reform 
but ended up as a “prisoner of the state” (Z. Zhao, Bao, Chiang, Ignatius, & 
MacFarquhar, 2009). Since then, China’s innovation has been largely driven by 
economic logic.  
 
Since China’s accession into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the ambition 
to sustain economic growth and develop a knowledge-based economy has led it 
to question its own growth pattern. The result of this soul-searching is renewed 
warmth towards creativity and innovation. A new enthusiasm in knowledge 
creation and diffusion is easily noticeable in policy debates in China. Innovation 
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has become a catchphrase and creativity and innovation has been elevated to an 
unprecedented height in official discourses. Former President Jiang Zemin is a 
champion of innovation, who advocated “three innovations”, namely new ways 
of thinking, new ways of doing things, and new mechanisms and institutions, 
and whose famous motto, “Innovation is the soul of a nation’s progress” is seen 
on billboards in Chinese city centres (Keane, 2004; Lam, 2002). At a national 
conference on science and technology in January 2006, President Hu Jintao 
proclaimed that innovation is the core of the nation's competitiveness and 
outlined major strategic tasks for building an innovation-oriented country, 
envisioning that China will embark on a new path of innovation “with Chinese 
characteristics” (Xinhua News Agency, 2006).  
 
What emerges in the review of these political statements is an equating of 
innovation with scientific and technological advances. Both Jiang and Hu’s 
attitudes towards innovation are that it is a technological development with 
“independent innovation” (zizhu chuangxin) (Xinhua News Agency, 2002, 2006).  
In a Science article that highlights the importance of science and technology in 
economic and social development, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao regards the 
history of modernization as essentially a history of science and technology, 
which “brought about new civilizations, modern industries, and the rise and fall 
of nations” (Wen, 2008). A rare exception to the technological focus is Hu’s 
report at the seventeenth Party Congress in 2007, when he called attention to 
the role of humanities and social sciences in “socialist cultural development”. In 
Hu’s talk, culture is foregrounded as part of China’s soft power, hence cultural 
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creativity and innovation are to be nurtured and encouraged. An initiative 
identified to this end is to “speed up development of cultural industry bases and 
clusters of cultural industries” (Hu, 2007).  
 
Of course, the zeal of government towards technology and business to the 
neglect of other areas of equal importance is not a problem confined to China. A 
report by the Young Foundation, a research and advocacy centre in Britain, 
laments the lack of attention to social innovation. As the report states, “Not one 
country has a serious strategy for social innovation that is remotely comparable 
to the strategies for innovation in business and technology” (cited in Diego, 
2006). 
 
The technology dominance in the innovation discourse is to be expected if we 
put it in the historical context of nation-state building in Modern China. It is 
deep-rooted in the mindset of Chinese elites. A century ago during the New 
Culture Movement, the elites believed the combination of “Mr. Science” (sai 
xiansheng) and “Mr Democracy” (de xiansheng), which represented rationality, 
modernity, could lift China out of the direness of internal collapse and external 
imperialism.6 In contrast to the misfortune of “Mr Democracy”, since then “Mr 
Science” has found himself fused into the backbone of communist party 
ideology, such as the so-called “scientific socialism”(kexue shehui zhuyi) (Zheng, 
2008, pp. 1-2, 17-18). A similar term, championed by Hu Jintao, is called 
                                                        
6 For a brief introduction about the New Culture Movement, see p.205 in Zheng Yongnian 
(2008). Technological empowerment: The Internet, state, and society in China. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press. 
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“scientific development” (kexue fazhan). It is to be found in tandem with 
“harmonious society” (hexie shehui) in most official occasions in current China. 
The decline of “Mr Democracy” and the rise of “Mr Science” showcase the 
socio-political shaping of innovation in China and point to the importance of 
innovation as a site where the mutual generation and reinforcement of 
knowledge and power can be illuminated and teased out. 
 
The technology dominance and economic focus in innovation is largely reflected 
in academic research on innovation in China. In research by Hu and Mathews 
(2008) on China’s national innovation capacity, patenting activity is used as a 
proxy to measure innovation performance. In an empirical research on regional 
innovation disparity, R&D, industry-specific innovation environment and 
government support are identified as determinants of innovation efficiency (Li, 
2009). Other research on innovation in China that shares the technological and 
business focus covers topics such as: progress in technological innovation (Zhou 
& Leydesdorff, 2006); innovative cities (Chen & Karwan, 2008); progress and 
challenges of innovation (Cao, Simon, & Suttmeier, 2009; Dodgson & Xue, 2009). 
 
Another body of literature on creativity and innovation in China can be roughly 
grouped under the umbrella of “creative industries” (Hartley, 2005; Hartley & 
Keane, 2006). This research adopts a socio-cultural approach to explore, among 
other topics, the relevance, validity and viability of the creative industries 
discourse in China (Hartley & Montgomery, 2009a; Keane, 2003; O'Connor & Gu, 
2006; Wang, 2004), the uptake of creative industries and their transformative 
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potential (Hartley & Montgomery, 2009b; Keane, 2006, 2009b), creative clusters 
and sectors (Hui, 2006; Keane, 2009a, 2009c) and copyrights (Montgomery, 
2009; Montgomery & Fitzgerald, 2006). 
 
The creative industries approach to innovation adds a balancing weight to the 
equation that is research on innovation in China. However, the gap remains. A 
number of questions arise in the review of these literatures. What is the place 
for everyday, vernacular creativity, for innovations arising not from corporate 
or university labs, but out of garages, backyards and bedrooms of consumers? 
How little innovations start？Who is involved? How do they grow, evolve, 
expand, and travel? If creativity and innovation is expressed through or 
imbedded user-created content, rather than forms of high culture or patents and 
publications, can it still contribute to the overall innovation system? If so, how 
can these forms of creativity feed China’s drive towards creativity and 
innovation? These questions are rarely asked, let alone answered.  
 
Spoof videos 
Spoof videos in my study are where Internet meets innovation. They are an 
instance of a dynamic and creative cultural system, through which ideas about 
unofficial cultures, internet and innovation in China will be analysed, tested, and 
answers to some of the questions above identified and new hypothesis formulated. 
As is noted at the beginning, the study is about internet-mediated unofficial 
cultures and innovation, so spoof videos have dualistic identities. They are both 
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cultural forms and creative systems and will be treated as such in the chapters that 
follow. 
 
I started my PhD journey in 2007. At the time I was fascinated by the drastic 
changes that the Internet was bringing about in China and the vibrancy of online 
communities. I was also intrigued by the popularity of the talk of innovation in 
China, and not wanting to take for granted the official talk that fed us I decided that 
I should do some research on innovation that is outside the expert system and out 
of sight the government. A logical move towards a subject of study was to combine 
the two interests into a single topic. This led me to the user-created content. For a 
PhD topic, however, it is still too broad to be viable and interesting. I was faced with 
blogs, Blackboard Bulletin System (BBS), Internet chat rooms, anime and games, 
and was stuck there at a loss about what to do next. Then I received an email link 
from my supervisor, Professor John Hartley, and that link was to lead me to my 
research topic.  
 
It was about YouTube clip called Chinese Propaganda Video7 by Hugh Atkins, then a 
law student at Sydney University. The clip features some footage of China Central 
Television Station on the China-Vietnam war in 1979, images of the Cultural 
Revolution and Kevin Rudd’s television footage. It mimics Maoist political 
advertising, likening the "mighty Rudd" to Chairman Mao and spoofing the Liberal 
Party's campaign tricks. The subtitles are in spoof Chinese broken English and have 
nothing to do with the Mandarin voiceover, which is an excerpt from news reports 
on the China-Vietnam war by Chinese media. The subtitles read: "Top most 
                                                        
7 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ptccZze7VxQ 
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politician Rudd seeks votes from eager and impressionable vote holders ... He 
unnerve [sic] decrepit Howard by deploying clever principle of 'similar difference'". 
I fell in love with the video immediately. The clip was to become a huge success and 
would get Atkins a job at the Australia Broadcasting Corporation. Similar videos 
commenting on the election were uploaded following Chinese Propaganda Video 
and helped to make Internet an important force to be reckoned with in the 2007 
federal election in Australia (Flew, 2008; Wilson, 2008).   
 
That was the beginning of my attention to spoof videos. In the past two and half 
years I have witnessed the many cases of spoofs migrating into the mainstream 
media and impacting on the agenda of public life. In the United States, mock ads 
(such as Paris Hilton Responds to McCain Ad), spoof videos (such as Obama and 
McCain - Dance Off!)8 , and parody television shows, such as Saturday Night Live 
and Comedy Central have served to amuse, challenge, educate, and helped to 
develop “a healthy scepticism” toward campaign narratives during the 
presidential election (Tryon, 2008). In China, since entering public life in early 
January 2006, spoofs have been a contentious topic. They entertain and amuse, 
ridicule and interrogate, tear holes and poke fun, advocate as well as subvert; 
they have been extolled as grassroots creativity and condemned as vulgar 
claptrap (Huang, 2006).  
 
In the United States, where parody television programming can be traced back 
as early as 1950s (Gray, Jones, & Thompson, 2009, p. 20; Marc, 2009), much 
                                                        
8 See Paris Hilton Responds to McCain Ad at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ySc12uzoxqU, 
and Obama and McCain - Dance Off! at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzyT9-9lUyE.  
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research has been done (Baym, 2005, 2007; Druick, 2009; Gray, 2005, 2006; 
Gray, Jones, et al., 2009; Jones, 2009; Jones, 2005). In China, spoofs are off-limits 
on television, which is a still a media format that is tightly controlled by the 
state as the “mouth and throat” (houshe) of the Party. They are more of an 
Internet-mediated cultural form. Bahktin’s assertion, that laughter was the 
“least scrutinized sphere of people’s creation” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 4), remains 
true today. Serious and systematic research on spoofs is a rarity in China and 
the current study is a timely and much needed attempt towards this direction.  
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
There are five chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion. As is laid 
out in Chapter Two, the conceptual structure of the project is a micro-macro 
nexus. The thesis starts with the macro in chapter one with a review of the 
historical and socio-cultural processes that underlie the rise of user-created 
content and spoof videos. The purpose of the chapter is to set the context for 
further inquiries in later chapters.  
 
Chapter two discusses the tradition of subversive writing in contemporary 
China and outlines the methodology to study spoof videos today. Chapter three 
identifies the uses of spoofs videos, as phatic communication, alternative 
memory and playful citizenship, and discusses the implications of each use. 
Chapter four comes to the micro and examines the creation of spoof videos, with 
focus on users and user communities, and how their engagement with each 
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other has nurtured the current spoof culture. The chapter reviews literature on 
online communities and creative culture and proposes the term “liquid 
community” to account for the user networks in the Internet in China.  
 
Chapter five comes to the site where the spoofs and spoof culture are housed, 
video-sharing platforms in China. The chapter focuses on Tudou.com, tracing its 
growth in to a major site in China, charting its evolving trajectory from a 
“community” website to a media company, analyzing its role as both an enabler 
and constraint of the spoofing culture, and in so doing showcasing the “dual 
economy of freedom and constraint” (Foucault, cited in Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 
227) that is the general atmosphere of internet culture in China. 
 
The conclusion returns to the macro and discusses implication of the rise of 
spoof videos for cultural renewal. The migration of spoofs from the fringe to the 
center is conceptualized, to borrow from Viktor Shklovsky (Hawkes, 2003, p. 
72), as the canonization of the jester. How this migration will pan out is yet to be 
seen.  
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Chapter One: The Turn to the self: A brief review 
of popular culture and user-created content in 
China                                                                                       
 
 
 
I am, the self cries out, and then, taking a nice long look, it adds, 
and I am beautiful.  
                               Philip Roth (1975, p. 132) 
 
 
In early January 2006, spoof videos made their debut into public life in China. 
The occasion was the uploading of a video clip The Murder Caused by a Steamed 
Bun, satirizing eminent director Chen Kaige’s flop movie The Promise (Wu Ji). 
The Murder Caused by a Steamed Bun became an immediate hit and its creator, a 
computer music and video geek called Hu Ge,9 rose to become an instant 
celebrity on the Chinese Web. A multitude of spoofs covering a wide range of 
topics soon followed. 2006 was called by many the “Year of Spoofs”.10 
 
This was not the first time in Chinese history that a year was accorded 
humorous acclaim. The year 1933 was also declared the Year of Humour 
(youmo nian). Triggered by the launch of the humour magazine The Analects 
Fortnightly (Lunyu banyue kan) in 1932, a “contagion of laughter” spread across 
                                                        
9 A detailed analysis about Hu Ge is conducted in Chapter 2. 
10 See, for example, a year-end review of spoofs by 21.cn, ‘‘2006: ‘the year of spoofs in China’ 
when one hundred flowers bloom together’’. Available at: 
http://news.21cn.com/zhuanti/2006/pandian/egao/#. 
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China. According to one report, “suddenly, in China’s silent literary scene 
humour is all the rage; here’s humour, there’s humour – every which way you 
turn there’s humour!” (Zheng Boqi, as cited in Sohigian, 2007, p. 138). This 
humorous tide didn’t subside until 1937, when the anti-Japanese war broke out 
(Sohigian, 2007, p. 137). A more sombre mood prevailed. 
 
In future the Chen Kaige incident may be viewed as a significant moment in 
Chinese popular culture, one in which user-generated content came of age. 
However there are some notable precedents. This chapter turns to history for 
insights on the rise of user-created content. Looking back at the “oldness” of 
new cultures and linking what is old and what is new, the chapter provides a 
context for analysis in the ensuing chapters. In the process it provides an insight 
into the performative nature of creativity and the recombinant nature of 
innovation: i.e. novel outcomes are socially shaped by what already exists and 
what has happened before (Dutton, Carusi, & Peltu, 2006). The chapter begins 
with a review of popular culture and pleasure in pre-modern China; following 
this it looks at the political turn in popular culture; the next sections provide a 
deeper examination of dazibao and unofficial journals; finally, the chapter 
examines with examples the return of the self in popular culture and 
user-created content in the Internet era. The chapter concludes with a summary 
of the continuity and change in popular culture and UCC in China.   
 
The truncated review of the history of popular culture in this chapter aims to 
tease out the context of the social, political and economic metamorphosis that 
China has undergone in the past century and foregrounds the dynamics of 
26 
 
political, economic and technological forces transforming the “domain of the 
popular”. In the process I will not attempt to locate for the popular an 
autonomous space on which to focus my attention, as autonomy of either the 
state or the society is an illusion (Litzinger, 2001). Instead my analysis will  
concentrate on “the performance of the self” (Hartley, 2009, p. 76), or the lack of 
it, in popular culture and user-created content and chart the contours of the 
struggle for self-expression and representation in China. According to D. W. 
Winnicott, “it is only in being creative that the individual discovers the self” 
(1971, p. 54), so the performance of the self in this chapter is teased out through 
the discovery of the self through creative practises in popular culture. The 
emphasis will be largely on the post-1949 era. However, a brief review of the 
pre-Communist China is included here, the reason being that cultural genes and 
continuities run deeper than ideological divides, and as David Goodman (2001, 
p. 247) suggests, we should not over-state the influence that Mao and the 
party-state have exerted on popular culture.  
 
Since the early 20th century, popular culture in China has travelled a long and 
perilous journey. Traditionally a vehicle for the pleasures and desires of the 
unlearned, and a space of resistance for the common people against the didactic 
Confucian hegemony and canonical hierarchy, popular culture was first 
appropriated by the elite as a tool to “enlighten” the ordinary, mobilized to fight 
ideological wars against imperialism and feudalism, later manipulated by the 
Nationalists (Kuomingtang, or KMT) and the Communists against each other. In 
the post-1949 era, popular culture was for a long time an instrument for power 
struggles and infighting between different fractions of the Party. The “demotic 
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turn” (Turner, 2006) and the return to “the self” in popular culture in China 
came with the advent of affordable Internet access, which has accompanied the 
marketization of China’s economy and the transformation of its social landscape 
and public life.  
 
POPULAR CULTURE AND PLEASURE IN PRE-MODERN CHINA 
The ‘break out’ of humour referred to above unfolded at a time when much of 
China, particularly the big coastal cities, was dominated by Western powers and 
by Japan. Many called for a “unified, combative culture of national resistance” 
(Sohigian, 2007, p. 140). The communists were already advocating 
revolutionary, nationalistic and proletariat literature: popular culture was not 
dispensed with but enfolded into the new cultural policy rigorously devised at 
the base camps by leading intellectuals such as Qu Qiubai and Guo Muoruo. 
There was not much latitude for humour here. Likewise, the nationalist 
government under Chiang Kai-shek meted out punishment, including 
censorship, closure and bans, towards media daring to tell the truth. Caught 
between the external military power (Western occupation) and domestic 
semiotic hegemony (the discourse of national resistance), the fate of humourists 
like Lin Yutang, whose response towards the unbearable oppression was 
“frolicsome, comic caricature that stripped the frightening images of terror”, 
was to be expected. Humour was dismissed as a “frivolous anomaly”, the 
decadent pursuit of the leisure class and another sign of Shanghai’s hedonism, 
along with “Betty Boop cartoons, the foxtrot, blaring saxophones, and taxi 
dancers”. Lin Yutang, the champion of this humourism (youmo zhuyi), was 
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labelled an escapist and coward evading harsh realities (Sohigian, 2007, pp. 
139,148,152,157). However, it was censorship and semiotic hegemony in the 
1930s that had altered his speech. Turning into a humourist was just one of the 
“benefits of censorship”. As he said in his autobiography in 1936: 
My way of writing on current events was to say just enough to intimate my 
opinions and those of others so as to not just impress readers with 
hollowness and Confucian bombast, but at the same time say something 
with concealed and implied meaning, and thus manage to avoid a prison 
cell . . . In this strange and fascinating climate I became what people call a 
humorist or satirist. Probably it is as people say: when life is too miserable 
one cannot but be comical; otherwise one will die of sadness . . . In all this 
glib flippancy and piquant loquacity there are both tears and smiles. 
                           (Lin Yutang, as cited in Sohigian, 2007, p. 152) 
 
As I will show in this chapter, the “strange and fascinating” climate that Lin 
Yutang described about 1930s China, where culture, both official and popular, 
was mobilized as an instrument of national resistance and where there was no 
place for self-revelation and inconvenient truth, was a legacy of the early 1900s. 
As Li Hsiao-t'i observes, the extent to which popular culture was politicized 
from the 1930s onwards is “unusual even when measured against China’s own 
experiences in the past” (2001b, p. 31). In imperial China, popular culture 
provided for the unlearned and commoners a convivial space for desires, 
pleasures, where hierarchies were inverted, the self celebrated, social status 
transgressed, and routines and traditions cast away.  
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A well-documented form of popular culture in the late imperial period is called 
Shehuo, a communal festive occasion organized by and around local 
communities. It included a host of performances: walking on stilts, dragon and 
lion dances, bamboo horse, as well as comic skits with narrative content. The 
most important Shehuo occasion was the parade of gods during the Chinese 
New Year, when statues of gods from local temples were marched throughout 
local communities and ritual dramas were performed by musicians, actors, 
entertainers, and villagers and urban residents themselves in local temples, 
pleasure sites and marketplaces (Jeff, 2005; McLaren, 1998, p. 91)11.  
 
It was carnival of a kind similar to those in medieval Europe observed by 
Bakhtin (1984). Chen Chun (1153-1217), a Neo-Confucian scholar in the Song 
Dynasty (960-1279), disapprovingly recorded a god parade that happened in 
the wealthy Yangtze River Delta, during which fun makers were dressed in 
imperial finery, an offense otherwise punishable by death. He wrote: 
They [presume to] use yellow parasols, ride in carriages with the dragon 
symbol and sit on a throne with the backdrop embroidered with imperial 
insignia of rank, thus masquerading as the imperial retinue. (as cited in 
McLaren, 1998, p. 91)        
       
It was a carnival belonging to the people not the state, an occasion where all 
social customs and taboos were temporarily tossed aside, for fun and pleasure, 
                                                        
11 “She", originally means the God of Earth, and "Huo", literally means fire which ancient people 
believed to have the magic power of driving away the evil spirit. Shehuo is a spontaneous 
traditional festive occasion for songs and dances prevailing mainly in the countryside of North 
China. With a long history, these festive affairs are rooted from the primitive sacrificial activities 
in which ancient people prayed for harvest and affluence with their songs and dances. For more 
information, visit: http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_focus/2005-01/20/content_65198.htm 
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for “the performance of the self”. Old and young, masters and servants, all took 
part in it on an equal basis, masquerading as gods, immortals, ghosts, Buddhist 
arhats, monks, healers, soldiers, local and national heroes. “[M]en and Women 
mingle together, given rein to their lusts and becoming intoxicated with wine” 
(Chen Chun, cited in McLaren, 1998, p. 91). Shehuo continued through the 
pre-modern China and are still to be found in Northern China today. 
 
Another example of unofficial culture for the unlearned and commoners is 
found in print texts of chantefables of Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) discovered in 
Jiading County outside Shanghai in 1967. According to Anne McLaren (1998), 
the Ming period was the time when printed books expanded beyond Confucian 
and moral cannons to vernacular fictions modelled on oral and dramatic genres, 
including ballads and storytelling. The tales of romance and supernatural 
retribution in those fictions were a breath of fresh air from the boredom of 
didactic classics, shaped a new “performance culture in print” catering to the 
taste of the emergent reading community: the less learned, including women 
(pp. 1-2). Chantefables were a dominant genre of popular readings. Some of 
them were reworked elite texts, others based on prosimetric narratives whose 
tradition can be traced back to Buddhist storytelling dating from the first 
century A.D. (pp. 78-79). While there are repackaged Confucian moral stories in 
these texts, with the main audience being women, an important stock material 
in printed Ming chantefables deals with “the longing of women to leave their 
chambers and attend festivals and the difficulties of travelling with bound feet” 
(p. 99). Ming Chantefables also contain textual representations of communal 
festivals featuring role play and inversion with amateur participants. They could 
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even incorporate current events in their repertoire, as is shown by the “House 
of Romance” featuring the powerful evil eunuch of the day, Wei Zhongxiang, 
thus serve as sharp political satire. Chantefables were so popular with Ming 
people that there were used as burial gifts to entertain the deceased in the 
afterlife (p. 15).  
 
It is commonly held that the liberal, “decadent” culture underwent radical 
changes and there was revival of moral conservatism with the establishment of 
the Qing (1616-1911). However, Li Hsiao T’i argues that beyond the rigid moral 
discourse in the mainstream there was a rich and diverse “desire discourse” 
concealed in hundreds of popular songs in eighteenth century China, and there 
were carnivals in the popular domain beyond “civil” society (H.-t. i. Li, 2001a). 
Popular culture remained largely in the hands of the commoners until the late 
imperial period. 
 
THE POLITICAL TURN OF POPULAR CULTURE 
The political turn in popular culture started with the “enlightenment movement” 
at the turn of the twentieth century, usually referred to as the New Culture 
Period. The centre of activity was in the Treaty Ports of Shanghai, Tianjin etc12. 
“Political” here doesn’t imply politics as embedded in everyday practice (de 
Certeau, 1984), rather it entails organized activism and advocacy. Taking the 
period around 1900s as the beginning of the politicization of popular culture, I 
                                                        
12 Treaty ports refer to any of the ports that Asian countries, especially China and Japan, opened 
to foreign trade and residence beginning in the mid-19th century because of pressure from 
powers such as Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and, in the case of China, Japan and 
Russia. For further information about treaty ports visit 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/603897/treaty-port 
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don’t intent to ignore the political content in popular media forms or to rule out 
political tampering manipulation or appropriation of popular culture before 
that period. As is written above, some Ming Chantefables were used for political 
comment. Imperial rulers had never stopped trying to “change prevailing habits 
and customs” (yifeng yisu). I am also aware of the entertainment-oriented, 
commercial, and sometimes spontaneously educational forms of popular culture 
that run parallel to the enlightenment-oriented, ideologically-loaded cultural 
content. What makes the last decade of the imperial period stand out is the scale 
of the enlightenment movement and the extent to which popular culture was 
influenced by the political environment of the day.  
 
Fighting at once feudalism and colonialism at the turn of the century, 
reform-minded elites in search of modernity decided that the only way out for 
China was to enlist the support of the ordinary people. To turn people into 
partners, the first step would be to enlighten them, or in Yan Fu’s words, to 
“develop people’s intelligence” (kai minzhi)” (Yan Fu, cited in H.-t. i. Li, 2001b, p. 
33). And a point of entry to this end is to tamper with their culture. Drawing 
aspiration from traditional wisdom, education is to be done best through 
entertainment (yu jiao yu le), thus operas and local tunes were considered the 
most efficient tool to enlighten and mobilize the unlearned masses. In a paper 
published in 1904, Chen Duxiu,13 a leading cultural intellectual and later a 
staunch advocate of the New Culture Movement and co-founder of the Chinese 
                                                        
13 Chen was co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and a major leader in 
developing the cultural basis of revolution in China. He was removed from his position of 
leadership in 1927 and expelled from the Party in 1929. For more about Chen Duxiu, see 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/109115/Chen-Duxiu 
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Communist Party, lifted the status of opera to an unprecedented height, 
“Theatre is a great school for the masses, while the performer is a great teacher 
of the masses”(cited in H.-t. i. Li, 2001b, p. 35). The weight he attached to the 
educational function of popular culture was to be heeded by later generations of 
Communist leaders, most notably the role of Revolutionary Model Operas in the 
Cultural Revolution, another case for the importance of attention to continuity 
in the study of “new” cultural forms.  
 
A success story of this enlightenment movement is provided by Li Danke 
(2004) . In her study of the role of popular culture in the rights recovery 
movement in Sichuan, she analyses how new primers were published to 
promote literacy about science, geography and teachings on the intrusions of 
imperialist powers in to India, Africa and China, and how these new primers, 
together with local folk stories and folks song, created a lively and diverse 
“cultural milieu” that nurtured and gave expressions to anti-imperialist and 
nationalist sentiments, influencing political action in Sichuan. In these stories 
and songs, foreigners were portrayed as people eaters, baby killers, stealers and 
looters, while Qing officials as corrupt and incompetent losers. One local song 
sings: 
A roc soars to great heights, 
right into the nine layers of clouds. 
When it dived into a lotus pond for a bath, 
a feather dropped off to the earth. 
Picked up by a foreign merchant, 
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[Who] painted [it] with colours and sent it to the Qing court. 
It became a priceless tribute, 
Thus a piece of feather was displayed in the shrine of the imperial court. 
(cited in Danke Li, 2004, p. 394) 
 
To regard the sentiments expressed in these local stories and songs merely as 
repackaged values of local elites would be to oversimplify the dynamic workings 
of popular culture and shortchange the agency of local people. The role of 
enlightenment movement in the making of nationalist sentiments should not be 
underestimated.    
 
Popular culture was meant to fight evil practices, advocate new ideas, and instil 
new knowledge. However it was also appropriated by sympathizers and 
members of the Revolutionary Party (geming dang) to articulate alternative 
histories and communicate their political visions in forms of adapted 
storytelling, and regional and reformed operas (H.-t. i. Li, 2001b, p. 36). 
 
The 1920s was the “era of mobilization” [dongyuan shidai] (He, 2005). It 
witnessed the organized appropriation of popular culture for political ends by 
both the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Kuomingtang (KMT). The CPC 
was obviously a front runner. Under the call of “going to the people” and “going 
to villages” inspired young Communists in 1920s used speeches, lectures, public 
gatherings and parades to communicate new ideas to urban residents, rural 
peasants and factory workers(Gao & Pugsley, 2008; H.-t. i. Li, 2001b, pp. 36,47), 
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with the rural area as their focus. These experiments were later integrated into 
the CPC’s practice in its peasant and labour movement and in its military 
conflicts with the KMT. In their study of CPC’s tradition of utilising satirical 
power Gao & Pugsley (2008) have made a vivid observation about the adept use 
of popular culture by the CPC in Jingangshan, Jiangxi, a land-locked region ideal 
as a hideout from the KMT forces. They write: 
[t]he “greatness” of the CCP permeated the illiterate peasantry through 
popular cartoons, comic books, folksongs, farces, and other performing 
arts. Thousands of popular satirical posters were put up, the CCP’s 
primary messages of “Down with the landlord” and “Redistribute land” 
were incorporated into popular folk rhythms and children’s songs, and at 
least two pictorial magazines were published… and the CCP began its own 
practices of ridiculing enemies. (p. 456) 
 
The principles embedded in these practices, literature and art as tools to 
“educating the masses” and “criticizing enemies”, were to be formalized in Mao’s 
1942 talk on art and literature and they still guide China’s official discourse on 
culture.  
 
It is a dangerous oversimplification to frame the culture debates in pre-1949 
period as revolving the ideological divide of the two major political parties. 
There were many independent scholars, and a lot of debates and initiatives 
were bipartisan. Apart from fighting each other, they had a common enemy: 
foreign occupation and invasion. In time of national crisis, the cultural 
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atmosphere was palpable with nationalist sentiments. The CPC promoted 
“proletariat” art and literature to mobilize. The KMT advocated “New Life 
Movement”(xin shenghuo yundong) to “revolutionise" Chinese life (Dirlik, 1975) 
and censored dissenting views. Popular culture in this period was a space of 
both political manoeuvre and national resistance, a culture “created not by the 
people but for the people” (Chang-tai Hung, as cited in Danke Li, 2004, pp. 475, 
original emphasis), for purposes beyond and bigger than the self. The 
intervention by both parties purged undesirable fun element in popular culture, 
replacing it with didactic satire against class enemies. Spontaneous laughter 
became a luxury. It was little wonder that when Lin Yutang advocated humour 
in the 1930s, his country fellows were not amused.  
 
DAZIBAO AND THE RADICALIZATION OF POPULAR CULTURE  
If the politicization of popular culture started with the large-scale creation of 
content for people, the radicalization of popular culture in China was marked by 
creating content by ordinary people, on an unprecedented scale, in “Dazibao”, or 
big character posters. 
 
Dazibao got their name because of the large lettering used in the posters (Hala, 
2007). Traditionally, dazibao had been used for business advertising or public 
notices (haibao) or for publicizing good news (jiebao), but rarely had they been 
used to publicize political opinion. However, Dazibao can be easily appropriated 
as a tool to communicate personal views and to mobilize support for political 
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causes. A famous early adopter case is Zhu Qianzhi,14 a twenty-year-old 
philosophy student in Beijing University. He posted a dazibao in March 1920 to 
make public his refusal to take examinations (Lanza, 2008). For ordinary people 
there were good reasons to take up dazibao over other means of 
communication: they were cheap, effective, easy to use, and could be 
anonymous, just like today’s BBS on the Internet.   
 
According to Hua Sheng (1990), the use of dazibao as a form of political dissent 
started with a 36-year-old pro-Communist scholar called Wang Shiwei, who 
wrote a long essay on a big poster in 1942 and put it up on a wall in Yan’an, the 
headquarters of the Red Army, lambasting Party leaders for their arbitrary and 
repressive treatment of political dissent. His poster struck a chord with people 
of similar views and more posters followed. Wang Shiwei was labelled as a spy 
and lost his life for his straight talking.15 He would never have expected that this 
new form of political dissent he pioneered would become such an important 
means of public expression, extolled so highly and damned so fervently, loved 
and hated by so many people in the years to come. 
 
Since then, dazibao remained a notable feature of revolutionary mass 
                                                        
14 Zhu Qianzhi later became a translator and historian. He combined diverse philosophical 
influences, ranging from Max Stirner, George Sorel, and Zhang Binglin. For more about Zhu, visit: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhu_Qianzhi. 
15 Dai Qing wrote about the life of Wang Shiwei in Wang Shiwei he Ye Baihehua (Wang Shiwei 
and Wild Lily) (Wenhui Monthly, May 1988). In her work she concluded that He Long ordered 
Wang’s execution. She was challenged by Xu Yiqing, the writer of the biography of He Long, who 
conducted a serial of interviews and managed to get the original record of the execution of 
Wang. According to Xu, Li Kenong gave the order after consulting his boss Kang Sheng, who was 
then head of social affairs in Yan’an and became a political star in the Cultural Revolution, but 
died soon after losing the trust of Mao. Wang’s name was cleared in 1991 by the Ministry of 
Public Security. For Xu’s account, see: 
http://politiccn.ifrance.com/politiccn/author/h/huangchangyong/huangchangyong007.txt. 
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communication in China for much of the 20th century. It has accompanied 
nearly every major political movement in the PRC (Downing, Ford, Gil, & Stein, 
2001, p. 171; Downing, 2003; Sheng, 1990).  
 
In the early post-revolutionary years, after the foundation of the PRC in 1949, 
the economy was recovering, and people were enthusiastic about the promising 
new republic. However, under the threat of feudal and capitalist residue, class 
struggle was still the norm of life and politics was the priority in every facet of 
society. The cultural domain, from newspaper to poetry and the comic book, 
was filled with accounts of the glorious heroism and idealism of the proletariat 
and the extolment of new socialist values.  
 
The boring nature of the official media didn't suffocate the creativity of the 
general public, however. In 1957, When Chairman Mao invited intellectuals to 
speak frankly about the problems of the government, his liberalism was 
welcomed with big character posters critical of the government. Judging from a 
report in Guangming Ribao (Enlightenment daily), ‘Students of Beijing University 
put up “Democracy Wall”’ (May 26, 1957, as cited in Sheng, 1990), the diversity 
of opinions and the spirit of open debate were palpable. 
 
The dazibao written by Beijing University students were diverse in form. They 
were a real feast for the eyes. They included lengthy formal theses, sarcastic 
essays, poems, cartoons, and traditional Chinese novels. After some posters 
were put up, many more followed to support or oppose views expressed in 
previous ones, resulting in lively debate among the students. Students even 
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wrote invitations on some posters challenging the author to a face-to-face 
debate.  
 
With Mao's encouragement, dazibao writing flourished and posters by hundreds 
and thousands were created by people across the social spectrum of society. 
What these enthusiastic creators didn’t expect was that Chairman Mao was not 
really keen on critical posters; rather, he was more interested in “luring the 
snakes out of the hole”. Many out-spoken people were labelled “rightists” and 
“capitalist-roaders” conspiring to sabotage the rule of the proletariat and jailed 
or sent to the countryside for re-education. Dazibao was still encouraged, but 
only to support Chairman Mao, to attack his critics, or to echo government 
directives. As Chairman Mao said at the Shanghai Conference in late 1957, 
“Because most of them are on the side of the proletariat, dazibao are 
instruments favourable to the proletariat and not the bourgeoisie” (address by 
Mao Zedong, Shanghai Conference, July 1957, as cited in Sheng, 1990). The 
appropriation of dazibao as a tool of propaganda led to homogeneity and 
strangled the spontaneity and thus creativity of public expression. 
 
People learned fast. When Chairman Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 
1966 to eliminate the residual manifestations of bourgeois culture in the arts, 
sciences, education, medicine, and in popular or elite attitudes(Dittmer & Chen, 
1981, p. 3), the country fell into factional rivalries to show their loyalty to Mao, 
competing with each other in radicalism. The big character posters in this 
period were full of prayer-like expressions, and martial and violent terms such 
as: 
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Think of Chairman Mao day and night! 
The red heart forever turns towards the party! 
The head can be cut off, blood can be shed, but the revolutionary 
spirit cannot be forsaken! 
A great victory of Mao Zedong Thought! 
Xi’an Red 6th Company are all destroyed! 
5.16 Military Corps fire cannon at Premier Zhou! 
                             (Dittmer & Chen, 1981, pp. 30-38) 
 
Of course, not all forms of public expression were in praise of the Great 
Revolution. The high-handed political atmosphere forced the people to turn to 
popular doggerel—a form of popular expression, mainly for political and 
pornographic jokes, that is still fashionable today—to express them themselves 
in private, especially in later stages of the Cultural Revolution, when 
revolutionary zeal waned and many got disillusioned. One of the doggerels goes 
like this: 
Those who once climbed the snowy mountains and tramped the 
grasslands are not better off than the one who sings the Red Lantern; 
It is no use to have survived the hardship of the Long March; 
Better dance a ballet; 
Head bowed like a willing ox, I serve the children; 
Still, I am inferior to the ping pong player! 
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                               (Dittmer & Chen, 1981, p. 50) 
On the micro-level, the mass criticism movement initiated at the beginning of 
the Cultural Revolution started a witch-hunting process. Some took this 
opportunity to settle old scores. Others reported on their neighbours, even 
family members with fabricated wrongdoings to show their own political 
uprightness and protect themselves. Yu Hua, a famous writer in China, had an 
interesting account of dazibao in an interview: 
I finished elementary school and middle school during the Cultural 
Revolution. I grew up in a period without books. Nearly all literature was 
burned…I believe my first real literary reading experience began with my 
reading Big Character Posters during the Cultural Revolution. Big 
Character Posters were filled with lies, accusations, denunciations, and 
attacks. The Cultural Revolution brought out the full potential of Chinese 
imaginative powers. People invented crimes for each other out of thin air… 
(Yu Hua, interviewed in Standaert, 2003)  
 
Figure 2: Piling Dazibao on the wall in the Cultural Revolution16 
                                                        
16 http://news.china.com/zh_cn/history/photos/11025921/20050714/12481097.html 
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For the Chinese government, dazibao was used mainly as a way of mass 
mobilization. But it did give the general public a chance to have their voices 
heard, albeit under the peculiar political climate before the end of Cultural 
Revolution in 1976. A lot of people, be they politicians or ordinary citizens, 
appropriated this opportunity to vie for political power or to abuse each other. 
The witch-hunting seriously damaged the social and moral fabric of China, 
leaving an open scar that took many years to heal, if it has healed at all. Even 
today, people still use dazibao to express their indignity or frustration when 
they cannot have issues resolved through official channels (See Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: “I shall decide what to do with my own property”17 
 
UNOFFICIAL JOURNALS: THE DEMOCRATIC UTOPIA 
The end of Cultural Revolution in 1976 ushered in a period of great hope in 
China. The Gang of Four, who were blamed for all the atrocities of the Cultural 
                                                        
17 A dazibao in a residence quarter in Beijing, China, July 2007, accessed at 
http://dzh.mop.com/mainFrame.jsp?url=http://dzh.mop.com/topic/readSub_7645083_0_0.ht
ml 
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Revolution, were overthrown and prosecuted. Deng came to power and 
introduced a series of liberal policies generally known as the “liberation of 
thoughts”. In 1978, he launched a nationwide debate on the “criterion of truth” 
to counter his political opponents—“the whatever faction”, so called because 
they believed that whatever Chairman Mao said should be carried out; and 
whatever Chairman Mao did not say should be rejected (Chen, 1982, p. 7). The 
days when the slogan “Politics takes command” was chanted everywhere were 
gone, in its place was the new slogan “Economy takes command”. For a period, 
optimism and the spirit of democracy filled the air in China, as Orville Schell 
(1988, p. 202) observed, “After ten years of political suppression and terror, the 
sense of freedom and excitement in the air was palpable.” 
 
In this political context, dazibao were given a new leaf of life. They were first 
used to air personal grievances, to reflect on the cause of the Cultural 
Revolution, and then to ask for freedom and democracy. The growing number of 
posters in Beijing attracted people all over the country to travel to the capital to 
read them, to put up their own and discuss face to face with authors and readers 
of other posters. The desire to broaden readership and influence led these 
authors to seek better ways to have their view heard, other than posters on the 
wall, which were quickly covered by others (like posts in today’s popular BBS). 
They found a solution in the form of the unofficial journals. 
 
The backbone of the unofficial journals were the “Lost Generation”, who as Red 
Guards in the Cultural Revolution regarded themselves as an idealistic and 
hopeful generation, only to be sent to the countryside for re-education under 
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poor peasants – many were disappointed and became depressed. Without 
formal schooling, most of them had no opportunity to go to university. When 
China recovered from the chaos of the 1970s, this generation was singled out as 
uneducated, uncultured. No longer the hope but the burden of the nation, they 
were made to shoulder the blame of the Cultural Revolution (Chen, 1982, p. 
102). 
 
They had the biggest urge for changes. The posters and related political debates 
rekindled their political passion and sense of mission. They felt a great urgency 
to express themselves, as was evident in the preface of one unofficial journal, 
Today: 
History has finally given our generation the chance to sing out what has 
been buried for more than ten years… we can’t wait any longer, for waiting 
means retreat since history has advanced. (Cited in Chen, 1982, p. 51)   
 
Some of these journals were purely literary. But the majority centred on current 
affairs and political discussion, criticizing the political system, advocating 
democracy, law and human rights and urging immediate reforms. Chen Ruoxi 
(1982, pp. 66-98) summarized the themes of these journals as including social 
democracy and system reform; human rights and law; economic and welfare 
reform; attacks on cadre preference; de-Maoization; breaches of literary taboos. 
Chen counted over 130 of this kind of publication. Beijing alone was home to 
more than 30 unofficial journals during the peak two and half years of free 
publication movement, with subscription ranging from several hundred to over 
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ten thousand.   
 
Figure 4: Cover and Table of Content of Today 
18
 
(van Crevel, 2007) 
 
Van Crevel (2007) described the early journals as having “amateur” or 
“primitive” physical quality and formats as a result of limited access to means of 
production: low-quality paper, crude (mimeograph) printing, and manual 
stapling. In a way, the popularity of these unofficial journals is typical of user 
created content in the Internet era: media content outweighing the technical 
inadequacies in their production. This was a pattern that Downing et al. (2001, p. 
172) noted in his study of Samizdat in the former Soviet Bloc. In Democracy Wall 
and the Unofficial Journals, Chen Ruoxi accounted for their popularity in this 
way: 
It was a fresh start, heartily embraced. The excess of demand over supply, 
proof of the journals’ popularity, was too striking to be ignored by the 
authorities. Though there were inferior to the official journals by being 
                                                        
18 This is the cover and table of content of the second issue of Today and was undated.  
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mimeographed, often illegible and roughly bound with poor editing and 
often poor writing, nevertheless their ample variety of content, bold 
approaches to sensitive subjects and, most of all, prompt response to 
current events and the readers’ demands outweighed this inferiority. 
                            (R. Chen, 1982, p. 65) 
 
 
Figure 5: Cover of the first issue of Enlightenment in 1978 
(van Crevel, 2007) 
 
The discussion on paper soon spilled over into political activities. 
Demonstrations were organized, with workers demanding more rights and 
benefits, and farmers asking for better living standards and having their 
grievances heard. Some of these journal authors took part in the local elections 
and asked for fair and open votes (R. Chen, 1982). This in turn pushed some of 
the journals into even more fierce criticism of the government. Wei Jingsheng, a 
former Red Guard turned editor of Explorations (Tansuo) and famous for his 
journal article “The fifth modernization”, unequivocally called Deng a "new 
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dictator" (Hala, 2007). 
 
The government finally decided that they went too far. By this time, the 
leadership around Deng Xiaoping had consolidated their newly gained power 
and felt no more need for expressions of popular support in their struggle with 
remnant Maoist forces (Hala, 2007). In December 1980, at the Central 
Committee of CPC’s work conference on stability and economic development, 
Deng singled out the democrats as the “counter-revolutionaries” responsible for 
the recent social and political instability and their journals were denounced as 
illegal publications (R. Chen, 1982, p. 36). In 1981, most journals disbanded. 
Some, such as Beijing Spring and Today, later reappeared as unofficial 
publications in the West (Hala, 2007; van Crevel, 2007). 
 
THE RETURN TO THE SELF: NETWORKED USER-CREATED CONTENT 
The disbanding of unofficial journals ended an era of mass participation in 
political debate by means of user-created content. It ushered in a period of 
“collective amnesia” (Tripathi, 2008), when people indulged in money-making 
and material pursuits and avoided their political past. Whether this is moral 
sickness, perversion or social progress is a matter of personal opinion. 
 
A different China: Politics sidelined by popular culture 
The reform policy that Deng’s Southern Tour of 1992 helped to reinvigorate led 
China through a metamorphosis that has not only utterly transformed the 
economy and much of society, but also the Communist Party. In politics, 
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pragmatism has been the order of the day and ideology is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant to policy decisions (Hook, 2007)). David Brooks (2007)in his New 
York Times column essay, made an insightful observation about the “seismic 
shift” in China’s political climate over the past decade: 
Westerners think the Communist Party still has something to do with 
political ideology. You know there is no political philosophy in China 
except prosperity. The Communist Party is basically a gigantic Skull and 
Bones.19 It is one of the social networks its members use to build wealth 
together. 
 
Or as Han Yuhai, a professor from Peking University put it: “Money is the only 
ideology” (as cited in Hook, 2007).  
 
The general public, once demanding political participation, are now more 
preoccupied with material aspiration, more spacious housing, bigger cars and 
better education for their kids. College students are less political and more 
concerned about economic freedom and opportunities, jobs with government 
agencies or multinationals, scholarships from US universities, success stories of 
Bill Gates and Steve Jobs, soccer World Cup and NBA basketball games. 
Teenagers are immersed in different passing fads, Korean fashion (Han Liu) and 
TV plays (Han Ju), Japanese comics, computer games, instant messaging, “Super 
Girls” (and boys), and loads of homework from school. With the drive to 
prosperity, public life in China – like that in the West at the same point in its 
                                                        
19 Skull and Bones is an elite secret society at Yale University that includes some of the most 
powerful men of the 20th century including George W Bush and John Kerry. For more 
information, visit: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skull_and_Bones. 
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economic development – has metamorphosed from political activism to pop 
culture, “less didactic and more concerned with entertainment, more 
commercialized and more commercializable” (Goodman, 2001, p. 247). 
 
The Changed media-scape: Party line, bottom line and “ideotaiment” 
With the metamorphosis of Chinese society, the media landscape has also 
changed beyond recognition. The change reflects technological and social 
development at home and abroad.    
 
In the west, the increasingly distributed means of media production brought 
about by more user-friendly technologies and affordable Internet access has 
made the web more “participative” (Jenkins, 2006) and led to surge in 
“mini-media producers” (Leadbeater, 2006). With the surge of citizen media, the 
once obedient, silent “readers” have become creators sharing the stage with 
“credentialed knowledge producers” (Tapscott & Williams, 2006, p. 11), 
“blurring the lines between traditional audience and author, creator and 
consumer, expert and amateur” (Keen, 2007, p. 2). This “convergence culture”, 
as Jenkins (2006) calls it, marks a return to self-representation or “demand-led 
rather than supply-led journalism” (Hartley, 2008b) and heralds an era of 
co-creation in media. In his blog space “confused in Calcutta”, JP Rangaswami 
vividly describe this shift as from "heard the ad, seen the movie, bought the 
video, got the shirt, got the fridge magnet" to "created the ad, (co-)shot the 
movie, mashed the video, designed the T-shirt, made the fridge magnet" (cited 
in Tapscott & Williams, 2006, p. 130). 
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In China, the media have undergone a “messy, protracted, confusing, and 
confused” process of market-oriented transformation that is “littered with odd, 
counterintuitive institutions, structures and practices ”(Y. Zhao, 2000). The 
media are still subject to Party control and are regarded as the mouthpiece of 
the Party, but with state subsidies cut or scrapped altogether, they have to 
negotiate between “the party line and the bottom line (Y. Zhao, 1998), become 
more tuned to market rules and more responsive to readers’ demands. 
Broadsheet newspapers such as People’s Daily and Guangming Daily, and 
provincial Party newspapers, are becoming more and more marginalized by the 
general public and are facing increasing pressure to change. Few people read 
them, even less subscribe to them with their own money. Along with the 
traditional Party press, there has emerged a sort of ‘quasi-official’ or popular 
press (Z. Li, 1998). The introduction of the Internet is another sea change for the 
media in China. It provides an alternative, and more credible, source of 
information. More and more people have migrated from traditional media to the 
Internet because accurate information is to be found not in newspapers or on 
TV, but online (Datong Li, 2008). The Internet has also provided a new platform 
for self-representation and a distribution channel for user-created content in 
China. According to a survey conducted by China Internet Network Information 
Centre (2008), of the 21 million users in China at the time, 65.7 percent have 
engaged in user-created content, posting comments or uploading contents 
online.20 The same survey also profile typical creators as urban youngsters aged 
18 to 24 with relatively good education. 
                                                        
20 Both the number of internet users and the percentage of active video users are based on the 
survey released at the end of February 2008. According to the latest statistical survey of the 
internet in China (Burgess, 2007) released in July 2010, the number of internet users has 
reached 420 million. The latest statistics for video users are not yet available. 
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The ability of the users to express themselves, be it for political advocacy or for 
the celebration of the self, is countered by new forms of control from the 
government. Facing challenges from the Internet, the Party has injected a “soft 
power” element into the workings of its propaganda apparatus to win the 
“hearts and minds” of media users, changing the forms and looks of these organs. 
Johan Lagerkvist (2008) calls this element “ideotainment”. With this change of 
strategy, “cool” images, designs, and sounds of popular Web are intermeshed 
with “subtle ideological constructs, symbols, and nationalistic messages of 
persuasion”. While the overt form of ideotainment entails ideology repackaged 
as popular culture that appeals to younger generations, the covert form of 
ideotainment uses anonymous postings or BBS moderators to shape political 
discourse and neutralize ‘risky’ sentiments in chat rooms (Bandurski, 2008). 
Ideotainment started as a Party initiative. However, a series of administrative 
guidelines since 2000 have delegated the responsibility of maintaining a “clean” 
and risk-free Internet to Internet Service Providers and Internet Content 
Providers, thus forcing Internet businesses to collude with the government in 
censorship(S. Li, 2010; Weber & Jia, 2007). Ideotainment has become a 
prominent feature of the Internet in China and has made it a much richer, more 
complicated and ambiguous space than it appears to be.  
 
Internet writing: From theatre to agora 
Internet writing in China can be seen as going from the “theatre” into the 
“agora”, from text-based postings to multimedia content. The evolution can be 
attributed to three historic forces: technology (affordable Internet accessibility 
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and easy-to-use digital devices), demographics (the coming of age of the Net 
Generation), and global rise of the “writing public” (Hartley, 2008a). 
 
Commercial Internet network services in China started in 1996 (CNNIC, 2004). 
Before that computer enthusiasts in China used telnet-based BBS to get 
connected and share ideas. Some of them also used email lists to disseminate 
their work. CFido, launched in 1991, was the first and largest BBS network in 
China, hosting over 10, 000 users at its peak in 1997 (S. Li, 2010). Web-based 
BBS and public forums have taken over from telnet-based BBS to provide a rich, 
flux, multi-layered platform for users to engage the society and with each other. 
Starting from 2005, streaming video has become ever more popular with the 
younger generations of Internet users.  
 
Because of the high price tag attached to electronic gadgets and Internet 
technology, many of the early user-creators were relatively wealthy and 
technically savvy, a group of people that might be categorized as “social elites”: 
well-educated, well-paid and well-read (S. Li, 2010). As far as content is 
concerned, early Internet writings had a lot in common with “unofficial 
journals”, showing characteristics typical of unofficial writers in Chinese 
cyberspace: “originality, sharpness, abundance, outspoken, nonconformist 
stance, and authority-challenging bravery” (Y. Zhou, Chuang, Constable, Guo, & 
et al., 2005). However, “authority-challenging bravery” does not necessarily 
guarantee an alternative opinion in everything. Zhou Yongming‘s ethnographic 
research online finds that the more informed Chinese are the more nationalistic 
they may be. Thus there is a form of “informed nationalism” which the 
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government can leverage for its own purpose in time of convenience (Y. Zhou, 
2005).  
 
In the early stages of networked user-created content, the net was not so 
“democratic” as some claimed it to be, the reason being less about technology 
and more to do with ideas. There was a clear line between elite content creators 
and ordinary users, and their relationship could get intense at times. It was of a 
“theatre model”. As a participant of Heaven’s Matter Teahouse21, a sub-forum of 
the Tianya BBS, recalled: 
If posting is performativity, then clicking is akin to watching. Posters are 
performers on the intellectual stage of ideas in the theatre that is Heaven’s 
Matter Teahouse. Thread starters are star performers; repliers are 
co-stars, and lurkers spectators. 
 
In the past elites performed on the stage offering their most splendid 
thinking; most members of the forum could only watch in silence. There 
were occasions where people in the audience stood up and contributed to 
the show, but they didn’t get to go on the stage. Elites didn’t welcome their 
participation, rejecting postings that they thought were inconsequential. 
They even failed to respond to applause and acclamation from the 
audience, regarding them as unseemly and dangerous cacophonies. In this 
theatre of ideas, the consequence of distancing between and estranging 
performers and spectators was that the former became intoxicated with 
                                                        
21 http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/articleslist/0/no01.shtml 
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themselves, and treated the forum as a world of black and white: as 
‘performers’ they bathed in the light of Athenian wisdom. Beyond the 
stage the audience was in pitch darkness, having nothing to do with the 
academia and thinking. “Happy” grudges from the audience were hardly 
surprising. (Y. Chen, 2002) 
 
The rise of the second-generation Internet, together with inexpensive digital 
devices, open source software, user-friendly editing tools, cheap storage, and 
increasingly affordable bandwidth has helped to lower down the threshold of 
content creation, fostering the growth of the “writing public”. Demographics 
have further changed the rules of the game. 
 
Internet users are getting younger. In 1997, users younger than 20 accounted 
for only 5.6%, in 2009, the number soared to 33.9%(CNNIC, 1997, 2009). They 
are the “Yuck and wow” generation(Greenfield, 2008) growing up with the 
Internet. They are said to be rarely politically motivated and if anything are 
motivated by an attitude of frivolity and lightness. Their catchphrase is to “have 
fun” (F. Liu, 2011). With more freed minds, the content to be created is of a 
different kind: now it is time for self-broadcasting. For them, the Internet is a 
mirror. As Keen (2007, p. 7) observed, ‘‘Rather than using it to seek news, 
information, or culture, they use it to actually BE the news, information, and 
culture’’ [original emphasis]. With this generation joining in the rank of 
user-creators, UCC online has moved from the “theatre” into the “agora”. The 
same member from the sub-forum of Tianya BBS rejoiced at the transformation 
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the forum has undergone. He writes, 
It has come out of the theatre into the agora. In the agora, every member is 
spectator and a performer at the same time. What a marvellous 
combination! We are “all sails, without a single anchor”. We can be 
carefree. We can be loud and boisterous, as well as soft and gentle. Under 
these circumstances, all members are active; the carnivalesque nature of 
the agora has emerged…intoxicated gods and decorated chariots parade, 
flanked by us, while we would drink and cheer them. It is all a festival 
atmosphere. We can jeer and pull pranks in front of the elites. We can light 
fireworks, or organize masquerades. On these occasions, performers and 
spectators are the same…with everybody performing, for others or for 
themselves, watching as well as performing.(Y. Chen, 2002) 
 
The celebration of the self: Sister Lotus, Back-dorm Boys and spoof videos 
Sister Lotus will surely go down in history as one of the pioneers of networked 
user-created content in China. Sister Lotus is a homely girl from a small town 
who claims to be very beautiful. She is a mediocre dancer who regards herself as 
among the best. She tried and failed three times to gain admission to Peking 
University and then to Tsinghua University, China's most prestigious 
institutions of higher learning. In the spring of 2005, she posted her personal 
stories about her failure and determination, together with some of her photos 
and a short dance video clip on to the BBS of Tsinghua University. They touched 
a nerve among students who forwarded her posts into other websites. Sister 
Lotus became an instant celebrity, courted by newspapers and TV talk shows.. 
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Figure 6: Sister Lotus and her favorite S pose in 200522 
 
The popularity of Sister Lotus was hailed by some as “the victory of the common 
people” and the Internet, and lamented by others as a sign of “lack of beliefs 
among young people”. A more-to-the-point explanation was offered in a 
Washington Post column: Sister Lotus has grabbed the imagination of young 
Chinese because she is affirming her individuality so blatantly in a society 
where children are generally taught to conform and avoid sticking out (Cody, 
2005). Sister Lotus was just such a symbol of a wakening self-identity among 
the young. 
 
The “Back-Dorm Boys”, an art student duo in Guangdong Province named after 
the Backstreet Boys, are more representative of a new generation of Chinese 
who spend hours online every day, surfing, blogging, playing interactive games, 
                                                        
22 Retrieved October 22, 2010 at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/school/2005-06/17/content_3096393.htm 
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doing video and text chat, and downloading music and movies.  
 
In March 2005 they lip-synched the Backstreet Boys hit I Want It That Way, 
filmed their performance in their dorm room with a cheap little web camera and 
posted it in their college intranet. It quickly migrated to big sites like Google 
Video and YouTube23. It fast became one of the most watched and highest rated 
amateur clips online. Web forums discussed their private lives. National radio 
and television shows have hosted them. Even their roommate, just visible in the 
background playing computer games, gets celebrity treatment. The Back Dorm 
Boys phenomenon has resulted in an Internet ‘meme’ and spawned a variety of 
spoofs and countless copycats (The Economist, 2006; www.china.org.cn, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 7: Back-Dorm Boys in 200524 
 
Spoofs and other Internet videos provide an outlet for people’s creativity and a 
new form of self-expression. To a certain extent, through ironic inversion of 
authority and the classics, showing their viewers what is possible, they serve as 
                                                        
23 For a sample Back-Dorm song, see http://au.youtube.com/watch?v=IGnhMR4Mdu8 
24 Retrieved October 22, 2010 at 
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=6776404 
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a liberating force for the Chinese, who for many generation have been taught to 
respect order and follow trodden paths. Fifty years after the foundation of the 
new republic, Chinese people finally get a chance to turn to themselves for 
representation. 
 
User- created Content in China: Continuity and Change 
In half a century, popular expression in China has migrated from brick walls to 
electronic walls on the Internet. The changes in form have also been 
accompanied by changes in content. While UCC in the pre-Internet stage tended 
to be politically oriented, in the Internet age, it is now more about fanfare and 
fun-making. Popular culture plays an ever more important role in public life. 
Rather than politics, the focus of user creation has turned to the self. 
 
Socio-political metamorphosis and technological change have not only altered 
the conditions of media production, but also the contexts of circulation and 
reception. What remains the same in China is the need of users to have their 
voice heard and their voices expressed and represented, and the ambivalence of 
the CPC in treating these user creations. As Jenkins & Hartley (2008) argue, 
there is a history of user activism in the growth of user-created content and we 
shouldn’t erase the politics behind those struggles to prepare the way. By 
reclaiming the history of user-created content in China, and revisiting the 
vicissitude of the user’s fight for self-expression, we get a better understanding 
of why Internet as a new public ‘commons’ has been quickly embraced, adopted 
and widely diffused in China, and what might be possible if we participate in this 
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emergent culture.  
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Chapter Two: Understanding Spoof videos in 
China: Definitions, methods and approaches 
 
The best way to initiate a dialogue with a group about their 
behaviour is to ask them what it is they’re doing, and then listen 
when they respond. 
                                Theresa Senft (2008, p. 12)  
 
SPOOFS, EGAO AND SUBVERSIVE WRITING 
Defining spoofs and Egao 
The etymological study of the word “spoof “leads us to Arthur Roberts (1852–
1933), a great British comic singer and burlesque actor of his time and founder 
of a club called ‘Spooferies’ (Roberts, 1927). In Murray’s New English Dictionary 
Roberts is cited in his autobiography, Fifty Years of Spoof, explaining spoof as “a 
game of a hoaxing and nonsensical character” (1927, p. 68). Of course, for 
Roberts, it is not just a game, as he says:  
Why did I take on spoof? Because I thought that all the spoof in life 
should not be on one side. When I first grew up to consciousness I 
found that everybody I knew was being officially spoofed. They were 
spoofed by politicians who promised everybody three acres and a 
cow…Finding myself, therefore, alive in a world of pretense—in fact a 
party to a general conspiracy to defraud—I said to myself at once, 
“Everybody seems to be spoofing everybody for the sake of their own 
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pockets. Why not let us spoof everybody for the sake of our own 
hearts. And the heart, you know, loves laughter”. (Roberts, 1927, p. 
68) 
 
Nowadays the term ‘spoof’ is often used interchangeably with ‘parody,’ which itself 
expresses a formal or structural relation between two texts, with a level of 
comic and satiric effects. In her study of amateur spoofs in UK, Willett (2009, p. 
116) differentiates the two terms on the basis that “spoof” is the more common 
term for videos online. However she also states that “it is effectively 
synonymous with parody and the terms are often used interchangeably by 
amateur video users in their tags and titles”. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals 
that there are more and bigger differences than that of register. Linda Hutcheon 
(1991) defines parody as imitation with critical difference, its intent being 
intramural (form, structure) rather than extramural (social, moral). She thinks 
that parody doesn’t have an “ameliorative aim to hold up to ridicule the vices 
and follies of the mankind, with an eye to their correction” (Hutcheon, 1991, p. 
43). Her definition of parody can certainly be applied to account for those 
spoofs that “use the parodied text as a target” rather than “a weapon”. But 
spoofs can mimic structure, form as well as the cultural practice itself; the target 
can be all or any of them; and as I will show in the following chapters, they can 
be a weapon of users for social correction, as Roberts has stated clearly in his 
remarks. For Dentith (2000), parody refers to both textual and cultural 
practices, and can be very contentious. He defines it as “any cultural practice 
which provides a relatively polemical allusive imitation of another cultural 
production or practice” (p. 9). Parody as defined by Dentith is more similar to 
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spoofs for which this thesis aims to account, although unlike parody in Dentith’s 
mind, spoofs are not necessarily polemical, in many cases they are simply 
playful. In the thesis, spoofs refer to cultural productions that comically 
mimic other cultural productions or practices. They criticise, ridicule, but first 
of all, they imitate and make us laugh.  
 
The closest counterpart of spoofs in Chinese is “egao”. Literary “e” means “evil” 
or “naughty”, “gao” means “”to work” or “to do”, combined egao means “mischief 
making” or “reckless doings”. As a form of subculture, egao is a site of power 
struggle between different ideological forces, between authorities and egao 
practitioners as well as among the practitioners themselves (Haomin Gong & 
Xin Yang, 2010). 
 
However, in the official media, egao is mostly regarded as subversive of 
authority and establishment and erosive of mainstream norms and values. For 
example, the official newspaper Guangming Daily defines egao as “a popular 
online strategy, in the form of language, picture and animation, which comically 
subverts and deconstructs the so-called normal”(J. Chen, Zhang, & He, 2007)25. 
In an article on another state-run newspaper China Daily it is defined by Huang 
(2006) as “a subculture that is characterized by humour, revelry, subversion, 
grass-root spontaneity, defiance of authority, mass participation and 
multi-media high-tech.” As a result spoofs have been criticized for “vulgarizing” 
                                                        
25 The original is in Chinese, “恶搞是当前网络上流行的，以文字、图片和动画为手段表达个人
思想的一种方式，完全以颠覆的、滑稽的、莫名其妙的无厘头表达来解构所谓‘正常’”。 The 
translation is borrowed from Gong Haomin and Yang Xin (Haomin Gong & Xin Yang, 2010) 
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popular culture or using “claptrap” simply to please the public (S. Lin, 2006) .26 
In August 2006, Guangming Daily even held a “Preventing Online Spoofs from 
Becoming a Fad Experts Discussion Meeting” to launch an offensive against 
online spoofs. During the meeting, spoofs were lambasted as “meddling with 
people's—especially youth's—thinking, meddling with the mainstream values 
by which the majority in our society abide, such as values of honour and 
disgrace, of right and wrong”(Y. Lin, 2006).27 Starting in late 2007, China has 
introduced a licensing policy that requires all video-sharing platforms to 
register with SARFT (State Administration of Radio, Film and Television) and 
apply for permit to host videos (Greenberg, 2008). 
 
Egao and subversive writing 
In chapter one, I argued that the rise of user-created content is the function of 
both technological advances represented by digital affordability and the 
socio-cultural changes manifested as the rise of popular culture. I propose here 
that spoof videos as user-created content have not only to do with the advent of 
information technology; more importantly, it is the continuation and extension 
of subversive writing in pre-YouTube era, such as “hooligan culture” (G. Barmé, 
                                                        
26 For more information, read the feature on People Daily, “‘Entertaining’ Classics: innovation or 
spoofing?” Available at: http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/22226/68825/index.html; and an 
Article by TANG Yu (20 August 2007) on Hong Kong-based Takungpao, “Spoofing Chinese 
Culture May Lead to Dire Consequences”, available at: 
http://www.takungpao.com/news/07/08/20/EP-782864.htm. 
27 Original in Chinese, my translation: “恶搞”搞乱了人们特别是青少年的思想，搞乱了社会大
多数人所遵从的主流价值观，包括荣辱观、是非观，. More about the meeting is available at:  
http://www.gmw.cn/CONTENT/wseg.htm; see also John Kennedy’s blog posts on China: 
Censors vs. Video, Culture at: 
http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2006/08/24/china-censors-vs-video-culture-innovation-h
umor-the-entire-chinese-blogsphere/ 
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1992; Yao, 2004) and “silly talk”(“mo lei tau” in Cantonese) movies28 (Yan Feng, 
2001; Wilkins, 1998).  
 
As Jacques Attali tells us, “the distrust of new languages, codes, and instruments, 
the refusal of the abnormal” is typical of totalitarian societies, because the 
“subversive noise” that these languages, codes and instruments carry demands 
cultural autonomy and claims differences or marginality, and this is reason 
enough for cultural control and repression (Attali, 1977, p. 17). However, spoofs 
are by no means “new languages”, not even in contemporary China. Liu Xiaobo 
traces the current “egao spirit” manifest in Hu Ge’s spoof videos back to the 
1980s, with its earliest expression in “quasi-hippy literature” (X. Liu, 2006), the 
most prominent representative of which is Wang Shuo’s “hooligan” novels. 
 
A closer look at popular culture in contemporary China leads us to several forms 
of subculture that have paved the way for the emergence and fast take-up of 
spoofs today. The first is popular literature as pioneered by the Wang Shuo (G. 
Barmé, 1992; Yao, 2004), who gives voices to “riffraffs” or “hooligans” (pizi or 
liumang) that are “fast-talking, glib-tongued, and foul-mouthed” yet “playful, 
irreverent, and satirical” (Yao, 2004, p. 432). In Wang’s novels, these characters 
are cast as heroes or heroines, who are daring, tell truth about life and thus 
embody “true cultural spirit” (p. 433), rather than people to be despised and 
avoided. The iconoclasm, ruthless ridicule of the lofty and the sacred and daring 
                                                        
28 “Mo lei tau” is a Cantonese slang term used to describe a way of doing things that is odd 
irrational and nonsensical. BBC’s film critic Jonathan Ross uses “Silly talk” to describe the “mo lei 
tau” style of Stephen Chow’s movies. Read more at Suite101: 
http://asian-films.suite101.com/article.cfm/kung_fu_hustle_hong_kong_style#ixzz0mZ3LePvF. 
It is also referred to as “nonsensical” movies(Tao, 2007; Yam, 2009) . 
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challenge of authority Wang shows in his novels won him a great readership at a 
time when the ideological system and values were “in a state of extreme flux” (G. 
Barmé, 1992, pp. 36-37),29 with Maoist socialist realism still “synonymous with 
cultural orthodoxy” and “the default popular culture” (Rojas, 2009, p. 3) and 
consumerism and materialism growing and getting ready to take over. Wang 
Shuo is held up by the young generation as “the idol of rebellion for the youth” 
(Yu Guan, cited in Yao, 2004, p. 432) 30. However, as Geremie Barmé observes, 
the rebellion is “quintessentially expressed not in the tones of overt dissent, but 
more in the creations of sardonic popular culture ” (G. Barmé, 1992, p. 23). The 
covert dissent and sardonic resistance has remained in the last two decades and 
found expressions in the Internet culture in today’s China.  
 
Popular literature of “hooliganism”, with its “defiance of existing literary 
orthodoxies” (Rojas, 2009), has been the first step towards “the cannibalization 
of the canons” in popular culture (Rojas & Chow, 2009) in post-Mao China. 
Popular music and theatre have followed and joined in the party. Cui Jian, the 
icon of pop music in modern China, wears a red bandana and an army uniform 
on the stage, sings, in his “gritty vocal style”, a rock song Nothing to My Name in 
front of animated fans. This image is itself a parodic subversion of the music 
canon in Mao’s time: Short, soft, simple melody with optimistic and patriotic 
lyrics carrying educational messages. Nothing to My Name was adopted by 
students as their anthem in the heady days of spring 1989 (Matusitz, 2010). Cui 
                                                        
29 According to Yusheng Yao(2004),in the last ten years “more than 10 million copies of his 
books have been sold, and most of his twenty-odd stories and novels have been made into 
movies or television miniseries”. 
30 As was explained in Chapter one of this thesis, for CPC the main purpose of art and literature 
is to “educate the masses” and to “criticize the enemies”.  
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Jian’s music, with its attack on moral corruption, hypocrisy, and desertion of 
idealism, rebels and empowers, raises angst and hope at the same time. What it 
shares with “hooligan” novels is its ever-present subversive power and the 
subtlety and covertness in its ideas and messages, an ethos to be kept in mind 
when looking at spoof videos today. 
 
If popular fictions and pop music have popularized a culture of rebellion, 
nurtured the literacy of subversive writing and consumption, thus have 
prepared the setting for the emergence of spoof videos we see today, then “silly 
talk” movies by Hong Kong “comedy king” Stephen Chow (Braester, 2005) can 
be regarded as the pre-Internet form of spoof videos.  
 
Among the most influential of “silly talk” movies is the duology A Chinese 
Odyssey: Pandora’s Box (Yueguang Baohe) and Cinderella (Xianlu Qiyuan). It is a 
hilarious parodic translation of the Chinese classic A Journey to the West (Xiyou 
Ji), turning the spiritual quest for sacred Buddhist writings into a funny but 
heart-breaking love story. The worshipped goddess Bodhisattva Kuan-yin is 
called “Sister Kuan-yin”; the wise and reserved Buddhist master Tang is mocked 
as a fussy and nagging idiot; the mischievous Monkey King turns into a cockeyed 
gang leader and a “love sage”; even the white-skeleton demon, a femme fatale 
who tries to entrap Master Tang and eat him to become immortal, becomes a 
passionate woman who is ready to sacrifice everything for love. Few people 
could get it. The two-part movie was a book office flop when it was released in 
1995, only to gain popularity several years later with the advent of more 
affordable digital technology, through pirated VCD and university BBS (Yan 
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Feng, 2001; NETEASE, 2000). University students, fascinated by the “parabolic 
representations” of the comedy (Yam, 2009), have been the first and foremost 
cheer-team members of Chow’s movies . Lines and catch phrases of the movie 
are posted and discussed online, copied, quoted, appropriated, and find their 
way into the vernacular of the young generation. The de-canonizing parody 
turns into a new canon (Yan Feng, 2001). 
 
A Chinese Odyssey, as its Chinese name ---The big talk version of Journey to the 
West--- stands, ushers in an era of new style of jesting and mockery known as 
“Dahua” culture or “Canon-Mocking” culture(Tao, 2007) . As Tao Dongfeng 
(2007) explains, “dahua” literally translates as “big talk”: sham, inflated, empty, 
and useless words, especially in government talk. In “Dahua Culture”, however, 
the term is appropriated to mean the ways in which classical works and official 
rhetoric are mocked and parodied. In this context, “big talk” no longer refers to 
government rhetoric but to its subversion. Big-talk style lines and footages of 
Chow’s movie are still popular texts on which basis to create networked spoof 
videos in China, especially for those spending their university years watching 
“Silly Talk” movies. There are clusters of spoofs emerging around these movies, 
the latest being a dozen spoofs with tags related to Chow’s latest movie: CJ7 
(Changjiang qihao).31 
 
THE PROTOTYPES OF SPOOF VIDEOS: THE BIG HISTORY TRILOGY  
Towards the end of the year 2001, Lu Xiaobao, a director with Beijing TV Station, 
                                                        
31http://so.tudou.com/isearch/%E9%95%BF%E6%B1%9F%E4%B8%83%E5%8F%B7+%E6
%81%B6%E6%90%9E 
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was desperate for ideas for his performance at the year-end party. What he 
came up with was a widely popular video pastiche The Year That Was (dashiji, 
literally “Big History” in Chinese),32 a humorous take of the events of 2001 
played against a mashup of scenes from famous movies, whose directors and 
casts were among those present at the party (L. Yuan, 2006). The clip is about 
19 minutes long and touches on many topics, some of them (graffiti, the World 
Cup, WTO, Olympic Games) legitimate in official media, some of them 
(Falungong, corruption, Bin Laden and “9.11”) subtle, even taboo in comedy 
shows. As the purpose of the video was to entertain artists at the party (L. Yuan, 
2006), more emphasis was on weaving together their movies, music and current 
affairs of 2001 than on plot, and there is no coherent narrative in the clip.  
 
Much of the appeal of this piece stems from its Stephen-Chow-style lines. Some 
of them are “Big-talk” version of official statements, some are reworkings of the 
original footage, and some are completely made up. The video opens with a 
scene from Ashes of Time, with a “nonsensically inverted” (Martinsen, 2006) 
voiceover, in a nasal North-eastern accent: 
The story is like this. A long, long time ago, one day, as a whish was 
blowing like the wind, and it was a five fingers where you couldn't see the 
dark night if you extended your hand. 
 
I wrote your name on the sky, but it was carried away by the wind. I 
wrote your name on the beach, but the waves carried it away. So I 
wrote your name in every corner of the street. Damn! The police 
                                                        
32http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3i_9Ildo610 
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carried me away.33 
 
This video is commonly known as “Dashiji I” (Big History I) because it was the 
first of the three videos uploaded online. Actually, the videos of the “Big History” 
trilogy are known online in reverse order of production. Dashiji I was the third 
of the “Big History” series in time of production. The other two are not related to 
episode one, except for the fact that they are also re-dubs of old movies. They 
are created by anchors and directors from CCTV. While episode one is a spoof 
targeting others, the other two are self-parodies.  
 
When Lu Xiaobao made The Year that Was, he didn’t know that he was following 
the path that his colleagues at CCTV pioneered a couple of years earlier(L. Yuan, 
2006). What is known as Dashiji II is a short film titled Splitting up in October 
(fenjia zai shiyue)34, produced in February 2001. It is based on Tell the Stories of 
TV Hooligans Themselves, a non-existent memoire of Chen-Meng-nov, a Russian 
persona of Chen Meng, then deputy director of the News Commentary 
Department of CCTV. The title of the memoire spoofs the punch line of CCTV’s 
morning show Oriental Horizon: Tell the stories of ordinary folks themselves35.  
 
The short video repurposes two Russian revolutionary classics Lenin in October 
and Lenin in 1918 to tell a story of power struggle concerning the reshuffling of 
Oriental Horizon and the establishment of a separate news department in CCTV. 
                                                        
33 Original in Chinese: 故事是这样的，在很久很久以前，一天，小嗖风风地吹着，有一个伸手
不见黑夜的五指。我在天空写下你的名字，却被风吹走了，我在沙滩写下你的名字，却被浪花
带走了，于是，我在大街的每个角落写下你的名字，我靠，我被警察带走了。The translation 
is borrowed from Joel Martinsen (2006), with minor changes by author.  
34 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UblQ3gkaJHA&feature=related 
35 The Chinese version is 讲述老百姓自己的故事。 
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Besides Chen Meng, all else featured in the video are given Russian-style names. 
Cui Yongyuan and Bai Yansong36 become Cui Yongyuan-ski and Bai Yansong-ski 
respectively, each of them paired with a famous revolutionary in the two 
Russian movies. The self-parody is hilarious, though it requires a good sense of 
humour in the part of the spoofed to appreciate it. Famous, serious and 
appropriate images projected in the “front stage” (Thompson, 1995, p. 88) of 
television screen are recast as lechers, bribers conspirators and hypocrites. The 
first scene shows Li Ting-nov, a senior reporter paired with Lenin in the clip, 
regretting having to cut short his visit to the “Sex Capital” Amsterdam because 
of the tense situation in his department. He asks his entourage to keep safe the 
coupon he collected and murmurs to himself, “Amsterdam, I will be back”. Cui 
Yongyuan-ski is dismissed as “Guozui” (literally “state mouth”) who takes bribes 
and sits on the fence. The video is full of lines with sexual insinuation, scenes of 
bribe haggling, skewered revolutionary slogans and ridiculed mainstream 
rhetoric. A widely quoted line by Bai Yansong-ski, “Shall we take the fourth-ring 
road of rationality, or the peaceful avenue of passion?” is not only a spoof of the 
way Bai Yansong himself talks on TV, but also a mockery of lofty yet empty 
government rhetoric.  
 
The clip is a brainchild of Cui Yongyuan (Cai, 2003), created with support from 
his colleagues in the same department. The only actor in the movie is a doorman 
with CCTV. The wheelchair at the beginning and end of the movie are borrowed 
from a hospital and the dubbing is mostly done by staff in the news department 
                                                        
36 Both Bai Yansong and Cui Yongyuan are famous hosts with CCTV. Bai is chief commentator of 
CCTV. Cui used to be talk show host and is now focusing on a documentary project on classical 
movies Movie Legends (电影传奇). 
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of CCTV, with Cui Yongyuan-ski dubbed by Cui Yongyuan himself 
(www.XINHUANET.com, 2006; L. Yuan, 2006).   
 
Splitting up in October, together with Grain (also known as “Big History III”)37, 
another self-parody by CCTV staff adapted from the 1959 revolutionary film 
Grain, was prepared for the annual Spring Festival party, and intended “just for 
fun” among the news department (www.XINHUANET.com, 2006), rather than 
for public distribution. According to a CCTV staff in a report at XINHUANET 
(2006), Grain was made in 1999 by a colleague for that year’s New Year party. 
The short movie was so popular that parody videos became a must-have on 
similar occasions. When Splitting up in October was out, colleagues asked for 
copies of it. Nobody knows how it ever ended up online. The upper management 
quickly recalled the disks, afraid that the video would harm the image of CCTV. 
After 2002, the News Department replaced the Spring Festival party with 
singing contests and tea party (W. Liu, 2008), and that was the end of the Big 
History series and the parody video tradition in the News Department.  
 
The recall of the disc did not stop the distribution of the videos. The “Big History” 
videos were first circulated in BBS and forums online and through mobile hard 
disk offline before the advent of video sharing sites in China, passing through 
personal networks among those who could afford the expensive gadget. When I 
got a copy in 2003 on hard disk I watched the videos with a full house of 
classmates in our dorm. At that time, egao or spoof was yet to emerge in our 
cultural vernacular, so “Big History” became a handy term for other parody 
                                                        
37 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tIrqMgIRi7k&feature=related 
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videos we came across. 
 
Although made for a small audience, the repercussions of “Big History” videos 
go beyond the audience that the creators intended. They have changed the 
long-held view that “Nothing good can come out of CCTV” (Martinsen, 2006) and 
at the same time have raised controversies about their moral responsibilities as 
representatives of a national television network (www.people.com.cn, 2006). 
For user-created content, especially networked spoof videos as we see today, 
these videos serve as enlightenment and literacy texts38. Reflecting on the 
influence of “Big History” series on his own spoofing practice, Hu Ge pointed to 
the eye-opening feature of those videos, “After watching it, I realized videos 
could actually be done this way ” (Hu Ge, 2009). Jiaoshou(2010) also recalled 
the thrill when he first came across the Dashiji videos, “That was in 2002 and I 
had just started to access the Internet, and Big History series were stunning for 
me…”  
 
Their roles are much more than enlightenment and literacy. They have become 
inspirations and canons to be followed, copied and emulated. As Jiaoshou(2010) 
confesses, 
The video that has influenced me the most is Big History II: Splitting up 
in October.… I regard Cui Yongyuan as the torchbearer of my practice. 
Up till now most of my mash-up videos are imitations of the Big 
History series.  
                                                        
38 The influence of professional spoofs on amateur parodic practices has also been discussed by 
Willett, who shows that professional spoofs provide models for amateur video makers in terms 
of aesthetic, content, and media forms (Willett, 2009, pp. 119-120).  
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One of the most popular videos, China Won the FIFA World Cup, opens with the 
same memoire-style voiceover as Splitting up in October, “I am very old now, so 
old that many things have eluded my memory. But I still remember…”39 
 
As this thesis will show, what spoof videos today have drawn on from the series 
are not only exterior, surface features such as format, narrative, length, puns 
and lines40, but also, and more importantly, interior, deep-rooted ethos such as 
“mo lei tau” style teasing, mockery of the establishment and critical comment on 
and engagement into public life.  
 
UNDERSTANDING SPOOF VIDEOS IN CHINA: DESIGN OF RESEARCH  
Historical Perspective: The pancake and the bun  
The bun has become a popular term after it made Hu Ge famous. A thousand 
years ago a pancake gained Shi Dongtong, a court jester, approval from the 
emperor he served. The story is documented in the Extensive Records of the 
Taiping Era (Taiping Guangji) and goes as follows.   
Emperor Gaozu held a banquet for his close ministers at which 
they amused themselves with entertainments. Gaozu said, “I am 
                                                        
39 Original in Chinese, my translation: 我已经很老了,老到记不清很多事情，但我仍然清晰地记
得….The video China won the FIFA World Cup is available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0dfbRtyf7Yo 
40 For example, one of the outstanding features of amateur spoof videos carried down from the 
Big History Series is video length. The shortest of the three videos, Grain, is more than 13 
minutes. Most of Hu Ge’s early spoofs are long videos with relatively complete narrative, with 
The Legend of Suppressing Mt. Birdcage Bandits (鸟笼山剿匪记) lasting as long as 48 minutes. 
The same feature applies to videos of other spoofers that are going to be discussed in this 
chapter. According to Thurman and Lupton(2008), the preferred format for online video is 40 
seconds, “accessible and shareable” with lightweight stories (p. 445). Spoof videos in China 
obviously defy these standards.  
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going to give you all a riddle, and you lot solve it: ’Cu lu ge da.’” 
None of the courtiers could work it out. Someone asked if it was a 
kind of ecolian arrow. “Wrong,” said the emperor. Moving Bucket 
piped up, “I’ve got it!” “What is it then?” asked the emperor. “It’s 
fried pancake!” The emperor laughed and said, “That’s it, Moving 
Bucket’s cracked it. Now you lot ask me one and I’ll solve it for 
you.” Before anybody else had thought of one, Moving Bucket 
again asked, “Cu lu ge da.” The emperor couldn’t figure it out and 
asked, “So what is it then?” “A fried pancake.” “But I asked that one 
first, why are you asking it again?” Moving Bucket explained, 
“Well, I thought I’d strike while the griddle’s hot and make 
another one.” The emperor laughed heartily. 
(Cited in Otto, 2001, pp. 85-86) 
 
Many forms of popular media we experience today have their antecedents in 
various stages of Chinese history. Thus “the court of last resort for popular 
culture studies ought to be history” and this historical turn holds the key to 
understanding the present (Barlow, 2001).It follows that insight into current 
cultural trends of China should be grounded on an perspective in “long-term 
historical and cultural trajectories”, as Eric Baark writes:  
The basic rationale that understanding a dynamic China must involve both 
insight into the new phenomena – many of which have been imported, or 
inspired, from overseas – and an awareness of the old legacies that have 
evolved over millennia(Baark, 2007, p. 338). 
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In the study of the Internet, “historical consciousness is urgently needed”, Zhou 
Yongming argues, because of its primary focus on recent developments(Y. Zhou, 
et al., 2005). In the case of user-created content (UCC)41, the history and legacies 
are not only to be appreciated, more importantly, they need to be reclaimed. As 
Jenkins and Hartley(2008) observe about YouTube: 
There is much that is new about YouTube, but there is also much that is 
old. The emergence of "Do-It-Yourself" cultures of all kinds over the past 
several decades paved the way for the early embrace, quick adoption and 
diverse use of new media … 
 
A historical review was in place in Chapter One. In the following chapters the 
historical perspective will continue to be adopted to better understand the 
current surge of use creativity and user activism in China. A historical 
perspective means not only looking back into history for insight, but also 
putting down entrenched presumptions, especially the long-held 
“control-resistance” binary, listening to users and observing their practices to 
gain a nuanced understanding of the rich, flux and multilayered Internet space. 
 
Grabbism 
A wide range of social science methods are available to explore the social 
implications of emerging technologies. However, there is no general ‘cookie 
cutter’ social science method or one-size-fit-all answer that can be applied to all 
contexts and technologies(Dutton, et al., 2006). For an interdisciplinary topic, an 
                                                        
41 By UCC I refer to amateur media content created outside of professional routines and 
practices. 
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interdisciplinary approached have to be adopted, as Hartley and Keane(2006) 
put it commenting on the cultural studies tradition of research methodology, 
“[c]ultural studies has always been an interdisciplinary, inter-sectoral and 
international colloquy”. 
 
Writing about Benetton advertisements, Paula Amad proposes an approach she 
calls “theory shopping”, which she explains as “not a brand-loyalty devotion or a 
drive-your-dollar-further bargain hunt”, rather, it “takes advantage of the skills 
of browsing, seeing and not seeing the products, according the specific 
situated-ness of one’s needs ”(as cited inHartley, 1996, pp. 6-7). Her approach 
echoes a principle advocated by Lu Xun (1881-1936), known as the father of 
modern Chinese literature. Lu Xun’s principle is called “grabbism” (nalai zhuyi),  
by which he means to appropriate, to take what one see as useful, instead of 
take whatever is fed or imposed. The term was first used to mean cultural and 
literary borrowing from the West. Now it is adopted to refer to any selective 
adaptation or borrowing (Michelson, 2005; J. H. Miller, 2008).   
 
Such an approach calls for a scrupulous, rational, and balanced shopper, or 
grabber, instead of an irresponsible shopaholic. As Hartley(Hartley, 1996, p. 7) 
writes,  
Such as procedure has risks…you don’t always find what you are looking 
for, and different selections may clash with each other. The net result 
depends quite obviously on the browser’s astuteness as a reader, and on 
how deft they are at putting found objects—theories, texts—to new and 
interesting uses.  
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To make wise choices, and to put found objects to interesting, productive and 
creative uses, we need, as Lu Xun himself says about grabbism, to “use our brain, 
and show good taste” (Lu, 1982, p. 39,original in Chinese, my translation). More 
importantly, we need to show adroitness and discretion in the indigenization of 
theories so they fit the “water and soil” of the new land that is our topics at 
hand. 
 
So, in the following chapters I will be going on a shopping spree for theories in 
the process of the study and be a responsible shopper.    
 
Conceptual structure: a micro-macro nexus 
The focus of sociology is on collective or social outcomes, macro-level 
properties. However, while it is possible to explain and understand how the 
macro-level properties influence individual behaviour, that is, the macro to 
micro link, accounting for individual actions and interactions that brings about 
the collective outcomes, that is, the micro to macro link, has been a major 
difficulty in sociology, the reason being that the survey data that on which 
empirical sociological research are unhelpful in explaining dynamic social 
processes (Hedstrom, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, a “Web science” approach is advocated by Tim Berners-Lee 
and Nigel Shadbolt towards the study of the Internet, with a view to account for 
and harness the emergent properties on the Internet and predict what new is 
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coming. A major area of the “science” is to explore the micro-macro process, 
specifically, “how a small technical innovation can launch a large social 
phenomenon”, for example, the emergence of the blogosphere and its 
socio-political impact(Shadbolt & Berners-Lee, 2008)42.  
 
My research concerns how individual creativity fits into and feeds the 
knowledge creation and innovation of a society, with evidence from spoof 
videos. So it is a typical one exploring the micro-macro process. Specifically, my 
research tries to understand how the “micro”, that is, the creativity of 
individuals demonstrated in each spoof, develops into the “macro”, the 
creativity and innovation system of a society. It also includes a “meso” level, that 
is, social networks and cultures emerging around spoof videos and 
organizational forms or institutions like Tudou.com. In my conceptualization of 
this micro-macro nexus, ideas and people behind spoof videos (individual 
creativity) form networks and sub cultures (creative networks), which through 
a “generative” process contribute and influence the overall properties of the 
network culture (innovation on the national level). The network culture in turn 
provides the context for individual behaviour, thus forming a closed feedback 
loop of creativity and innovation, as is shown in Figure 8. 
 
                                                        
42 For more about Web science, see Berners-Lee, T., Hall, W., & Hendler, J. A. (2006). A 
Framework for Web Science. Now Publishers Inc. 
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Figure 8: A Micro-Macro Nexus 
 
Textual Analysis 
Textual analysis is a type of qualitative analysis that, beyond the manifest 
content of media, looks for the underlying ideological and cultural assumptions 
of the text. As a prevalent method in media studies, it has a controversial history 
and there has been no shortage of critics against and defenders for it. A recent 
critic is Greg Philo. In his criticism of critical discourse analysis as developed by 
Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough, Philo (2007) disapproves text-based 
studies as “limited in the conclusions which can be drawn ” as they don’t cover 
“key production factors” or “audience understanding”(p. 175). As a corrective, 
Philo proposes that the only adequate way to account for the circulation of 
social meanings is to analyse, at once, the processes of content, production, 
reception and circulation.  
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In response to Philo’s criticism Carvalho (2008) argues that critical discourse 
analysis has been done in a much more contextualized way than is given credit  
by Philo. Fürsich (2008) goes further to points out that Philo’s concern about 
production factors and audience reception was addressed by Raymond Williams 
in 1974, when he developed the idea of “pluralistic television criticism”, which 
incorporate at once all aspects of cultural production (p. 2). And at a later stage 
the issue was looked after by du Gay, et al. in their approach to cultural studies 
as the investigation of the “circuit of culture” (du Gay, Hall, Janes, Mackay, & 
Negus, 1997). Fürsich goes on to lauch a full defence of textual analysis. She 
points out the potential traps in the investagation of production processes and 
in audience research, and outlines the advantages of textual analysis in allowing 
open, mult-layerd readings of texts, in understanding the narrative role of 
media, and in elucidating “the scope and spectrum of the mediated reality” 
(Fürsich, 2008, pp. 7-9). 
 
By reviewing briefly the debtates about textual analysis, I do not intend to join 
in the debates about research methods or take sides. My point here is that there 
are no best research methods, only the most suitable ones. A research method is 
as good as the researcher who uses it. As Bonnie Dow observes about textual 
studies and audience studies, neither present ‘‘better’’ evidence because in both 
methodologies ‘‘the act of interpretation and argument by the researcher 
(whether ethnographer or critic) is paramount’’ (as cited in Fürsich, 2008, p. 6). 
We need to show methodological sensitivity and flexibilty so as to choose the 
methods that best serve our research topic.  
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The subjects to be analyzed in my research are spoof videos, a form of parodic 
cultural production, that, according to Bakhtin, are double-voiced discourses. As 
such, they have multi-layered texts that needed to be decoded by readers or 
viewers if they are going to get it (Druick, 2009). As parody plays on words and 
texts and has different meanings behind what is actually said, the best way to 
tease out those meanings is to attend to the texts themselves. What makes spoof 
videos funny? What makes them pleasurable? What’s intent or hidden meanings 
behind the humor?Only through texual analysis can we spell out the niceties and 
the creative possibilities of the texts.  
As Fürsich suggests, textual analysis “typically results in a strategic selection 
and presentation of analyzed text as the evidence for the overall argument” 
(2008, p. 3), in the following chapters I will choose what I take to be illustrative 
texts or moments, rather than attempting “objective” or “scientific” 
methodologies of sampling, surveying or statistics. My research will be 
qualitative, documentary, interpretive, and argumentative, rather than 
quantitative, diagnostic and prescriptive.  
 
Text, context and paratext 
In their study of YouTube video cultures, Burgess and Green (2009) find that 
reading the videos themselves not enough to account for the popularity and 
suggests that it is only by looking at the creative activity that occurs around 
these videos that we begin to understand just how important participation is to 
popularity. 
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In his study on the significance power television previews hold over the 
consumption of the television programs involved, Jonathan Gray (Gray, 2008) 
points to the importance of “paratexts” ,that is, all elements surrounding a text 
that are not perceived as wholly of the text. Paratexts may include book covers, 
hypes, reviews, advertisement, parody or fan production, and public response. 
He argues that 
[S]ince paratexts can add meanings to a text, clearly our discussion of 
media effects, power and identification should involve significant 
acknowledgment of the degree to which paratexts create or contribute 
to the text’s many powers.  
 
This point that there is a need to go beyond a particular text in order to 
understand it better is one with which the Carvalho (2008) concurs. She writes, 
While discourse analysts have concentrated attention on the text, many 
of discourse’s modes of operation are extra- or supra-textual, i.e. they 
are realized beyond or independently of a given text (p. 165). 
 
To address this issue she proposes the category of discursive effects by which 
she means “processes that are linked to texts, but occur outside the text or 
‘above’ it”. These process “cannot be ‘found’ in one single text”(p. 165) . For a 
networked video spoof, its para-texts include peer comments, hyperlink 
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information, and other related videos, such as video replies, parodies and 
copycats. 
 
Context is widely used in media studies as a tool to situate meaning in a social, 
cultural, and historical context. Context is an integral part of my study as it 
provide a historical framework for the understanding “our own terms”. By 
providing my readers with contexts and paratexts of a specific text, I don’t aim 
to establish causalities between them. Rather, my intention is to flesh out and 
explain the possible scope of the texts before us. Were it the case that certain 
contexts always lead to a specific textual forms, we would be deprived of the 
happy surprises of creative changes.   
 
Aiming for smart guesses 
Since textual analysis is about “making educated guesses” (McKee, 2003, p. 1), 
there are no defined protocol for it. Nonetheless, there is no need to feel sorry 
about that, because as Anssi Perakyla, there is not necessarily a need to 
predefine the paradigms: 
In many cases, qualitative researchers who use written texts as 
their materials do not try to follow any predefined protocol in 
executing their analysis. By reading and rereading their empirical 
materials, they try to pin down their key themes and, thereby, to 
draw a picture of the presumptions and meanings that constitute 
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the cultural world of which the textual material is a specimen 
(2008, p. 352).  
 
That being said, there is good advice to take heed. Stuart Hall suggests that we 
conduct a “long preliminary soak” (as cited in Fürsich, 2008, p. 3) in the text at 
hand. Fürsich (2008) proposes “a prolonged engagement” of the chosen text 
using multiple approaches to qualitative analysis. Hartley(1996) compares the 
relation between text and reader to kissing, and the textual analyst an 
non-participant observer of the kissing. It is an interesting metaphor and merits 
a lengthy quote, 
Kisses are thus very like meanings, being soft, fleeting, and 
immensely important, sometimes telling the truth, sometimes not, 
sometimes holding the universe still for a moment, sometimes 
betokening very little; always highly coded according to existing 
socio-cultural, historical and political systems for both performers 
and observers, and always marking, changing and renewing the 
boundaries between the public and the private(pp. 4-5,my 
emphasis).  
 
As a result of this peculiarly intimate nature of the text-reader relation, what the 
analyst can do is to read it within the “the cultural and intellectual traditions and 
training in which their literacy is formed and practiced”(Hartley, 1996, p. 5, my 
emphasis), and one way to do it is to “read thy self”(Hartley, 2006).  
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Ethnographic Research 
An ethnographic aspect will be used to complement the study of texts. This is 
done in two ways: participant observation and interview. I have opened a user 
account in Tudou.com, a major video-sharing site in China launched at roughly 
the same time as YouTube. Through that account, I have participated in sharing, 
commenting, friending and messaging on the site. This has helped me follow the 
trajectories of popular videos and topics and better understand the cultural 
practices on the site. As a participant observer I also find it easier to talk to 
users and Internet entrepreneurs in my interviews.  
The purpose of the interviews is to collect data on media users’ experiences 
with and thoughts about videos spoofs and video sharing platforms, and to gain 
insight on the role of video sharing sites in the development of video cultures.  
People interviewed include video creators, users and executives of Tudou.com. 
The interviews are semi-structured and biographical, with questions revolving 
personal experiences with and opinions about online media in general, and 
video spoofs in particular; contexts of creative practice; and involvement in 
online communities and offline activities. The face-to-face interviews are done 
in Beijing and Shanghai, with follow-up questions exchanged online through 
instant message tools such as MSN (Microsoft Messenger) and QQ (a native 
messaging tool in China). Four interviews are done through emails, instant 
messaging tools and Skype VoIP. Before each interview, a brief introduction of 
the project is made and participants’ rights spelled out to make sure that 
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interviewees make informed choice as to whether they are happy to take part in 
the project. 
The thesis as a whole is designed to bring a historical and a holistic perspective 
to bear on an emerging cultural phenomenon that is the online spoofing culture 
in China, linking the past with the present, the micro to the macro. In the 
process, I have mainly used textual analysis and interviews as tools for analysis. 
Textual analysis is done throughout the thesis, on popular videos themselves, 
and in some cases on video logs, blogs and comments, to provide contextual and 
paratextual information. The people interviewed are users of and practitioners 
in the video streaming industries. In the first category I have interviewed Hu Ge, 
Jiaoshou and Corndog, three user celebrities in China’s cyberspace. In the 
second category I have sat with Jiang Weimin, chief content officer of 
Tudou.com, one of the most popular video-sharing sites in China. A detailed 
account of the three users, how and why I select them for my analysis, their 
networks and productions, are reported in Chapter Four. The information I have 
collected in my interview with Ms Jiang is used in Chapter Five, where I use 
Tudou.com as a case study to tease out the complex role of video platforms, as a 
link at the meso level that connects the micro (users and user networks) and 
macro (state and society).  
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A seemingly ordinary, even meaningless, link may open up a new 
world, full of possibilities.  
                                  Wang Wei(2010)43 
 
Given that spoofs are considered to be “critical” (Hutcheon, 1991) or “polemical” 
(Dentith, 2000, p. 9) allusive imitations, spoof videos are expected to challenge, 
to critique, and to make statements, though Jameson (1984) doubts that 
post-modern societies, with its culture “amputated of the satirical impulse”, still 
retain a critical edge (p. 65). While technology crosses cultural and sovereign 
boundaries, its uses are always local. As technology of self-presentation, spoof 
videos are highly diverse and idiosyncratic in its uses, shaped by personal 
proclivity of users and the cultural settings in which various parodic practises 
are embedded. Willett (2009) provides a contextualized analysis of spoof videos 
in the UK. What stands out in her finding is that while spoofs can be used for 
culture criticism, in most cases the “polemical” part of these videos was “highly 
ambiguous”. They serve more “localised” functions, used by amateur creators as 
a space for peer play and identify construction (p. 131). In Chapter Four I will 
discuss the formation and performance of identity in user networks and 
                                                        
43 Wang Wei is the founder and CEO of Tudou.com, one of the biggest video-sharing sites in 
China. The quote is from his voiceover in the finale of the 2010 Tudou Video Festival, available 
at http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/HCwJTYlmMX4/. 
Chapter Three: The uses of networked spoof 
videos: spoofs as phatic communication, 
alternative memory and playful citizenship 
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communities. I elaborate the other uses that spoof videos afford in this chapter. 
The focus of my analysis will shift from personal to social, with a view to tease 
out the cultural-political functions of spoof videos as a collectivity in the current 
socio-political settings of China, rather than providing a detailed account of the 
vastly variegated uses to which they are put by diverse user-creators. In so 
doing I hope to further our understanding of spoofing culture from internal 
structures to the external agency. In particular I will look at three uses of spoof 
videos in China, namely their functions as phatic communication, social archive 
and playful citizenship. By localising and contextualising—rather than giving a 
generic account of—these functions I hope to tease out the specific ethos of 
spoofing culture in China.  
 
In my analysis of the phatic function of spoof video, I have drawn upon a large 
body of literature ranging from linguistics to informatics, from Socrates to 
Confucius, in the belief that historical and interdisciplinary approaches are 
needed if we want shed new light on an important subject that, as is shown in 
the following section, is often misunderstood and ridiculed. The same approach 
is also used in my examination of spoof videos as alternative memory. The texts 
and videos I have studied in this chapter are collected through my ethnographic 
experience as a participant observer on Tudou.com, a video streaming site in 
China. The content bank of video-sharing sites for spoof videos grows by 
thousands with each passing day. For clarity and convenience I have to choose 
some texts and videos over others. My criteria for choosing include: (a) 
representativeness, because these are popular and widely shared texts; (b) 
prominence and attention, because they are covered by either Chinese or 
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international media, thus enjoying a high level of fame or notoriety among users; 
and (c) pertinence to my research questions, which allows me to pursue my 
thesis at a deeper level of analysis.  
 
SPOOF VIDEOS AS PHATIC COMMUNICATIONS 
Senseless babbles?  
Andreas Wittel (2001) notes an emerging paradigmatic shift in the social forms 
of our times away from stability, coherence, embeddedness and belonging, 
towards a sociality that is de-localised, on the move, over distance and based on 
technological closeness (p. 70). He calls this phenomenon the rise of a “network 
sociality”. According to Wittel, in a network sociality, social relations are no 
longer rooted in common narrative and shared biography, but primarily based 
on the constant “exchange of data and on ‘catching up’” (p. 51). Deep and 
substantive communication has given way to phatic and ephemeral checking up 
of open channels, to be consumed and reproduced at a later stage. The flattening 
and thinning out of social bonds is in thus tandem with the flattening of 
communication, mutually reinforcing each other.  
 
The concept of “network sociality” is adopted by Vincent Miller (2008) in his 
critical study of the new media’s “drift” from blogging, social networking to 
micro-blogging(p. 398). However, with a big departure from the optimism of 
Wittel, who embraces the network’s “open structures”, dynamism and limitless 
potential for expansion (2001, p. 52), Miller (2008) calls attention to the 
prospect of “an online media culture increasingly dominated by phatic 
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communication”, with links and networks taking precedence over content and 
dialogue (p. 387). He calls it “the phatic culture” and laments that it may lead to 
“nihilistic” consequences.   
 
Echoing Miller’s dystopian view of the “phatic” in communication is a survey on 
the uses of Twitter by Pear Analytics (2009). According to the survey, 40.55% of 
the tweets fall in the category of “pointless babble”: tweets of the sort as “I am 
eating a sandwich now”, in stark contrast to 3.6% for news. Despite the 
positioning of Twitter as a premium source of news, as shown in the 
catchphrase on its homepage: “The best way to discover what’s new in your 
world”44, it is primarily a phatic media and used for phatic purposes. 
 
YouTube is another phatic platform. In a study of video interaction on YouTube, 
Adami (2009) examined a video thread that builds up from a video titled @–
Where Do You Tube?–@45, posted on YouTube in March 2007 . In the video, 
ChangeDaChannel, a popular vlogger, has his mouth covered, gazes at the 
camera at first, then produces a pen and a notebook and writes a line on it, “I 
TUBE FRom CALi, USA”. In a few second he writes and shows this second 
writing, “WHERE DO You TUBE FRom?” After that the screen turns black with 
his typed invitation for responses and his promise to make a sequence to follow 
up. The video is more of an invitation to participation and performance than a 
solicitation for information. It serves more phatic functions than informational 
ones. Adami collected altogether 837 video responses within five months of the 
                                                        
44 http://twitter.com/, accessed on 18 November 2010.  
45 The video and its video responses are available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/video_response_view_all?v=IXXUloFArsU.  
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uploading of initial video, and in her analysis of these videos she finds that while 
most users answer the question, others defy, spam, curse, or spoof. Users take 
the invitation as a “themed performance” through interactional exchange. 
“Unique-but-attuned” performances are staged by users to balance 
differentiation and compliance with the invitation so as to “minimize the risk of 
exclusion” in the follow-up video. Till today, users are still using texts and 
videos to participate the game. 
 
So, while “the Internet has a lot of small-talk and chit-chat, and much less 
Shakespeare and science” (Hartley, 2009, p. 112), the small-talk and chit-chat 
are much more than “pointless babble”, and there is no sign of nihilism on the 
Internet yet. Behind the phatics are creative performance, the need for 
connection, the urge of inclusion, and the potential for new forms of sociality 
and knowledge production. As Hartley argues, in the time of phatic media, it is 
necessary to “re-evaluate” phatic communication (Hartley, 2009, p. 114), which 
I intend to do in the rest of the section. Commenting on the imperative to 
theorize phatic communication, Žegarac (1998) observes, “phatic 
communication is often mentioned in passing, sometimes described, but, to the 
best of my knowledge, never explained”(p. 327). In this context, my 
re-evaluation starts with the genesis of the term, proceeds to its development 
linguistics and ICT, and ends with a discussion on its potential in facilitating new 
forms of sociality and knowledge production. In the process I aim to explain one 
thing about phatic communication: Why it matters?  
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The phatic 
Phatic communion as a mode of action 
In his seminal paper, The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages, 
Malinowski (1949) discusses the distinction between language as “an 
instrument of reflection” and language as “a mode of action”. He asked, “Are our 
conclusions about language [as a “mirror of reflected thought”] correct…when 
the object of talk is not to achieve some aim but the exchange of words almost 
serves as the end in itself”(p. 312)? To illustrate his point he cited situations 
where language is used for its own sake, 
A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes 
as in a European drawing-room, fulfils a function to which the 
meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant. Inquiries 
about health, comments on weather, affirmation of some 
supremely obvious state of things— all such are exchanged, not in 
order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, 
certainly not in order to express any thought (p. 313).  
 
Malinowski (1949) argues that this case of “language used in free, aimless, social 
intercourse requires special consideration” (p. 313) and calls this type of 
linguistic uses as “phatic communion”. For Malinowski, phatic communication is 
“a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchanges of 
words” (p. 315, my emphasis), thus phatic exchanges are primarily for checking 
socials connections rather than communicating ideas, as Malinowski (1949) 
states, 
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Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey 
meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! 
They fulfil a social function, and that is their principal aim, but 
they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they 
necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we may 
say that language does not function here as a means of 
transmission of thought (p. 315).   
 
For Malinowski, language in phatic communication is used as a mode of action. 
As such its mere linguistic meaning is almost irrelevant as its purpose is to fulfil 
a social function: to initiate, retain, strengthen or terminate a social link, to 
create an ambience of sociability or personal bonding between interlocutors.  
 
The phatic function and the communication channel 
Linguist Roman Jakobson (1960) identifies six constitutive factors in verbal 
communication, namely addresser(speaker), addressee (hearer), context, 
contact(channel),code and the message itself. According to Jakobson each of 
these factors determines a different function of language. Thus we have six 
functions of language corresponding six factors of verbal communication (See 
Figure 9)46: 
 addresser—emotive, or expressive 
 addressee—conative, or regulatory 
 message—poetic, or aesthetic 
 context—referential, denotative 
                                                        
46 See Hartley(2011b)  for a more detailed explanation of Jakobson’s six functions of language.  
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 contact—phatic 
 code-metalingual 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Language functions in verbal communication  
Based on diagrams of Jakobson (1960, p. 353, p. 357) 
 
Jakobson (1960) borrows the term and characterises the phatic function as the 
use of language to focus on “physical channel and psychological connection” 
between communicators to attract attention and confirm engagement, rather 
than on the information conveyed by the language code, though at the same 
time he states that there are hardly any verbal messages “that would fulfil only 
one function” (p. 353). He illustrates that profuse phatic exchanges occur 
sometimes with the mere purpose of keeping the channel open. Jakobson’s use 
of the phatic function to address the “physical channel and psychological 
connection” is a reduction of Malinowski’s idea of the phatic for “ties of union”, 
but shares with the latter in its focus on relations in communication.  
 
The phatic and relations in communication 
While the term “phatic” has not attracted sufficient attention in communication 
research, the relational aspect of phatic communication (“ties of union”, or as 
Jakobson put it, “physical channel and psychological connection”) has been 
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addressed by scholars of various disciplines from linguistics to communications. 
Laver(1974)proposes that the fundamental social function of phatic exchanges 
is “the detailed management of interpersonal relationships” (p. 217). Halliday 
(1978)suggests that any semiotic act plays an “interpersonal function” apart 
from providing information. 
 
For James Carey (1975), Malinowski’s notion of phatic communion is proof in 
support of his ritualistic view of communication, because it shows that “even 
writers indissolubly wedded to the transmission view of communication must 
include some notion… to attest however tardily to the place of ritual action in 
social life.” So the phatic is part of a social ritual and as such it is directed “not 
toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of 
society in time”. In so doing Carey also restores the currency of the term beyond 
linguistics and applies it back to the broad field of human communication. In the 
“Interactional View” of communication championed by the Palo Alto Group, 
there are two levels of communication in each exchange: the “content” and the 
“relationship” (Wilder, 1979). Chen and Ding (X. Chen & Ding, 2009) have kept 
up the binary of “information communication” and “relations communication” 
with the relational aspect given primary status. As they write, 
In fact, a core aspect of communication lies in its construction of 
relations with and interaction between the subjects of 
communication… Communication reflects, explains, and at the 
same time maintains a kind of relationship carried by the message 
content. The relationship is more fundamental than the content; it 
influences and even decides the content.  
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(X. Chen & Ding, 2009, p. 371) 
 
Here the “construction of relations” is placed at the centre of any 
communicative act, foregrounding the pivotal role of the phatic function in 
human communication. Chen and Ding (2009) provide scenarios where 
information content approaches zero with “pure communication relation” still 
there. Their argument echoes an observation by linguist Jean Aitchison (1996), 
who notes that “Conversational interaction between friends often supplies a 
minimum of information, but a maximum of supportive chat” (p. 22).  
 
In their study of communication in technology-enabled remote collaboration 
Casalegno & McWilliam (2004) define phatic communication as the “transitional, 
marginal moments in which the users make conventional, stereotyped and 
trivial conversation that is essential to establish a certain harmony and good 
communication dynamics between them” (p. 20). They provide an ideal 
scenario to demonstrate the importance of phatic communication in a cycle of 
communication: the opening, medial and closing moments:   
In the opening phase phatic communication is important as it 
allows the users to find a common language, to spot a common 
semantic field and to establish a psychological feeling and a 
certain hierarchy among them. During the closing phase the users 
consolidate their relationship and its new nature, confirm their 
agreements or what they discussed in the medial phase, seal their 
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agreement or disagreement and set the parameters for any 
eventual future exchange. (Casalegno & William, 2004, p. 20) 
 
Phatic interpretation and risk 
An outstanding commonality of the literature reviewed above is that they all 
approach the phatic function from the speaker’s point of review, focusing on the 
purpose or intention of the speaker to the neglect of role of the hearer in the 
process. Obviously, if a phatic conversation is be started and sustained, the 
speakers must be able to produce a (phatic) utterance, and the hearers must be 
able to interpret it as such and be willing to concur to it. Failure in either side to 
do so will risk in communication failure. 
 
In Žegarac & Clark’s explanation of phatic communication, three propositions 
are developed with regard to phatic interpretation (Vlad Žegarac & Clark, 1999, 
pp. 333-335) 
 Some interpretations depend on the fact that something has been said 
rather than on exactly what has been said. There is a big difference 
between what is “communicated” and what is “linguistically encoded”.  
 There are degrees of phatic-ness. By definition, no utterance can be 
entirely non-phatic.  
 Phatic interpretations become more likely when the social relationship 
between the interlocutors is in doubt. 
 
According to Žegarac (Vladimir Žegarac, 1998; Vlad Žegarac & Clark, 1999), a 
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hearer interprets the phatic-ness of an utterance in a way that is most relevant 
based on contextual assumptions. This concurs with the primacy Malinowski 
put on the “context of situation” in meaning-making of verbal communication, as 
he says, “In the reality of a spoken living tongue, the utterance has no meaning 
except in the context of situation” (Malinowski, 1949, p. 307). While Malinowski 
(1949) and Jakobson (1960) limit the phatic function to the use of language, 
through the distinction between what is communicated and what is linguistically 
encoded in phatic communication Žegarac & Clark (1999) extend the pertinence 
and efficacy of term to account for non-verbal communication, making it 
possible to put it to bear on the analysis of written and visual forms of 
communication pervasive in our era of social media. 
 
One of the examples analysed by Žegarac & Clark (1999) is particularly helpful 
in fixing our misconception about phatic exchanges. Consider the utterance 
Pauline says to Arthur, “there is a red gas bill”. It is not conventionally regarded 
as a phatic message. However, if Pauline makes the utterance during breakfast 
after they stop talking to each other for three days following a major row, the 
very fact that Pauline has spoken at all is the most relevant for Arthur so that he 
unlikely to pay much attention to what is the linguistically encoded information 
in the utterance. His interpretation of the utterance will be totally phatic, to the 
effect of “Pauline wishes to communicate with me”, or “Pauline wishes to make 
up with me”, rather than making a fuss about the colour (red) or type (gas) of 
the bill(Vlad Žegarac & Clark, 1999, pp. 331-333).  
 
The point I want to stress here is that there is no linear connection between 
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content and function in verbal commutation. Although there are standardized 
and conventionalized phatic forms, the phatic function can be realized in 
numerous ways as seen appropriate in specific and concrete contexts. Contrary 
to general perception, to be phatic doesn't necessarily mean to be banal and 
insubstantial. It is beyond consideration of substantiality and informativity. 
Phatic exchanges are not all small talk and chitchat. In some context, 
“Shakespeare and science” serve more of a phatic than informative function. To 
denigrate the phatic as “pointless babble” is to miss the point in two ways. 
Firstly it throws meaning on messages without regard to their linguistic and 
cognitive contexts. It mixes content with intent, form with function, 
communicative (social) with informative (cognitive) messages and adopts a 
normative stand towards human communication. In so doing it fails to 
acknowledge the social (phatic) function of (ostensibly) informative messages.  
 
Phatic interpretation is discussed here in ideal situations where interlocutors 
follow the “Cooperative Principle” (Grice, 1975, p. 45)in their exchanges. 
However, in the reality of everyday conversation, hearer agency is always an 
issue to be reckoned with. An initiation of a banal exchange about weather 
(phatic) can be interpreted (appropriated) as opportunity to start a substantive 
conversation about climate change. As the case discussed in Adami (2009) 
shows, a seemingly obvious invitation to provide information as of the 
whereabouts of YouTubers are appropriated (or rightly interpreted?) as an 
invitation to perform the self.   
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The phatic and communication media 
Up till now I have discussed the phatic in verbal communication where 
interaction takes place in the context of “co-presence”, where interlocutors 
share the same “spatial-temporal framework” (Thompson, 2005, p. 32) and 
contextual information, where the phatic is realized, and interpreted, in a 
multiplicity of ways: words, gestures, facial expressions, among other symbolic 
cues. In our life world today social interaction is, more often than not, mediated, 
“stretched” across space and compressed in time: print media (postcards, books 
and newspapers), mass media (film, radio and television), and digital media 
(mobile phone, Internet, iPad) are part and parcel of our everyday life. Phatic 
communication in these mediated interactions has taken forms as afforded or 
restrained by the media technologies with which these interactions take place. I 
identify three modes of mediated interaction here and discuss in turn the 
transformation of phatic communication by media technologies in each mode of 
interaction.  
 
The phatic as intimacy and creativity 
The first mode of mediated interaction is one-to-one, interpersonal 
communication. While physically co-present interpersonal communication is 
often mostly verbal, mediated interpersonal encounters can take both verbal 
and textual forms. Instant messaging tools today are converging towards 
platforms for audio, video and textual communication, available for calls, textual 
messages, and video conferencing with a camera attached to them. The 
versatility of mobile phones allows people to be connected around the clock 
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even on the move, either through voice, text messaging or emails. Phatic 
communication in these encounters has also taken different forms.  
 
Kate Crawford (2010) finds that a level of intimacy is built through phone calls 
by “sharing the banalities of everyday life” and “talking about what might seem 
to others to be insignificant details”. According to an ethnographic research on 
mobile uses in Japan by Ito and Okabe (2005), light, low-content instant 
messages are exchanged between young mobile users throughout the day. 
These messages are short and simple, typically containing information that does 
not require a response, such as the communicators’ physical location, activity 
status, or mood. Ito and Okabe (2005) compare these messages to the “virtual 
tap on the shoulder” (p. 265). These “virtual taps” are there to create an 
ambience of “virtual co-presence” while physically separated, to maintain 
“on-going background awareness of others” and to keep “multiple channels of 
communication open” (p. 264). They may lead to a chat sequence of textual 
messaging or voice call, or be ignored, depending on the availability of the 
recipient for focused interaction.  
 
What makes Ito and Okabe’s (2005) research particularly relevant to the 
discussion on the phatic here is their finding that mobile users sometimes use 
substantive content for phatic purposes. A student in their research spent about 
ten minutes talking about fireworks with her boyfriend through text-based chat. 
In the interview she admitted that her interest was not in the fireworks but the 
conversation itself. As she said, 
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Part of the way through, it becomes just something to keep the 
conversation going just for the sake of continuing. Around when 
[sic] this fireworks topic comes up. All I wanted to really say was 
about my workday, but since I still have some time to kill. I didn't 
really care about the fireworks. (Ito & Okabe, 2005, p. 262) 
 
In a study on the use of “intimate technologies”, Vetere and his colleagues 
(Vetere, Gibbs, et al., 2005) use cultural probes, interviews and focus groups to 
document expressions of intimacy among six couples over seven weeks. They 
find that phatic exchanges with little instrumental value are conducted through 
notes, emails, and mobile text messages. These “idle chatter”, seemly trivial and 
empty, has important emotional value and is genuinely valued by participant of 
the research. What matters to them is the reassurance that they are connected 
and a channel of communication is available to them, rather than the 
informational value of their communication. 
 
The phatic doesn’t only come in written, textual forms. In instant messaging, 
emoticons (emotion icons) are used instead of or side by side with text to 
achieve socially oriented communication: to greet, to show mood, and to 
express intimacy (Derks, Bos, & Grumbkow, 2007; Walther & D’Addario, 2001).  
In a lightweight asynchronous messaging system called the Cube (Figure 10), 
personalized and combinatorial graphical codes are used for exchanges of 
“expressive content” across distance. The Cube runs on any Internet connected 
computer with Java Runtime Environment. To compose a message, one needs to 
rotate the cube to reveal one of six sides, and place one or more symbols on the 
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three-by-three canvas. The recipient of the message will then be alerted by 
email or SMS, allowing them to access the Cube to review and reply to the 
message (Howard, Kjeldskov, Skov, Garnoes, & Grünberger, 2006). A similar 
design is called SynchroMate. It is a handheld device that fit snugly in the palm 
of one’s hand, with a touch sensitive display and a small number of 
programmable buttons. Messages are composed with short, iconic sketches on 
the screen. The device vibrates gently and the circles on the touch screen 
changes colour when receiving messages. Like the Cube, SynchroMate focuses 
attention on the mechanics, and fact, of message composition and exchange, 
rather than on the content of any messages (Gibbs, Vetere, Bunyan, & Howard, 
2005). The Cube and SynchroMate are part of the technologies that are called by 
ICT designer as “phatic technologies” whose purpose it is to sustain social 
interactions rather than to inform (Gibbs, et al., 2005; Howard, et al., 2006; 
Makice, 2009; Vetere, Howard, & Gibbs, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 10: The Cube 
Source: Howard et al. (2006, p. 911) 
 
104 
 
What these different forms of phatic exchange share is the ability of the users to 
engage with the features of each tool of communication to express their 
creativity and uniqueness with texts, icons, codes, and sketches, and to play with 
the technologies. Soffer (2010)calls text messages “digital orality” and finds that 
the non-verbal feature of this new type of orality is “celebrated” rather than 
lamented by users. They toy with features afforded by the media and come up 
with new emoticons, symbols and personalized shortening forms, in the 
creative process projecting a positive impression. Users of SynchroMate can 
“tease”, play and flirt with text composition (Gibbs, et al., 2005). When 
technology is a given, user agency come into play. This echoes the 
“hyperpersonal model” of computer-mediated communication (CMC), which 
posits that “users exploit the technological aspects of CMC in order to enhance 
the messages they construct to manage impressions and facilitate desired 
relationships” (Walther, 2007, p. 2538). In interpersonal interactions across 
time and space, the impressions are managed through discursive and artistic 
creativity. In these settings, the phatic has not only to do with channel-opening, 
connection-maintaining and intimacy-building; it is also an opportunity and a 
platform for creative play and self performance.  
 
The phatic as corporate marketing 
The second mode of mediated interaction is the one-to-many broadcasting 
communication. One-to-many interactions are typically found in primary oral 
societies to publish and preserve knowledge (Soffer, 2010), and in the church to 
persuade and enlist following. In the broadcasting age, one-to-many 
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communication is used to market and sell. To this end the phatic is adopted by 
broadcasting media to create a sense of “intimacy at distance” (Horton & Wohl, 
1956). Horton and Wohl (1956) observe that this kind of intimacy is staged and 
performed by the “personae” on radio and television who talk as if they were 
making a personal and private conversation. On television, gestures, casual 
styles and a flow of small talk are maintained to give the impression that an 
invisible interlocutor is being engaged whose contribution is valued and 
responded. On radio, this is done through an informal, chatty style of 
conversation. As Dave Garroway confesses,47  
I just rambled along, saying whatever came into my mind. I was 
introspective. I tried to pretend that I was chatting with a friend 
over a highball late in the evening. . . Then - and later - I 
consciously tried to talk to the listener as an individual, to make 
each listener feel that he knew me and I knew him. (Horton & 
Wohl, 1956, p. 217) 
 
This use of phatic communication by broadcasting organisations, as Hartley 
(2011b, p. 293) points out, is “ideological”: it serves an institutional purpose 
rather than the purpose of phatic communication as such; the newsreader’s 
cheery ‘hello’ is not to communicate directly with an interlocutor but to make 
you feel that there is a natural relationship with them48. The phatic becomes 
part and parcel of corporate pursuit of high rating figures. Intimacy and open 
                                                        
47 Garroway was the first "communicator" on NBC Radio's Monitor when the program began on 
June 12, 1955, and was the founding host of NBC's Today from 1952 to 1961. For more 
information about him visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Garroway. 
48 This clarification of the word “ideological” is done by John Hartley through personal 
communication.  
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channels are initiated, maintained and valued for corporate purposes. As 
Hartley (2011) writes, 
News anchors will say ‘Good evening’ to a camera, but (hopefully) 
be heard as establishing communication with each viewer. The 
more populist and entertainment-oriented the show, the more it 
will distend phatic communication. Game show hosts will engage 
in phatic communication with both contestants and viewers, at 
least in the non-competitive, fun versions of such shows. Their 
warm and friendly linguistic performance slides into corporate 
marketing, because the TV channel itself is associated with the 
openness and other-orientation characteristic of phatic 
communication. (Hartley, 2011, p. 293) 
 
Since mediated one-to-may interactions take place out of shared contexts, 
phatic messages in these interactions tend to be open-ended. With contexts 
missing and listeners invisible, communication under these circumstances is 
more like monological performance, with the actors talking with and 
performing for an imagined audience.  
 
The challenges of phatic interpretation in social media 
As is discussed above, the phatic-ness of an utterance is interpreted in a way 
that is most relevant to a particular context. This interpretation has become 
literally impossible in social media, which collapse multiple, diverse contexts 
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into one. To borrow the term used by Lasica (2001) to theorize weblogs, social 
media are by nature a many-to-may, or “any-to-any” system of talking and 
sharing. As such it requires that communicators follow rules of “the marketplace 
of ideas” (Singer, 2005): initiating interactions and acting creatively so as to 
draw as much attention as possible, just as what people typically do to sell in a 
Saturday market. In the market of goods, people shout, sing, dance or put up big 
and colourful billboards to gain attention. In the market of ideas that is the 
social media, users craft idiosyncratic profiles (H. Liu, 2007), manage 
connections (boyd, 2006; Donath & boyd, 2004) and create videos (Adami, 2009) 
to achieve the same goal. If creativity in phatics is a plus in one-to-one 
interactions, in the many-to-may social media environment it is a must.  
 
As Crawford (2010) argues, “much of human conversation is couched in small 
talk and embedded in mundane”. So when we watch a funny and funky video 
online, we need not only to look for the narrative, informational or aesthetic 
messages in the video, but also to appreciate the relational (phatic) messages 
imbedded in every communicative act in the cyberspace: the urge to be 
connected, and for that purpose the need to be different and creative. However, 
not everybody is born or trained to be an artist. So we see in the cyberspace a 
lot of visual and textual productions that can at best be termed mediocre. They 
are mostly ephemera rather than archive, “broadcasting the banal” rather than 
the grandiose (Crawford, 2010), “said and done” and got over with as soon as 
uttered (Hartley, 2009, p. 112), as what we see in the offline world. However, to 
call them “senseless babble” is to disregard the “techno-social situations” (Ito & 
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Okabe, 2005) of communication online, and to miss an important aspect of any 
act of human communication: The channel-maintaining, connection-building 
and union-strengthening function of human interaction. As Hartley writes, 
Compared with The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, such language-use as 
‘lol’ or Facebook’s prompt ‘What’s on your mind?’ may indeed 
seem impoverished, but without contact-maintaining traffic the 
online environment would not be able to function at all. Further, it 
can serve to remind us that the bulk of most media usage, speech 
included, is phatic rather than something more ‘worthy’ but less 
communicative. (Hartley, 2011, p. 293) 
 
The development of ICT has created new territories for communication, from 
aural to textual to visual, and the ways the phatic is exchanged have also 
changed significantly. If, as Chen & Ding (X. Chen & Ding, 2009) argue, the crux 
of new media communication is not “technical message” but “dialogic relations”, 
then the phatic is what starts, sustains, and to a large extent constitutes these 
dialogues. It is an “indispensable element of concerted human action” 
(Malinowski, 1949, p. p.361). In time of need, “Shakespeare and science” can 
also be phatic. 
 
Up till now I have been arguing for the significance of phatic communication in a 
“network sociality” (Wittel, 2001) that features our times. In this sociality the 
phatic serves as a space for creative performance and a means to get and remain 
connected. I have argued that these connections serve important social 
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functions and this is reason enough to value phatic messages. However, the 
re-evaluation of phatic communication is only half-finished if I stop here, 
without exploring the epistemological side of the connections, asking why 
getting linked matters for fulfilling the potential of the Internet in knowledge 
production, or what Hartley calls “dialogic productivity” (Hartley, 2011a).  
 
In what follows I intend to provide an epistemology of the connection. The 
purpose is not to conduct philosophical inquiries into the nature of true 
knowledge but to explore the “knowledge-producing practices” (Ekström, 2002) 
and potential of the connection. In so doing I hope to offer my side of the answer 
to the question of why getting connected matters. I will use link, which we use in 
many cases interchangeably with connection, as metaphor, method and form for 
the connection. I start with the path-opening function of the link in the 
production of new knowledge as shown in the dialogue between Socrates and 
the slave boy in Meno (Plato & Guthrie, 1956), and proceed to the discussion of 
the link as a tool for knowledge collection, organization and production in 
encyclopaedias and the Internet. I end with a discussion on the convergence of 
the social and knowledge links on the Internet and the implication of such as a 
convergence.  
 
The Link  
The Link and the production of knowledge: A message from Socrates 
Meno is one of the most readable of Plato’s dialogues (Plato & Guthrie, 1956, p. 
7), taking place between Socrates and Meno, a “wealthy, handsome and 
imperious young aristocrat” visiting Athens(p. 101). Although the dialogue 
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revolves around the nature of virtue and its mode of acquisition, it touches upon 
many themes and is thus subject to multiple interpretations: the paradox of 
enquiry and the ‘hypothetical method’; the relationship between desire and the 
good, knowledge and virtue; and the theory of memory as information retrieval 
and learning as recalling (Caygill, 1999; Devereux, 2008). What is relevant to 
our discussion of the link and knowledge production is Socrates’ presumption 
that knowledge is inborn because the soul has learned everything in its past life. 
Thus knowledge acquisition, or, learning, is “nothing but recollection” (Meno, 
81d, in Plato & Guthrie, 1956, p. 130). Socrates makes his case in the episode 
where the nameless slave boy from the crowd of Meno’s retainers is shown to 
have possessed the knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem. 
 
In a typical Socratic maieutic way, Socrates takes the slave boy through the 
technique of solving the geometrical problem of producing a square of twice the 
area of a given square, a problem whose solution requires knowledge of 
Pythagoras’ theorem. The slave boy is successful, and Meno is convinced of the 
truth of Socrates’ proposition of knowledge as recollection. An alternative, 
closer reading beyond the surface of the dialogue at the ways in which Socrates 
facilitates the recalling of knowledge from the slave boy reveals the antidote of 
Socrates’ proposition: knowledge as technological invention, by links. 
 
In this reading, Socrates starts and proceeds with his dialogue with the slave 
boy and solves the geometrical problem by establishing links between diverse 
discourses, as is the way new knowledge is invented in geometry. He begins by 
drawing in the sand a square and asking the slave to agree to name it as such, 
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and getting him to concur that that its four sides are equal. With this he 
introduces the axioms of equality, parallel lines as well as the common notion of 
the equal sides of a square. He then suggests that the horizontal and vertical 
lines meeting at the centre are also equal. Following the slave boy’s concurrence 
to the proposition, Socrates assigns numerical values to the sides of the square, 
and proceeds to show, always with the aid of the slave boy, that doubling the 
length of the side quadruples the area of the figure. In the process Socrates 
establishes three links, as Caygill (1999) writes, 
The first links established are between the visual figure of the 
square and certain words such as ‘lines’, ‘sides’ and ‘equality’; 
these are then supplemented by links to geometrical concepts, 
such as largeness, smallness, or directionality, and then in their 
turn these are translated onto arithmetical concepts and 
operations such as number, addition and multiplication.   
(Caygill, 1999, p. 5) 
If these links have organized the slave boy’s knowledge of space, quantity and 
arithmetic in to new combinations and made it possible for the boy to follow 
Socrates’ reconfiguration of arithmetic and geometry, it is another set of links built 
on these combinations that solves the problem of discovering a square with twice 
the area of the given square. Socrates then rubs out the original figure and begins 
again, this time bisecting the given square diagonally. He then draws the gnomon – 
or squares on adjacent sides of the original triangle plus a third – reproducing the 
square with twice the sides and four times the area. Each of these squares is 
bisected diagonally and the square made up of the four diagonals is shown as made 
up of four halves of the original square, thus is twice its area. The slave boy, moves 
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across the links between the geometrical inscription, the language describing its 
properties, and mathematics. He looks at the figure and agrees that there are two 
halves in the original and four halves in the new square made up of diagonals; he 
then agrees that four is twice two and that the new figure is the desired square with 
twice the area of the original. Problem solved. 
 
What Socrates has done, by inviting the slave boy to “seek truth” in company with 
him (Meno, 84d), is to establish “lateral links” between diverse bodies of 
knowledge and reinvent and the Pythagorean Theorem (Caygill 1999). As Caygill 
(1999) argues, the dialogue can be understood alternatively as links or paths built 
“between different, existing configurations of experience” (p. 6). New paths, new 
links between existing configurations of knowledge and existing patterns of 
experience generate new knowledge. The link has inventive potential for new 
knowledge, and everybody, even a slave boy, is capable of knowledge production: 
that is the message from Socrates.  
The link and the organization of knowledge: Renvois and Memex 
If the links in Socrates’ conversation with the slave are “established, and concealed, 
by means of the methodological elision of language and inscription”(Caygill, 1999), 
and the link is used more as a metaphor for the creation of new knowledge, then in 
the compilation of an encyclopedia it is adopted more as a method for the collection, 
structuring, presentation of knowledge.  
 
While the encyclopedia provides an answer to the desire to capture and organize 
all human knowledge in a single text, this text is not agenda-free. It is not only 
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subject to epistemological and disciplinary biases, but also social, religious, 
ideological and political influences. Early encyclopedias, whether systematically or 
alphabetically organized, suffered from undermining the very purpose they tried to 
serve: promoting knowledge sharing and acquisition, and through it, knowledge 
production(Zimmer, 2009). The systematically organized encyclopedias did this by 
framing knowledge within arbitrary (though well-thought) yet rigid and dogmatic 
disciplinary structures boundaries or ideological boundaries, the alphabetically 
organized ones by fragmenting knowledge by “tearing knowledge apart and 
pigeonholeing it in alphabetical boxes”(Innis & Christian, 1980, p. 215). A 
corrective, cross-referencing, was provided by Ephraim Chambers, who produced 
the Cyclopaedia, or An Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, in London in 1728. 
 
In the preface to Cyclopaedia, he explains the purpose and promise of the new 
technology he calls “reference”, which builds links between different entries and 
opens up channels for communication between different bodies of knowledge. As 
he writes, 
This we endeavored to attain, by considering the several Matters 
not only absolutely and independently, as to what they are in 
themselves; but also relatively, or as they respect each other. They 
are both treated as so many Wholes, and as so many Parts of some 
greater Whole; their Connexion with which, is pointed out by a 
Reference. So that by a Course of references, from Generals to 
Particulars; from Premises to Conclusions; from Cause to Effect; 
and vice versa, i.e. in one word, from more to less complex, from 
less to more: A communication is opened between the several 
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Parts of the Work; and the several Articles are in some measure 
replaced in their natural Order of Science, out of which the 
Technical or Alphabetical one have remov’d them. (Chambers, 
1728, p. i)49 
 
With cross-referencing, Chambers provided a complex weaving of articles which, 
though alphabetically arranged, were systematically linked. This way of 
knowledge organization leaves it to the user to follow the links and make their 
own judgement. The passive reader becomes an active partner in fulfilling the 
inventive potential of the link.   
                                                        
49 The quote is based on the Optical Character Recognition results provided by University of 
Wisconsin Digital Collections at 
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/HistSciTech.Cyclopaedia01. The author has corrected 
some of the errors contained in the original scan.  
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Figure 11: An Excerpt of the Preface to Cyclopaedia  
Source as the quote above 
 
In the Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers 
(Encyclopedia, or Reasoned Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Crafts),published 
by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert in France starting in 1751, 
cross-referencing was not only used as a way to organize and disseminate 
knowledge, it was also an effective tactic to get away from censorship in a time 
featuring “monopoly of knowledge of the church” (Innis, cited in Buxton, 2004, p. 
182) and state. They called their cross-referencing system renvois, which are a 
web of “articles cross-referenced to one another”. In this system, readers were 
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led to radical or subversive knowledge without the notice of the church or state 
authorities (Zimmer, 2009, p. 103).  
 
What was subverted was not only the authority of the state or church, but also 
traditional models of knowledge as “singular and infallible” (Zimmer, 2009, p. 
104), because, as Michael Zimmer observes, 
Renvois can not only indicate subversive links between articles, 
but also they can juxtapose articles with opposing ideas or 
arguments and thus expose concealed relationships between 
controversial issues or hidden links between disparate pieces of 
knowledge.(Zimmer, 2009, p. 103) 
 
Letting the reader follow the web of unsettling links of articles and interpret for 
themselves ideas that confirm and refute each other, revnois weaken the discursive 
authority of the encyclopaedia as well as the church and state as a final source of 
knowledge. More importantly, by encouraging the user to navigate the hidden links 
between diverse bodies of knowledge, revnois make it possible for them to 
establish new links and alternative paths between these bodies of knowledge, thus 
making the encyclopaedia a self-reinforcing inventive knowledge system.  
 
Two hundred years after the introduction of renvois into knowledge organization, 
Vannevar Bush, faced with “a growing mountain of research” that is “being 
expanded at a prodigious rate” (Bush, 1945, section 1), and came up with his 
solution for the organization, coordination and navigation of research texts: the 
memex system.  
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In As we may think, a celebrated and widely cited paper appearing in the July 1945 
Atlantic Monthly, Bush outlined his physical design for the imaginary information 
machine.  
It consists of a desk, and while it can presumably be operated 
from a distance, it is primarily the piece of furniture at which he 
works. On the top are slanting translucent screens, on which 
material can be projected for convenient reading. There is a 
keyboard, and sets of buttons and levers. Otherwise it looks like 
an ordinary desk. (Bush, 1945, section 6) 
 
According to Bush (1945), it is a device “in which an individual stores all his books, 
records, and communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted 
with exceeding speed and flexibility” (section 6).  
 
The basic idea behind memex is simple: “The process of tying two items together is 
the important thing” (Bush, 1945, section 7). As the human mind “operates by 
association”(section 6), the best way to build knowledge, then, would be to draw on 
the analogy of mental association of thoughts and create links between recorded 
ideas that can be stored, retrieved and passed on. This links he calls “associative 
trails.” The user creates individualized associative trails as he explores “the maze of 
materials available to him”, to be consulted by himself later as he needs them or 
pass them to any researcher to insert in their own memex and point to their related 
trails. These associative trails, like the lateral links in Socrates’ dialogue and 
references in renvois, are new paths between existing patterns of experiences, and 
are inherently inventive. In Bush’s visionary, the “mesh of associative trails” 
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created and shared by users will lead to“wholly new forms of encyclopedias” 
(section 8). This is a form of pre-Internet user-created content, an expression of 
“collective brain” anticipated by Paul Otlet (1934, cited in Buckland, 1992) and 
celebrated by Levy (1997) . 
 
The renvois and memex share a very similar rationale with another “open-ended 
and path-indeterminate” (Zimmer, 2009, p. 104) and “generative”(J. L. Zittrain, 
2008) system that has become an essential part of our everyday life today: the 
World Wide Web. 
 
The link and the promise of the World Wide Web 
Bush’s memex system never materialized. However, his idea of “associative trails” 
lived on and was taken a big step forward by Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the 
World Wide Web. Like Bush, Berners-Lee (1999) recognized that “the human mind 
has the special ability to link random bit of data”, and “there is power in arranging 
ideas in an unstrained, weblike way”(p. 3). The technology to realize this vision is 
hypertext, a text system developed by Ted Nelson that would allowing users to 
write and publish in a “nonlinear” and “consequential “way, and through which “a 
reader was not constrained to read in any particular order, but could follow links 
and delve into the original document from a short quotation”(Berners-Lee, 1999, 
pp. 5-6). According to Nelson himself, hypertext would be a revolutionary 
technology in knowledge production and distribution. As he envisages, 
It would be a universal publishing system where every interested 
person has direct access to humanity’s accumulated 
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knowledge—in effect, the ultimate system where each person is 
both contributor and user. (Cited in Stockwell, 2001, p. 168) 
 
The idea of the link was central to the Web (Lewis, Hall, Carr, & De Roure, 1999), in 
both its conceptualization (random associations) and technology (hypertext and 
hyperlink), in both its prototypical system-- the “Enquire” program, and the later, 
more sophisticated forms. The “Enquire” program, Berners-Lee said in Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQ) of his webpage on www.W3.org, was written as a 
mnemonic aid for his “random associations”. It was meant to be “a hypertext 
notebook” for his “own personal use” (Cited in Caygill, 1999, p. 8). As he writes, the 
program was 
[S]omething I found really useful for keeping track of all the 
random associations one comes across in Real Life and brains are 
supposed to be so good at remembering but sometimes mine 
wouldn't. It was very simple but could track those associations 
which would sometimes develop into structure as ideas became 
connected, and different projects become involved with each 
other.(Berners-Lee, 1995) 
 
When the Enquire code led to the Web, the ideal for connection was also scaled up. 
As Berners-Lee writes, 
The vision I have for the Web is about anything being potentially 
connected with anything… Suppose all the information stored on 
computers everywhere were linked… All the bits of information 
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…would be available to me and to anyone else. There would be a 
single, global information space. (Berners-Lee, 1999, pp. 1, 4-5)  
 
This ubiquitous information space of random linkages, Berners-Lee believes, 
“provides us with new freedom, and allows us to grow faster than we ever could 
when we were fettered by the hierarchical classification system into which we 
bound ourselves” (Berners-Lee, 1999, p. 1).  
 
However, the implementation of the Web, at least till now, has failed the ambitions 
of its progenitors. For a long time since its genesis, the Web remained “very much 
receive only”, following a mass communication model of broadcasting. The users 
were largely left out. In an interview in 1995 Tim Berners-Lee himself described 
the scenario of Web use as “[T]he browsers browse and the only actual control you 
have is to click”, with the “ability to annotate, to interact, to up-date information” 
substantially restricted (Cited in Caygill, 1999, p. 9). In this way it reduced the 
inventive potential of the hypertext, and reduced at once the ambitions of Socrates 
(slave as knowledge producers), Bush (user-created links) and Nelson (universal 
access and users as bot reader and writer). 
 
The lack of interactivity, and thus the untapped creative potential, was not only due 
to technical limitations, but also to the resistance from the state and the market, not 
to mention the huge gap of access between the rich and poor, the north and the 
south. The restrictions from the state take the forms of censorship and law, in the 
name of protecting local culture, national security, privacy and intellectual property 
(Caygill, 1999, p.10). The resistance from the market comes out of the impulse of 
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the businesses to commercialize and monetize, to colonize, privatize or 
“appliancize” (J. L. Zittrain, 2008) the Web. The advances of ICT embodied by Web 
2.0, and the increasing affordability of Internet access has mitigated to some extent 
these issues and brought us closer towards a ubiquitous interconnected space of 
knowledge generation and sharing. But future of the Internet remains at stake. As 
Berners-Lee warns at the turn of the century, the Web, in its “various guises”, such 
as commerce, research, and surfing, has become an integral part of our life, but we 
should not let that familiarity “cloud our perception of the Web itself.” (Berners-Lee, 
1999, p. 2) 
  
Social links as knowledge links 
Up till now I have been talking about knowledge links. A logic question may arise: 
How are these knowledge links related to social links opened and maintained by 
the phatic?  
 
In the Analects of Confucius, there is a well-known passage on sources of learning, 
which, in our context of discussion about connections and knowledge, invites new 
reading. In Book VII of the Analects, the Master said: 
When I walk along with two others, they may serve me as my 
teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their 
bad qualities and avoid them.(Confucius, 2010) 
 
If we regard the three people walking together as a small social network, and the 
ties between then as social links, then the message in this passage is palpable: Each 
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person, good or bad, rich or poor (remember the slave boy in Meno), is a body of 
knowledge, and social links are potentially knowledge links. In today’s terms, there 
is the “social network market” model of innovation and knowledge production 
(Hartley & Montgomery, 2009b). Although each time with an advance in ICT, from 
print to radio and television, we moved a step closer, the realization of this 
potential became only possible with the advent of the Web, which, with Web 2.0 
and social media, has come to converge the knowledge networks and the social 
networks on the Internet, as the Internet has become a way of being in our life 
world today. Only put into this perspective can we realize the significance of the 
link, and come to understand the importance of the phatic. 
 
The phatic function of spoof videos 
Phatic spoofs 
Games-ruined-my-life was a teenage boy who spent most of his waking hours 
playing computer games when he dropped out of high school, bored of school 
routines. He loves the Internet and was thinking of starting up his own website 
when he got caught up in the debate on “non-mainstream” and 
“anti-non-mainstream”. He hated any claim of being “non-mainstream” and decided 
to build a website against it50. “It was for fun. Besides, there was no website 
dedicated to the topic” (Games-ruined-my-life, 2009). Game-ruined-my-life is a 
great fan of Stupid Dad, a famous spoofer who is also known as “Shouting Beast”. In 
search of ideas to promote his website, he thought of spoof videos. As he recalls,  
We didn't make those videos for their own sake (but to boost the 
image of our website). At the beginning, there was little traffic to 
                                                        
50 http://www.fanfeizhuliu.com/bbs.php 
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the website. So we created spoof videos and posted them on major 
BBS and video-sharing sites. People did come and there was more 
traffic… We did write articles and we still write them. But it was 
the videos that got the job done. I suppose it has to do with our 
times. People like videos more than texts.   
(Games-ruined-my-life, 2009)  
 
Those spoof videos are not retrievable now. They were meant to be passed over 
when the job was done. Even Games-ruined-my-life has lost track of them, and 
can't recall the content the videos. He has since then launched another website 
called Beijingzhan (北京站, literally Beijing Station)51, and is making videos for 
its promotion.  
 
Games-ruined-my-life is not alone in using spoof videos to reach out to people. 
Sun Wei, a stock market analyst, made a spoof videos based on Avatar to 
promote his financial website52. In the video, the Na’vi become individual 
investors in the Chinese stock market who are at the mercy of majority 
shareholders. They are asked to rally together around the website to fight back 
with their collective wisdom for their own interest. It time to show that “they 
cannot get whatever they want”, the video goes, and “it’s time to get our money 
back”.  
 
                                                        
51 http://www.beijingzhan.com/ 
52 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/nf2S8XMFk0w/ 
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This use of spoof videos for attention and channel-opening may be called the 
phatic function of spoof videos. This function helps to understand the importance 
of those spoof videos that may be called “banal”, with few views, at the far end 
of the long tail of attention curve.  
 
A case in point is the spoof videos of One Night in Beijing (北京一夜), a pop song 
written in 2005 by a Taiwanese song-writer Chen Sheng. The song is about old 
traditional Beijing and filled with home-sick (or root-seeking) sentiments and 
melancholy and integrates into it some pronounced elements of Peking Opera. 
In this sense, this song is itself a spoof. It was performed by many singers before 
being picked up by a famous pop music band called Shin. Shin brought some 
flavour of rock music into the piece and made the song a household name in 
2006. As of January 28, 2011, a search of “One Night in Beijing” generated 44 
spoofs. The earliest one53, up-loaded on 25 September, 2006, is of a typical 
YouTube genre: bedroom lip-synching (Burgess and Green, 2008). The others 
have basically followed the non-narrative performance-based model. Analysed, 
the content or aesthetic of these spoof videos won’t impress many people. 
Mostly what is done is to replace one video with another, clipped from 
elsewhere, or to make faces in front of the camera with the song as the 
background. But most of these videos are meant to be shared with a small circle 
of family or friends, to make fun, to serve as a “virtual poke”, sent as a link in an 
email or an instant message. In this sense, these videos have fulfilled their 
mission. To call them as banal or trivial is way off the mark. 
 
                                                        
53  http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/UOS57_qqNEU/ 
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Linked by spoof videos 
The phatic function of spoof video lies not only in its use by their authors as a 
way to get attention and open channels of communication, but also in its 
adoption by users a tool keep strong as well as weak links active. We share 
self-created videos with close friends and immediate family members. Beyond 
this close social network we share funny and ingenious ones. According to a 
CNNIC survey on the uses of Internet videos in China, 79.9% of videos users in 
China have shared videos with friends, and 22.3% of them share videos on a 
regular basis(China Internet Information Center, 2010)54. Spoof videos are good 
choices for “taste performance” (H. Liu, 2007) in social media and a good way to 
start a conversation. According to the same survey, among the users who share 
videos, 43.1% recommend videos through Instant Messaging tools, and 23.1% 
through blogging, and social networking sites are becoming another channel to 
share videos. Spoof videos, being funny, are ideal for these purposes. 
 
Being phatic and creative 
Although as discussed a large proportion of spoof videos online are better 
understood to be phatic, it doesn’t mean they are not creative or serving 
creative implications.  
 
Too exciting-2007 is song released on the Internet in early 2007 by Siwen, a 
freelance music writer better known for mobile ringback tones before the song 
                                                        
54 A survey by CNNIC(China Internet Network Information Center, 2008) in 2008 put the 
number of internet video users at 160 million. But the 2010 survey report didn’t update on the 
number of video users online. 
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got famous. The song spoofed a number of high-profile events of popular culture 
in 2006, rose to be a hit after its release, and has since then generated a large 
group of spoof videos. The earlier videos show small tweaks, replacing the 
original video with screen shots of anime, funny cartoons, game graphics, or 
adding a prologue or epilogue. Later the lyric was replaced, first with a 
summary of silly and funny ads, then with comment on the follies and dodgy 
behaviour of the stock market55. Then a spoof came that replaced both the lyric 
and the melody, only taking the genre. The spoof, titled Too exciting-200856 is a 
collection of hit songs in 2007. Now new videos are still adding to the number of 
spoofs with the title “Too Exciting”. Analysed in time sequence, it can be argued 
that these spoofs, as a whole, demonstrate the accumulative nature of creative 
innovation, with the earlier, more phatic ones pave the way for the more 
fundamental changes in later ones.  
 
The link is both social and technological, and it characterises humanity and 
Internet. It is what links them. In this sense, the phatic is fundamental. Thus, 
phatic spoofs serve as good case studies for the study of the phatic, the link, and 
their roles in knowledge production and cultural innovation. 
 
                                                        
55 A search of “Too exciting-2007” generated 825 videos on Tudou.com as of 28 January 2011, 
among which 139 falls into the category of “fun-poking”, 44 in “original” , 261 in “music” and 
212 in “entertainment”, based on Tudou’s own categorisation. The analysis of the spoofs is 
based on the 139 videos categorized by Tudou.com as fun-poking. The original song and its 
various spoofs are available at 
http://so.tudou.com/isearch/%E5%A4%AA%E5%88%BA%E6%BF%802007/. An 
introduction (in Chinese) of the song and its author is available at 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/731313.htm 
56 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/_ALHPNa_00U/ 
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SPOOFS AS ALTERNATIVE MEMORY 
We are born in history. This is an attempt to escape it…What I 
forgot comes back to me in dreams. Cut me open like a knife… 
                   (Threshold, cited in Schwarcz, 1991, p. 85) 
 
Airbrushed out of history 
At the beginning of the Book of Laughter and Forgetting, Milan Kundera tells a 
brief story about the malleability of memory in communist Czechoslovakia: 
In February 1948, Communist leader Klement Gottwald stepped 
out of the balcony of a baroque palace in Prague to address the 
hundreds of thousands of his fellow citizens…There were snow 
flurries, it was cold, and Gottwald was bareheaded. The solicitous 
Clementis took off his own fur cap and set it on Gottwald’s head. 
 
The Party propaganda section put out hundreds of thousands of 
copies of a photograph of that balcony with Gottwald, a fur cap 
on his head and comrades on his side, speaking to the nation…. 
Four years later Clementis was charged with treason and hanged. 
The propaganda section immediately airbrushed him out of 
history... Ever since, Gottwald has stood on that balcony alone… 
All that remains of Clementis is the cap on Gottwald’s head. 
(Kundera, 1983, p. 3) 
 
A similar act of memory manipulation was found in another communist regime. 
On the day after the funeral of Chairman Mao in 1976, a photo was published in 
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People’s Daily with all members of China's Central Committee, including the 
Gang of Four, present at the funeral.57 They were then arrested, and their 
images erased, leaving stark gaps in the line-up in the photo (see Figure 12) 
when it was published one month later again in People’s Daily (Hartley, 1996, p. 
205).   
 
 
Figure 12: The Gang of Four airbrushed out of history58 
 
As Hartley(1996, p. 205) cautions us, the strangeness of political iconography in 
China or other undemocratic societies should not be taken as evidence that in 
the West democracies famous icons are more real. Bill Marsh (2009) published 
a collection of faked photographs in the New York Times website. Dodgy photos 
in the collection include the picture of Lincoln, Robert Capa’s shocking “Falling 
Soldier” of 1936 and Joe Rosenthal’s Pulitzer Prize-winning shot of Marines 
raising the flag at Iwo Jima59. 
                                                        
57 A brief introduction of “the Gang of Four” and their arrest is available at the BBC News 
website at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/11/newsid_4712000/4712306.stm 
58 The photo is retrieved from New York Times on 31 January 2010 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2009/08/23/weekinreview/20090823_FAKE_SS_7.html 
59 The collection is under the title of “A brief history of photo fakery” and available at 
http://nyti.ms/N8TAX 
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These examples provide lucid annotations to a proposition about memory that 
have become almost consensus: memory is “the ongoing work of reconstructive 
imagination”(Assmann, Cited in Olick, 2007, p. 8) and thus “mutable, made and 
remade for present use” (Schwartz, 1991). The uses of memory include social, 
political and cultural dimensions: to shape belonging and exclusivity, to 
maintain community and social order, to muster political power and perpetuate 
repression and hierarchy, or to provide a “refuge”, a place of warmth and 
inspiration, repair or disrepair(Zelizer, 1995, pp. 226-228).  
 
In his historical review of memory manipulation in contemporary China, Jiwei Ci 
(1994) explains how an “inequality of memory” is created to sustain the 
inequality of power in the new social order that is the communist regime, how 
forgetting and remembering is governed, enforced and doctored, and how the 
“mnemonic tyranny” failed and memory came with a revenge to bring down the 
social order set up in 1949 (pp. 62-101). 
 
This section deals with the use of spoof videos for the construction of an 
alternative memory. It discusses the redressing the “inequality of memory”, and 
with it the redressing of the imbalance of power, made possible by the 
accessibility and affordability of media technology. I start with a review on the 
memory and power, and the changes that Internet as a mnemonic system has 
brought to their configuration before turning to memory policy in 
contemporary China and the challenges posed to this policy by active users on 
the Internet. I will illustrate with two well-circulated spoof videos, Little Rabit, 
Be Good and Grass-mud Horse, as examples how alternative memory is 
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constructed by spoof videos. I argue that this constructive process negates the 
official version of memory, strips bare all of its falsities and pretension, and 
signals an emergent model for the construction of memory and truth. 
 
Memory, power, and the Internet 
Memory and power 
Mirek is the protagonist in Lost Letters, a novelette collected in the Book of 
Laugher and Forgetting. He is meticulous about keeping a record for everything 
he does. He takes a careful diary, preserves all correspondence, and notes down 
allusions to current affairs at all meetings. “The struggle of man against power is 
the struggle of memory against forgetting”. This is his justification of his 
idiosyncrasy in memory keeping (Kundera, 1983, p. 3). It is also a terse wrap-up 
for the intersection between memory and power.  
 
While memory for Mirek is a tool of protection against state power, for others, 
including the state, memory is a means of control to gain and sustain power. As 
Connerton (1989, p. 1) wrote, “the control of a society’s memory largely 
conditions the hierarchy of power”. In a similar vein Le Goff argued that “to 
make themselves the master of memory and forgetfulness is one of the great 
preoccupations of the classes, groups, and individuals who have dominated and 
continue to dominate historical society”(cited in Zelizer, 1995, p. 228). Mary 
Douglas goes a step further to regards the “whole social order” as “a mnemonic 
system” (cited in Ci, 1994, p. 75).  
 
An essential method of memory control is to doctor the archive. As Derrida 
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(1996) proposes, "[T]here is no political power without control of the archive, if 
not memory” (p. 70). And since “archivization produces as much as it records 
the event” (p. 17), political power can be conveniently attained through archive 
tweaking, by deciding “who’s in and who’s out” in the archivization process 
(Greetham, 1999). This partly explains the impulse of government, east or west, 
democracy or autocracy, to censor the Internet.  
 
In their discussion of the “politics of memory”, Lee & Yang (2007, p. 3) break 
down the relationship between memory and power into three dimensions: The 
contestation and negotiation over interpretations of historical experiences 
between official history and social memory; the appropriation of these 
interpretations for political action, critic and consent; and the formation of 
political subjects through remembering and forgetting. What is pertinent to the 
discussion of spoof videos as memory are the first and third dimensions. It 
concerns the presentation of alternative reality as opposed to sanctioned 
histories, the active, and bottom-up process of “meaning-making through time” 
(Olick, 2007, p. 8) as opposed to the top-down definition of past experiences. It 
undermines memory control from the very start of the remembering process — 
archivization.  
 
Memory and the Internet 
As discussed in the last section, the Internet originated as a response to the need 
to record and retrieve personal information. As such it can be regarded as a 
mnemonic system, an archive (Caygill, 1999; Prelinger, 2007) , as a metaphor 
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(the Internet as an information aggregator), form (Internet archive), and tool 
(the use of Internet to store and share) in collecting and organizing past 
experiences. The proliferation of videos online has sparked interest in the role 
of the Internet as a video archive, “massive, heterogeneous, but for the most 
part accidental and disordered” (Burgess & Green, 2009, p. 88). Robert Gehl 
(2009) discusses the contest between large media companies, entrepreneurs 
and users for the role of “the curator of display”. Burgess and Green (2009, pp. 
87-90) explore the implications of the idea of YouTube as an archive for the 
creation of cultural heritage, including its impact on the missions and practices 
of traditional cultural institutions. Alan McKee (2010) provides a case study for 
their theoretical discussion. He compares YouTube and the National Film and 
Sound Archive as resources for television historians interested in viewing old 
Australian television programs. His findings show that YouTube prevails in 
reliability of cataloguing and retrieval of metadata, and serves as a better source 
for popular culture and popular histories, trivial “human interest” material 
—birth, marriages, and deaths, and “surprising pieces of rare ephemera”. These 
findings echo the testimonial of Senft (2008) on the Internet as a keeper of 
personal experiences:  
Online, the words and images with which we associate ourselves 
persist indefinitely, retaining their exact original form long after 
the context of their creation has been lost and the self who created 
them has been discarded. Most of us who started online in 1980s 
or 1990s can readily summon up a list of cringe-worthy 
documents of our past selves, long deleted but still locatable 
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through search engines like the Wayback Machine60.         
(Senft, 2008, p. 8) 
 
Memory in the offline world fades and disappears, but archive on the Internet 
lives on. However, the ground-breaking nature of the Internet as a mnemonic 
system doesn’t simply lie in its ability to stay the test of time, but in its impact 
upon the classical tropes of memory. For one, digital technology, as represented 
by the Internet, “with its capacity for order and storage, as well as its immediacy 
and interactivity, blurs the boundaries between archival and living memory” 
(Hume, 2010). Memory becomes living experience.   
 
The Internet affords users an active tool to tell and share their first-hand 
experience, to mold, enrich, annotate, and shape collective memory. Ordinary 
people with their everyday stories find themselves in the media landscape, 
writing and owning their own history, and bringing to light experiences that are 
unrecorded and deemed unworthy in history from the top. This is the first step 
towards the dissolution and subversion of the hierarchy associated with the 
archive, yet a big step towards redressing the “inequality of memory” and 
related to it the inequality of power. As Derrida argues, “Effective 
democratization can always be measured by this essential criterion: the 
participation in and access to the archive, its constitution, and its 
interpretation”(Derrida, 1996, p. 70).  
 
                                                        
60 The Wayback Machine is a search tool for internet pages archived since 1996, available at 
 http://www.archive.org/web/web.php. 
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As already discussed, Internet is a generative media. The Internet model of 
memory is thus “inventive rather than reproductive, concerned with producing 
as well as retrieving information” (Caygill, 1999, p. 8). With the Internet comes 
the proliferation and discovery of memory. The display of personal stories 
online is an invitation to share, follow, and to find out the undisclosed and 
contradict the distorted in official history. A case in point is the challenge posed 
by the ubiquity of new media to the state. As Latham (2009) writes, 
Among other things… new media offer new ways for those in 
China with access to them to question official versions of “reality,” 
to voice discontent, cynicism and skepticism and play 
subversively with news stories and reports of recent events. 
(Latham, 2009, p. 38) 
 
As I intent to show in this section, a popular form of suspicion voicing and   
subversive play in China is spoof videos.  
 
China’s memory policy 
Memory and media are naturally related to each other. As van Dijck (2004) 
argues, both “constitute intermediaries between individual and society, and 
between past and present”. A logical move to control memory is to rein in the 
media.  
 
It is no news that China censors its media. Mao’s regime was characterized by 
vertical control of communication, exemplified by a top‐down media system 
that acted as a conduit carrying Party thought to the masses. And information 
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access was strictly regulated. According to Tony Saich (2000, p. 221), it was "a 
system of information control and censure with an intricate grading process 
regarding who is allowed to see which kinds of information”. Telephony, the 
high-tech of the time, was beyond the reach of ordinary people. Even 
newspapers were only accessible by the few. In such as system, news media 
were regarded foremost the mouthpiece of the party. All news of the party was 
carefully crafted and handed out by Xinhua News Agency or People’s Daily to 
project an image of solidarity, harmony and righteousness. Memory control was 
accomplished by overwhelming the citizenry in every aspect of daily life with 
official information and interpretations of reality (Kalathil, 2002). 
 
The marketization process has given more editorial leeway to media, and the 
introduction to the Internet has put a DIY memory tool in the hands the 
ordinary users. However, a lot of topics and areas are still off-limit. Journalists 
are told what is allowed and what isn’t. For example, in 2004 the Central 
Propaganda Department, CCP’s agency of information control, issued a guideline 
‘Ten Must-Nots’, warning that media should not follow ‘sources from 
unauthorized origins’, and that too detailed reports on social news, especially 
“high-profile crimes” with “negative repercussions” are not allowed. Concrete 
cases forbidden include the China’s currency appreciation, “red-hat 
businessmen”61 in Anhui province, the murder case of Ma Jiaojue62, and the 
                                                        
61 It is a term for businessmen with official background. A report on the relationship between 
“red cadres” and “red-hat” businessmen is available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36529&
cHash=c56bb5eb49. 
62 Ma Jiaojue was a university student from a poor family who killed four of his roommates in 
2004 because he felt himself distanced and ridiculed by them. He attracted great sympathy for 
his experience as a poor kid working hard yet failing to make life better, despite his cruelty in 
killing. He was executed in June 2004, yet “martyred” and memorized by internet users as “the 
ultimate legend of a defiant have-less”(Qiu, 2009, p. 221). For more about the case, visit 
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BMW incident 63(Observechina.net, 2004). A directive from the end of October 
2010 that was leaked online a week later dictates that all media outlets should 
“strictly enforce propaganda regulations, and standardize news information 
sources”. The directive names eight news items that shouldn’t be “hyped”.  
 The girl who died at a police station 
 The case for investigation filed against the assistant director of a Public 
Security office in Hunan 
 The vice mayor of Maoming who fooled around with a female reporter 
 The relocation and elimination of newsstands in areas of Nanjing 
 The retention or abandonment of World Expo pavilion buildings 
 The Li Gang incident 
 Rumors about QQ groups being shut down 
 The incident involving the director of the Internet Office of the State 
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television 
(China Digital Times, 2010)64 
 
Junhua Zhang (2009) has compiled a list in principle of “dos and don’ts” for 
media as well as individual sharing information online (see Figure 13). The list 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/17/content_315545.htm. Jack Linchuan 
Qiu (2009, p. 217-222) has an analysis in his book on working-class and communication 
technology. 
63 The BMW incident happened in October 16, 2003, when a BMW was scraped by a tractor 
carrying vegetables. The two women in the BMW punched the tractor driver, went back to their 
car and drove into the crowds that were criticizing them for being unreasonable, killing the wife 
of the tractor driver and wounded 12 others. The two women received a minor sentencing in the 
court and sparked an outrage online, and generated a series discussion on the wealth gap, and 
social and legal injustice. It was the beginning of the internet activism as we see today. What the 
censors at the time didn't expect was that the fermentation of public opinion online forced the 
government to investigate the corruption behind the case and brought down a senior official 
behind the two women. China Daily has a report about the incident at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/18/content_300105.htm. An analysis of the 
impact of the incident on the internet participation is done by Chin-fu Hung (2006). 
64 A detailed introduction to the eight cases is available at China Digital Times website at 
http://goo.gl/R2I8V 
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shows that most public affairs, let alone the dark moment in CPC’s own histories, 
are to be interpreted by the state. 
 
Besides news media, there is a long term practice of the CPC in which literature 
and art must serve a higher political purpose than merely to “entertain”. 
Historically, the two central roles for literature and art are in “educating the 
masses” and “criticizing enemies”, a practice dating back to before the CPC’s 
takeover of national power in 1949 (Gao & Pugsley, 2008). As a result there has 
been a great number of cultural productions that glorifies the past and present 
of the ruling party, creating a new cross-medium genre called “the mainstream 
melody” (主旋律, zhuxuanlü). Media products belonging to this genre range 
from novels, theatrical plays music and opera, to movie and television drama 
(Barmé, 1999; Sun, 2007; Wu, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 13: Dos and don’ts -- red line 
Reproduced from Junhua Zhang (2009, p. 94) 
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In the Analects, the Master emphasized the importance of language to truth and 
success in endeavours, “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance 
with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, 
affairs cannot be carried on to success” (Confucius, 2010). The “names” and 
language are essential tools of memory control. As Ci (1994, p. 69) suggests, 
“one of the most durable ways of removing values from public memory is to 
remove the linguistic medium that alone affords access to them”. This is put into 
practice in control of memory in China. Ci (1994) gives a lucid account in this 
regard. According to him, classical Chinese has dwindled in importance and has 
been forgotten by the vast majority. With the diminishing of the linguistic world 
is the waning of a thought-world: the Chinese intellectual and moral tradition. 
The oblivion of old tradition is in the interest of the state, as Ci says, “It is 
precisely because the tradition is forgotten by the many that it can be used by 
the few” (p. 70).In the place of the classical Chinese and the tradition embedded 
in it are Maoist Chinese and Mao’s thoughts, a typical example of which is the 
text of “the little red book of quotations”(Schwarcz, 1991). The level of control 
in language in Mao’s time was meticulous and high-handed, as Ci writes, “The 
Maoist state, through its total control of education and the media, has all but 
monopolized the resources to shape the written and, to a barely lesser extent, 
the spoken word” (p. 71). The linguistic monopoly, coupled with Mao’s brand of 
anti-intellectualism, has produced a unique language that is “cliché-ridden, 
heavy-handedly political, intellectually crude, emotionally shallow, aggressively 
judgemental, blindly self-confident” (p. 72).The impoverished and heavily 
politicized language constituted, recorded and naturalized the impoverished 
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and politicized way of life, inscribed it into public memory, and made all that lay 
beyond its scope “unnatural and inaccessible” (p. 73). 
 
Political languages today, to a less extent, follow this pattern. Every few years a 
new set of terms and slogans are invented and propagated, incorporating and 
encompassing all experiences and narratives under its umbrella, enforcing a 
single version of history and reality, and pushing alternative stories to the 
margins. This type of language is similar to what Michael McGee (1980) calls 
“ideograph”, that is, “a high-order abstraction representing collective 
commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal”, and 
guiding “behaviour and belief into channels easily recognized by a community 
as acceptable and laudable” (p. 15). According to McGee, ideographs function as 
“agent of political consciousness” and “come to be as a part of the real lives of 
the people whose motives they articulate” (p. 12). Thus ideographs organize not 
only past experiences but also living memories.  
 
However, in the current techno-social environment, the monopoly of the state 
over the media as well as the language is collapsing. Double-meaning, parodies 
and wordplay are run-of-the-mill on the Internet, ridiculing and stripping bare 
the absurdity and emptiness of the ideographs. As Latham (2009, p. 39) 
suggests, “Indeed the official account ended up supplying the quotations that 
became the subsequent focus of jokes and fun-making”.  
 
The media fares no better than the ideographs. According to Latham (2009), 
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China’s media in the digital information age are no longer, if they 
ever were, appropriately conceived as mirrors of reality. Rather 
they offer Chinese people tools for investigating, contesting, 
questioning, supporting, discussing and fighting over the nature of 
contemporary Chinese realities. (Latham, 2009, pp. 41-42) 
 
Jiwei Ci (1994, p. 75) argues that the fall of regimes starts in the minds of people. 
“Every political authority accumulates memories, good and bad, and there can 
come a point when government means the governing of memories”. The 
proliferation and popularity of online joke, spoofs, and the pervasive cynicism 
and suspicion suggestion this point may be approaching, if having not already 
arrived. After more than half a century, we are seeing signs of “the revenge of 
memory” (Ci, 1994). 
 
Spoof videos and alternative memory 
Remembering through a tale: Little Rabbit, Be Good 
“This has been a truly meaningful year!” This is the line with which Little Rabbit, Be 
Good,65 uses to wraps up its story. The video, a spoof in the form of a greeting card 
ushering in Year of Rabbit in 2011, follows the format pioneered in The Year That 
Was, also known as Dashiji I (Big History I), taking stock of and commenting what 
has happed in the past year. It was passed around on Twitter, Weibo (the Chinese 
term for micro-blogging) and other social networks before being blocked online at 
                                                        
65 The video was initially available at Tudou.com before it was censored in China. YouTube has 
the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wr0BkayM_o, as well as the news package on 
the video from Australian ABC television, at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wzpHahizJ_g&feature=player_embedded 
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the end of January 2011. The video shows no plot, no coherent narrative, with only 
a string of high-profile cases in public life in China. Although in the form of greeting 
card, the tone of the video is sober, even depressing, rather than bright and jolly, as 
we would expect in a New Year’s card.  
 
The Year of Rabbit is around the corner, and fireworks are lightening up the sky. 
Kuang Kuang66 opens up a gift—a cartoon book from a friend and the tale unfolds. 
It all happens far in the future, in a beautiful forest, where a group of rabbits are 
leading a happy life. Little ones are playing and laughing, and a nursery rhyme sings, 
“Little white rabbits, oh, so white, your ears stand upright; you jump and bounce 
around, so sweet, carrots and greens you eat, greens you eat”67. A truck passes by 
bearing an ad that reads, “Three Tiger milk—good milk that gives rabbit moms 
peace of mind”. However, after drinking it little bunnies drop dead in groups. 
Another rhyme featuring rabbits sings, “Little rabbit, be good, open your mouth, 
open it up quick fast, drink it up for your happy future.” One of the adult rabbit tries 
to go into the cave of the tigers to petition and seek justice for little rabbit victims, 
but is stopped at the gate, on either side of which is decorated with one big 
character poster. Put together the poster read, “Serve the rabbits, and build a 
harmonious forest”.  
 
                                                        
66 Kuang Kuang is a little boy featuring a series of funny cartoon videos created by a 
Beijing-based group called Hutoon Animation who also call themselves as Kuang-er(哐人类, 
literally the humankind of Kuang). Their videos are generally innocuous. Though the video 
“Little Rabbit, Be Good” is blocked the website of the group is still functioning at 
http://www.kuanger.com/site/ . 
67 Little White Rabbits is a nursery rhyme that has been passed on for generations. It’s not clear 
who wrote it and when it was written, but literally every child in China can sing it! The original 
is in Chinese and translation is mine. 
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In the cave, a rally is convened in the name of “harmonious forest”. The podium is 
lined with tigers— or leaders, with rabbits sitting in the audience being addressed. 
Suddenly a fire breaks out. Rabbits scream and are not allowed to run for their life. 
A voice shouts out, “Stay where you are. Let leaders go first”. Against the cries of 
rabbits, a rhyme sounds, with the same melody as the last one but with different 
lyrics, “Little rabbit, be good, get out of the way, get out of the way fast, the leaders 
shall evacuate first”. The tigers jump into a car, leaving behind a cave full of rabbits 
crying for help.  
 
The bad fortune of the rabbits doesn't end there. Back in their homes, houses are 
being knocked down. Bulldozers are approaching, taking everything under their 
tracks, including a television showing a tiger extending condolences to rabbits for 
their tragic loss and the latter showing a board reading “Thank you brother Tiger”.  
A rabbit sets herself on fire on the rooftop of her house and falls down to the 
ground. Other rabbits are in tears. Those who rise to protest are clubbed and taken 
away. The only choice they have is to flee their homes. Against the debris, a song 
sings, “Little rabbit, be good, demolish the houses, demolish them fast, new ones 
shall be put up”. 
 
While running away from home, one of the rabbit is running over by a car. The tiger 
behind the wheel comes out of the car and announce, unapologetically, in front of 
the rabbits gathering around him, “My dad is Tiger Gang”. The same melody rings, 
and a song sings, this time in weeping voice, “Little rabbit, be good, get off the road, 
get off the road fast; Gang’s son is driving in this direction”. On the same road, an 
old rabbit is being held and tossed toward a passing car, and gets killed 
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immediately. The rabbit song sounds again, “Little rabbit. Be good. Listen! Be good. 
Be careful not to say whatever you want”. A voice threatens, “Or you should watch 
out for accidents”.  
 
Towards the end of the video, rabbits begin to bite tigers, giving vivid visual 
expression to a Chinese saying: If pushed too hard rabbits also bite. “This has been 
truly a meaningful year”, Kuang Kuang closes the book and exclaims, and is 
summoned by his mom to make dumplings, a New Year routine in China. The video 
concludes with the nursery rhyme at the beginning of the video, “Little white 
rabbits, oh, so white, your ears stands upright…” 
 
Despite the disclaimer at the beginning of the video that it is an adult fairy tale and 
should not be interpreted otherwise, its reference to real life events is apparent 
(see Figure 14) 68. These are notorious cases the discussion and disclosure of which 
the government has tried but to failed to suppress and, if possible, the memory of 
which it has tried to erase. 
 
The tale of Little rabbit, be good Real life events in China 
Three Tiger milk 
Sanlu (Three Deer) milk and 
tainted-milk scandal 
Serve the rabbits Serve the people  
                                                        
68 The disclaimer reads: 1) This film may make people uncomfortable, and children are 
forbidden to watch it. 2) This film is meant as an adult fairy tale, and has no connection to real 
life. 3) This film is only meant to be shared during the 2011 New Years’ (Spring Festival) 
Greetings period, so please don’t pass it around after that. The original is in Chinese. The 
translation is done by C. Custer, who posts the video with translation and analysis at 
http://chinageeks.org/2011/01/little-rabbit-be-good-a-subversive-new-years-video-card/ 
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harmonious forest  harmonious society 
Rabbit petitioner Petitioners  
Fire in the cave of tigers  Karamay fire in 1994 
Violence in forced demolition  
in rabbit land 
Violence in forced demolition 
in China 
Rabbit on fire in protest 
Tang Fuzhen, and others 
protesting with self-immolation 
My dad is Tiger Gang My dad is Li Gang  
Old rabbit tossed toward a car Qian Yunhui incident 
Figure 14: Allusions to real life events in China 
 
“My dad is Tiger Gang” is a spoof of “My dad is Li Gang”, the line of Li 
Qingming—the son of a local police chief—who killed a university girl on campus in 
a drunk-driving accident and tried to flee the scene. His words have become a 
cynical catchphrase for prevalent corruption cases in China, and a symbol of the 
deepening gap between the rich and poor, the elite and the underprivileged. 
Internet users conducted contests to integrate his phrase into sentences and 
classical style Chinese poetry. In an obvious parody of a famous line of Mao poems, 
one user writes, “it’s all in the past, talk about heroes, my father is Li Gang”.69 
 
                                                        
69 New York Times has a report on the case at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/world/asia/31china.html?_r=1. A detailed introduction 
to the case and a collection of user-created content based on the case is available at Baidu.com 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/4534118.htm 
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Another high-profile case referenced in the video is the Qian Yunhui incident. Qian 
was head of a village in Zhejiang Province who had petitioned to various levels of 
government for the loss of land of the village to a provincial industrial project. He 
was killed in a traffic accident near his home. But few except the government could 
accept the verdict of his death as a pure accident. There were rumours that he was 
dragged by four policemen under the truck that killed him. Analyses of video 
footage released by the police have been posted online by Internet users, who also 
self-organized and conducted private investigations into the case. Even the open 
trial and sentencing of the driver at the beginning of 2011 hasn't cast away the 
doubts of the public.70 The case highlights the credibility deficit of the government 
and draws attention to the nastiness of illegal land seizures, and related to it, forced 
relocation, which is also mentioned in the video. These tragedies, though staged on 
a daily basis in China, can only make headline news in their extreme forms. A case 
in point is the self-immolated Tang Fuzhen,71 who stood on the rooftop of her 
house and soaked and burned herself with gasoline in protest of forced demolition. 
The burning rabbit falling down from her rooftop is a memorial to Tang, and other 
victims that would not go into the sanctioned memory of the state.  
 
If these cases find their place in the video because they are recent happenings in the 
past year, others that happened long ago are still relevant for the video because of 
the sentiments they have raised and sustained. “Three-tiger milk” is an obvious 
                                                        
70 New York Times has a report on the incident at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/29/world/asia/29china.html. More detailed information 
on Qian and the incident is available in Chinese at Baidu Baike at 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/4976117.htm; In English at Wikepedia at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qian_Yunhui 
71 More information about Tang and the incident is available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tang_Fu-zhen_self-immolation_incident 
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allusion to tainted-baby- milk scandal represented by Sanlu (literally Three Deer) 
milk that erupted in 2008. The scandal still haunts China’s dairy products sector 
and food administrative agencies,72 and constantly pops up to remind people of 
food safety problems in China. It is also a case fuelling distrust between the elite 
and the commons: They don’t care because they and their kids don’t drink it.  
The posters outside the tiger cave are parody of two major political slogan of the 
Party. “Serve the rabbits” matches “Serve the people”, the title of Mao’s talk in 
194473 that becomes a household slogan in China. The line still decorates Xinhua 
Gate, the entrance to Zhongnanhai Lake, the residence of top leaders (compare 
Figure 15 and  Figure 16). “Harmonious forest” is a clear reference to the 
“harmonious society” initiative that was launched in 2007 and has dominated 
political discourse and organized past and present experiences ever since74.   
 
Most spoof videos feature a few popular catchphrases from the cyberspace. For this 
video it is “Let leaders go first”. Few in the young generation know its origin. It was 
an order to the kids in the 1994 Karamay fire, which killed 288 school children 
among 325 deaths. The children were told to stay still while leaders could evacuate. 
Reports on the fire were censored for stability concerns.75 However, details have 
travelled beyond the local areas with the accessibility of the Internet. “Let leaders 
                                                        
72 According to Chinese Health Ministry, by September 17, 2007 more than 6200 babies had 
fallen ill, mostly developing kidney stones, because of the tainted milk they drank. And most of 
the sick kids were from low-and-medium income families because they couldn’t afford 
expensive imported baby formula. As a result of lax enforcement and local corruption, a lot of 
the contaminated milk was not destroyed and is continuing to be used in some dairy products. 
Time Magazine has a report about the scandal at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1841535,00.html 
73 The English translation of the talk is available at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_19.htm 
74 An interpretation the term is offered by People’s Daily at 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html 
75 In an interview, Yang Weiguang, the head of CCTV, recollected the gagging of the fire story. A 
translation of the interview is available at China Digital Times http://goo.gl/dkBz1  
147 
 
go first” finds its way into the Internet vernacular. The Kamaray fire and “Let 
leaders go first” are mentioned in the song Chinese Children by Zhou Yunpeng, a 
blind singer in China.76 The fire in the video can be read as a memorial to the 
Karamay fire, as well as the fires in 2010, the biggest of which was the Shanghai fire. 
It killed at least 58 people, most of them retirees.77The allusion to the fire and the 
catchphrase is also a ridiculing of the current “leaders first” practice and mentality 
of the government. 
 
 
Figure 15: Serve the people78 
 
                                                        
76 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDSk_4l1vOg 
77 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Shanghai_fire 
78 http://iask.sina.com.cn/b/10558967.html 
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 Figure 16: Serve the rabbits, build a harmonious forest 
Screenshot from Little rabbit, be good 
 
In an interview, the directors of the video, Wang Bo, who goes by the Internet 
pseudonym Pi San, says that his purpose for the video was for venting and fun. 
I felt this past year was really depressing, so I wanted to create 
this thing for fun… I feel unhappy about some things in society and 
I need to give vent to my unhappiness. Everyone has their own 
way to express themselves: some go shopping and others wear 
makeup. For me, I vented by making this video. I thought I could 
express my feelings this way. (cited in Wall Street Journal, 2011) 
 
However, the video serves more purposes than just venting. By bringing a story of 
frustration with oppression online and in front of numerous computer screens, the 
“adult fairy tale” makes it possible for users to (re)experience past and unfolding 
dark moments, for which sanctioned official memory won't have a place79. Once 
                                                        
79 Official memory is reserved for magnificent moments like Shanghai World Expo and 
Guangzhou Asian Games, and in rare cases, for natural disasters such as earthquakes and 
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shared, these moments, together with personal sentiments about them, go into 
collective memory for viewers of the video. The propagation of this memory finds a 
much more receptive audience that official history; because the “fairy tale” is real 
life experience in many places, for many people. It is a memory that is lived rather 
than imposed, sanctioned by ordinary people rather than by the state. It is also a 
bonding force for viewers, maybe not a force to revolt, but to doubt and define. As a 
user comments, “we are all rabbit people” in front of power (cited in Custer, 2011). 
Little Rabbit, Be Good takes dark moments in our society to remember. It is just 
one version of memory. Others may choose to remember jolly moments, 
glamour occasions, or purely quotidian happenings. The video expresses the 
attitude of its creators towards the events it covers and thus serves as a 
comment on them. However, not what matters here are not the comments and 
attitude, but the very act of recording and archiving. As Jiaoshou, another spoof 
creator, proposes, “Spoof videos are a record of social reality. In many years’ 
time when we look back, we will know (through spoof videos) what are the hot 
issues on the Internet as well as in our society” (Jiaoshou, 2010) . 
 
Together these user-created, user-archived memories subvert the official 
definition and interpretation of our life experiences, bring life and colour to our 
common history, enrich and define our collective memory and identity. In the 
time of Lost Letters, Mirek may claim victory for the first battle in “the struggle 
                                                                                                                                                             
landslides, for which the government is not to blame. The top 10 domestic news events chosen 
by Xinhua News Agency include Shanghai World Expo; the economic pact between mainland 
and Taiwan; the 10-year national education plan; 30th anniversary of Shenzhen special 
economic zone; Earthquake and mudslide; the development agenda for 2011-2015; Guangzhou 
Asian Games; supercomputer Tianhe-1A; Grain output growth; and monetary policy shift. For 
more information visit 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/30/c_13669812_10.htm 
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of man against power” (Kundera, 1983, p. 3). 
 
Grass-mud horse and the subversion of ideographs 
If Little Rabbit, Be Good foregrounds the futility of the state efforts in forced 
forgetting, Grass-mud horse disarms and subverts government attempts to 
frame and define social reality with its “ideographs” (McGee, 1980).  
 
“Grass-mud horse”, which sounds like “mother fucker” (cao ni ma), a common 
curse in China, is a non-existent creature that features a series spoof videos, the 
first of which is appeared online in early 2009 as as a way to get around, and 
poke fun at, the government initiative “rectify vulgar content on the Internet”, 
which later expanded to campaign to purge popular culture of the “three 
vulgarities” (salacious, mindless and tasteless content) (Cui, 2009; The 
Economist, 2010; Wasserstrom, 2010). In the name of “anti-vulgarity”, many 
websites were closed down, information censored, online groups arbitrarily 
disbanded (Cui, 2009). The video, the Song of the Grass-Mud Horse,80 spoofs the 
theme song of the Chinese version of The Smurfs,81 introduced into China in 
early 1980s, and tells a story about the war between the grass-mud horse and 
the river crab, a homonym for "harmony", a propaganda catchword. The 
grass-mud horses have been living freely in the beautiful Ma Le Desert, but their 
survival faces a crisis, because river crabs arrive and are destroying the 
grassland on which they graze. The grass mud horses choose to fight for their 
life, as the song sings, 
                                                        
80 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wKx1aenJK08 
81 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AwsxdNkqxNE&NR=1 
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There is a herd of Grass Mud Horses 
In the wild and beautiful Ma Le Desert 
They are lively and intelligent 
They are fun-loving and nimble 
They live freely in the Ma Le Desert 
They are courageous, tenacious, and overcome the difficult 
environment 
Oh lying down Grass Mud Horse 
Oh running wild Grass Mud Horse 
They defeated river crabs in order to protect their grass land 
River crabs forever disappeared from Ma Le Desert (Cited in Xiao, 
2009) 
 
In the video, the grass-mud horse takes the image of an alpaca, is depicted as a 
charming, vulnerable yet brave animal. The story coupled with a nostalgic 
melody gives the dirty pun an endearing image. The video went viral and 
generated a cluster of spoofs in the forms of photos and videos, poetry and 
artwork (China Digital Times, n.d.). Popular examples include a fake nature 
documentary about its imaginary habitat and a classical poem with drawing 
(see Figure 18).82 The block of the videos didn't stop the popularity of the 
                                                        
82 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HON_9tViZFc&feature=player_embedded 
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image. Within weeks the "grass-mud horse" became the de facto mascot of 
netizens in China. Grass-mud horse dolls were sold in stores online and 
offline(Wines, 2009). 
 
     
Figure 17: The legendary grass-mud horse and the river-crab83 
 
                                                        
83 The images are from China Digital Times at http://goo.gl/j5eix. Thea river crab wears three 
watches. In Chinese “to wear three watches" sounds the same as "Three Represents", Jiang 
Zemin's signature ideological creation.  
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Figure 18: A classic poem on grass-mud horse and river grab84 
 
The spread of the videos is interpreted as the victory of the users against 
censors and the grass-mud horse as the “icon of resistance to censorship”(Xiao 
Qiang, cited inWines, 2009), and “a metaphor of the power struggle over 
Internet expression"(Anonymous blogger, cited in Xiao, 2009).85 However, I 
would propose that the grass-mud horse and its derivatives serve a bigger 
purpose. I argue that by creating an alternative “interpretative repertoire” 
(Edley, cited in Umlauft, 2006) and pattern of discourse that counter, undercut 
and subvert the official rhetoric, rendering it pale and powerless.  
 
                                                        
84 http://www.bimuyu.com/blog/archives/72319649.shtml 
85 Xiao Qiang has a collection of Chinese blog entries on the grass-mud horse phenomenon 
translated and posted on China Digital Times with original links. However, a majority of these 
links don't work anymore. Censorship is a plausible explanation.  
 
I want to enjoy the flowers 
in the beautiful March 
 
Must climb over the wall to 
the neighbour’s home 
 
In my leisure l drink liquor 
and boil river crabs 
 
Grass-mud horse running 
on the Ma Le Desert. 
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As already mentioned, the grass-mud horse was a collective response to the 
government censorship of “vulgar” content, carried out in the name of socialist 
morality and social “harmony”. It has a rebellious undertone but as Zhu Dake 
(2010) put it, “carries enough linguistic warmth to keep censors at bay”. The 
highly offensive obscenity carrying an innocuous linguistic shell got spread 
online unchecked. By going to the extremes while complying with 
“anti-vulgarity” rules the videos exposes the futility of the language control 
attempts, and the incapacity of highly sophisticated censorship mechanism. As 
Cui Weiping, a professor from Beijing Film Academy, writes, 
Its underlining tone is: I know you do not allow me to say certain 
things…I am completely cooperative… Of course I think it 
inappropriate to utter these obscene words…I want to keep my 
decency and dignity…So, I say “Grass Mud Horse”, not fxxx your 
mom. What is “Grass Mud Horse”? It always works hard in harsh 
conditions…it is from the vast grassland. I like it. I love it. This 
whole thing is… out of your jurisdiction. (Cui, 2009)86  
 
This is scornful compliance, compliance that shows both intellectual and moral 
superiority over rule-makers and enforcers. The obscene referent carries with it 
a refined significant—the frustration with censorship and demeaning of popular 
culture. The videos, however, haven’t stopped there. It points to the linguistic 
means of ideological and memory control—government rhetoric or ideographs 
(McGee, 1980) that dominate the definition of our experiences and shape our 
                                                        
86 Original in Chinese, translation from China Digital Times at http://goo.gl/dTrnq 
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interpretation of social reality. The target is harmony, which is given the 
negative image of the river crab in the videos. It is depicted as evil, clumsy, and 
bullying, yet incompetent and doomed to lose. It is a harmony “policed with 
overt rigour” (G. R. Barmé, 2010), a far cry from the branding of the 
“harmonious society” by the government as people-first, inclusive, prosperous 
and peaceful (People's Daily, 2007). With the river crab a much different 
meaning is attached to the grand ideograph, in whose name most government 
initiatives, political and economic, social as well as cultural, are rolled out, under 
whose banner alternative stories, minority pursuits are pushed to the 
periphery, ignored. The videos, and their derivatives, strip bare the emptiness 
and pretension of the ideographs and put an “interpretative repertoire” (Edley, 
cited in Umlauft, 2006) in the hands of ordinary users.  
This alternative interpretive repertoire doesn’t start with the grass-mud horse, 
and hasn’t ended with it. Before it there had been other “hidden scripts” (Zhu, 
2010) that afforded counter official interpretations. For example, doing 
push-ups was used to allude to official over-ups, censorship and murkiness 
(Latham, 2009), as was “playing hide and seek” (Zhu, 2010). In the current 
social-political setting, these coded languages, these forms of linguistic play 
have become the “memes for the masses” (Zhu, 2010). Grass-mud horse has 
become a rallying force for these forms of play. Under its name, a collaborative 
lexicon of user-created terms in China is compiled87. The ideographs are having 
an ever bigger balancing force.  
 
                                                        
87 http://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/Grass-Mud_Horse_Lexicon 
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Spoof videos’ regime of truth 
A question that naturally follows the proposition of spoof videos as alternative 
memory concerns the authenticity of this memory. Is it truthful? If positive, how 
is truth produced in spoof videos? 
 
When asked about the question of truth in spoof videos, Jiaoshou, one of most 
famous amateur video creator, says,  
Compared with formal, routine stories from official channels, 
stories in spoof videos have more life in them and travel with a 
bigger momentum, and what seems absurd is that they are closer 
to the truth of things. (Jiaoshou, 2010) 
 
This sense of absurdity comes from a feel of dislocation against the sea change 
in the “regime of truth”, from a paradigm of official sanction and expert 
domination to one where “various actors… are involved in a dispersed and 
widespread creative construction of truth”(J. Jones, 2009, p. 129). 
 
Foucault argues that truth is “an ensemble of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and functioning of statements” 
(Morris & Patton, 1979, p. 47). Thus the “regime of truth” in a society entails 
“the types of discourse it harbours and causes to function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true from false 
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statements, the way in which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
which are valorised for obtaining truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true” (Morris & Patton, 1979, p. 46).  
 
Taking American political culture as a point of entry, Jeffrey Jones (2009) argues 
satire has revealed the extent to which mainstream news has moved away from 
a “journalism-centred” regime of truth to a gut-centred regime of “truthiness”, 
where truth claims are based on gut-feeling and wishful thinking, “not reality ‘as 
is’, but reality as ‘must be’”(p. 139). In this culture, to quote what Denny Crane 
says in an episode of Boston Legal called Shock and Oww!, “There are no facts 
anymore, Kiddo. Only good or bad fiction” (Kelley, 2006). Borrowing Hartley’s 
theoretical model of “redactional society” (Hartley, 2000, 2008c), Jones (2009) 
calls this new phenomenon “redactional culture” and offers two stories of it. 
One, according to him, is a world “where elites and citizens alike have 
demonstrated a will to truthiness in their redactional practices”. It is a world 
driven by distrust and disbelief in people. The other, Jones continues, is “based 
on hope and trust in people”. It is “a story of satirists, bloggers and others who 
cling to the possibilities that redaction provide for the horizontal establishment 
of truth (or the questioning thereof)” Those redactional practices based on 
doubt allow for negation; those based on hope and trust, reformulation (p. 141). 
Jones gives special emphasis to the role of satirists in the new regime of truth, 
whose importance lies not in giving authoritative voices to truth, or creating 
“believable fictions”, but in countering truthiness “on its own terms” through 
redactional practices(p. 139).  
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Spoof creators are such satirists in China. As was reviewed in China’s memory 
policy, the traditional communicative relationship in China is one of domination 
and hierarchy. In that didactical culture, truth is handed out, to be accepted 
without hesitation and reservation. To borrow Stephen Colbert’s satirical 
remarks on his new book, I am America, 
It’s not just some collection of reasoned arguments supported by 
facts. That’s the coward’s way out. This book is Truth—my truth. I 
deliver my Truth hot and hard. Fast and Furious. So either accept 
it without hesitation or get out of the way. (Colbert & Brumm, 
2007) 
 
Truth in spoof videos, however, comes with “a veil of gaiety” (Lin, 1935, p. 224) 
because, as Lin Yutang (1935) cautioned, “Truth naked is not a sight for the eye 
of the Bishop” (p. 224)! This “veil of gaiety’ is not only to avoid antagonizing 
bishops (censors) and keep them at arm’s length, but also to appeal to 
commoners (Internet users). If Jiaoshou is right in asserting that there is more 
truth in spoof videos than official stories, this truth is attained in a very different 
ways to its official counterparts. In most cases, this truth is not based on 
authoritative sources of information or first-hand experience, as video spoofers, 
like textual bloggers, rely mostly on second-hand information. Rather, it starts 
with the negation of the established. Not with “what it is”, but “what it isn’t”. 
What paves the way for the negation is not only the renewed sense of agency 
enabled by advances in information technology, but more importantly, the 
“seeds of doubt, cynicism, indifference, and confusion that affect the citizenry’s 
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relationship to public life and social thought” sowed by elites (J. Jones, 2009, p. 
133). 
 
However, negation by itself doesn't produce truth. Like knowledge, truth is also 
produced between links, in networks. Internet is such a network. Singer’s 
(2007) model for truth production in blogging serves as an interpretative 
framework for networked spoof videos. According to Singer (2007), truth in 
blogs emerges from “shared, collective knowledge” (p. 85). More specifically, the 
blogger’s truth is created collectively by offering a space “for all comers to post 
what they know or think; to receive a hearing; and to have their ideas publicly 
debated, modified, and expanded or refuted”. Thus it is a horizontal rather than 
hierarchical regime of truth. A model of truth production in which “information 
is not vetted before its dissemination but instead through the process of 
disseminating multiple views: truth, in this view, is the result of discourse 
rather than a prerequisite to it” (p. 85). In Jones’ words, it is in “reformulation” 
that truth in produced (J. Jones, 2009, p. 141).  
 
Each spoof video offers an alternative view of reality, a different collection of 
experiences from official history. It is shared online and invites challenges and 
debates, refuting as well as following. Wrong information gets sifted out; 
extreme views tempered with, new knowledge produced. Networked spoof 
videos become a cultural forum where truth emerges from within. And this 
truth, balanced and checked, may be closer to the true nature of things.  
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It is in the spirit of this understanding that I conclude this section with a Latin 
adage, In iocus illic est verum: In jest, there is truth.   
 
SPOOF VIDEOS AND PLAYFUL CITIZENSHIP 
We can listen, we can talk, and we can laugh 
Carsick Cars is a popular indie-rock trio from Beijing. Since its inception in 2005 
the band has released two albums and its fast rise to success has inspired many 
metal bands to spring up. Unlike the old generation of rock musicians in China 
who are intensely rebellious and explicitly political, the band has claimed 
indifference to politics, as its vocalist and guitarist Zhang Shouwang said, "We're 
not into the politics and don't care that much about the older generation: for 
them it was like religion”(A. Liu, 2009).  
 
They may want to distance themselves from politics, but their music gives them 
away. On their second album, You Can Listen, You Can Talk, there is a lyric-less 
song titled "The Firewall Killed My Cat” (Carsick Cars, 2009). Its melody is 
beautiful. Being wordless, the song allows for multiple interpretations. 
However, the title tells it all. Resistance without being explicitly critical and 
excessively recalcitrant, political messages muffled in encoded and playful 
language, The Firewall Killed My Cat is metaphor for political engagement in 
popular culture in China, the topic of this section. The form of politics I address 
here doesn’t seek to investigate the struggles over “the right to reside and vote” 
(though a lot of issues in China boil down to this right), but “the right to know 
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and speak”(Miller, cited in Hartley, 2010, p. 238), and the right to laugh. It has to 
do with cultural rather than political, playful rather than dead serious, 
citizenship. The enactment of this form of citizenship is not through linguistic 
rationalism, but through the “affective and playful dimension of public 
communication” (Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 228), and in the case of my study, 
through spoof videos.      
 
Mediated participation of ordinary people in public culture is believed to shift 
the sensibilities and practice of citizenships, leading to new forms of citizenship 
(Chouliaraki, 2010; Hartley, 2010), which in totality can be called “media 
citizenship”(Hartley, 2010). In China it finds expressions in minjian (unofficial) 
political writers, whose new citizenship “centred around independence from 
state strictures in terms of both material well-being and freedom of thought” (Y. 
Zhou, et al., 2005), and in self-organizing, self-broadcasting video creators 
finding their voices in the performance of the self (H. S. Li, 2009). Reflecting on 
the misreading of his spoof videos, Jiaoshou complains that those criticising him 
choose only to see the “vulgar’ shell of his videos, but ignore “the sense of 
responsibility of a young citizen” (Jiaoshou, 2010) under the surface. In this 
section I aim to draw a sketch of playful media citizenship in China, identifying 
the resources it leverages (Avatar activism), issues it stands up for (banal 
activism) and patterns in which it is practised (spoofing as everyday making). 
Theoretical discussions will be substantiated with concrete case studies of spoof 
videos to flesh out peculiarities and specificities of the Chinese context.  
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Avatar activism 
On 12 February 2010, the inhabitants of the Palestinian village of Bil’in went out 
to stage their weekly protest against the building of barrier across the village. 
The difference is that this time, inspired by the Na'vi people in the highly 
successful film Avatar, five people painted themselves blue to resemble the 
azure-skinned Na’vi in the movie. They were routinely dealt with by Israeli 
army with tear gas and sound bombs. This time they managed to attract the 
attention they aimed for. Videos and photos of the protest were uploaded to 
YouTube and travelled worldwide88, with the punch line, “We will show the Sky 
People that they cannot take whatever they want! This, this is our land!” 
This is the story retold by Henry Jenkins (2010) when he coins the term Avatar 
activism to account for the use of pop icons for political engagement, as he 
writes, “The event is a reminder of how people around the world are mobilising 
icons and myths from popular culture as resources for political speech, which 
we can call Avatar activism”. The meaning of popular films, he continues to 
propose, resides “at the intersection between what the author wants to say and 
how the audience deploys his creation for their own communicative purposes”, 
that is, in their appropriation for contextualized purposes.  
 
Indeed the icon of Avatar is used across the world for various purposes: By the 
Dongria Kondh tribe in the eastern state of Orissa in India in their struggle to 
defend their sacred home land against a mining company; and by a 
non-governmental organization called Amazon Watch to protect the livelihood 
of the indigenous people in the Amazon rainforest against the threat posed by 
                                                        
88 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Chw32qG-M7E 
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the construction of a dam (Deuze, 2010). In these cases the “military-industrial 
complex” of the movie was rewritten with local embodiments (Jenkins, 2010).  
 
The appropriation of Avatar goes beyond the “military-industrial complex” and 
azure-skinned bodies. In China Avatar is used in different ways, for variegated 
communicative purposes. Two young boys are shown in a video painting their 
faces blue, with one singing Casablanca while playing the guitar, and the other 
dancing to the tunes in the high street of Changsha, central China (Figure 19). In 
a sports event of Chongqing University in south-western China, two college 
students wearing Na’vi style costumes became local celebrities and attracted 
news coverage.89  
 
 
Figure 19: Boys’ performance with faces painted blue90 
 
                                                        
89 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/1yeNOkbM5LY/ 
90 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/lqTfw_mDEbY/ 
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Figure 20: Na’vi at the games91 
 
Apart from self-performance, Avatar is also used to advocate various forms of 
rights. In a video titled the 2010 Internet Holy War in China,92 the footage of 
Avatar is dubbed to retell the story about the spat over competition practices 
between Tencent and Qihoo 360,93 two major Internet companies in China. The 
video draws attention to the disregard of Tencent for user privacy and its 
indifference to user rights, and urges users to fight back. Another video targets 
false advertising and malpractice in information disclosure by a listed company 
in China. The video juxtaposes Avatar footage with the TV ads of Gree, a Chinese 
air conditioner manufacturer, and drives home its message with a punch line 
spoofing the catch phrase of Gree’s ads— “Good air conditioners, by Gree”: Fake 
ads, by Gree.94 
                                                        
91 http://edu.163.com/10/0412/08/642CJEDI00293L7F.html 
92 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/cllSo1zuRoo/ 
93 Financial Times has a report on the spat at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e0e12040-f5ab-11df-99d6-00144feab49a.html#axzz1E4u0Gb30 
94 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/UzKVt07dEGc/ 
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If self performance and the advocacy of economic and financial rights are staged 
in an open and unambiguous way, activism of social and political nature is 
performed in coded languages, and in many cases, with parables. A case in point 
is a spoof video that mashes up Avatar footage and screenshots from a computer 
game called Perfect World95 to reference illegal land seizure and forced 
demolition. The video’s title, the Legend of Brother Chun,96 draws upon a 
wide-spread joke online poking fun at the 2005 Supergirl, Li Yichun. Li, with her 
boyish look and performance style, is joking called by many Internet users 
Brother Chun. The name, however, has acquired multiple meanings beyond Li 
Yuchun herself. Spoofs are made around Brother Chun. A term called “Brother 
Chun Cult” is coined for these spoofs and a catchphrase is repeated in forums, 
videos and photoshopped images, “Believe in Brother Chun for eternal 
life”(Martinsen, 2009). In this sense, the video tries to leverage three pop icons 
to propagate its message: Perfect World, Avatar, and Brother Chun.   
 
 
Figure 21: Believe in Brother Chun for eternal life97 
                                                        
95 http://www.perfectworld.com/ 
96 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/XtyCxtoh_fI/ 
97 http://www.danwei.org/trends_and_buzz/believe_in_li_yuchun.php 
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Avatar is interpreted online by Chinese users as a story of resistance against 
forced eviction and demolition98. The Legend of Brother Chun follows this line 
and tells a Chinese version of the story. In the remote Perfect Land, 
overpopulation, caused by birth control failure, has led to a serious shortage of 
land for property development. The Human Race turns their eyes to Pandora, 
inhabited by the Tide Born Race99. The Tide Born, of course, refuse to forsake 
their homeland, thus becoming what in China is commonly known as “"nail 
households". To get rid of property developers decide to send to Pandora an 
arm of Chengguan, China’s enforcers of urban order, feared and despised for 
their capricious crackdowns and penchant for violence, to force the Tide Born to 
hand in their land. Along the Chengguan they also send a handsome man to 
court the daughter of the chief of the tribe, so that a charm offence can be 
launched in case force doesn’t work out. However, the man decides to turn back 
against the developers and fight together with Tide born. With the help of the 
omnipresent and omnipotent Brother Chun, the Tide Born win the war again the 
developer. Their homeland is protected and their faith in Brother Chun 
rewarded.  
 
The video is dotted with jokes about Li Yuchun. Its narrative is not coherent, 
and the storyline is run-of-the-mill. However, the message is clear: forced 
eviction and demolition is evil and is doomed to failure. In the current 
socio-political environment, this message has to be dressed in parables and 
jokes. Jokes are not taken seriously, and thus can get the message through. This 
                                                        
98 Read, for example the comments on the post about the movie by Fauna at ChinaSmack. 
http://www.chinasmack.com/2010/stories/avatar-movie-chinese-reactions-long-lines-shangh
ai.html 
99 The Tide Born is a race in Perfect World.  
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is both the tragedy and the beauty of Internet expression and citizenship in 
China. Despite the difference in the Chinese context, the use of popular culture 
as inspiration for individual and civic engagement is similar across different 
cultural and political settings. Indirect, evasive yet resourceful in political 
activism, open, witty and unequivocal in advocacy for economic rights, bold and 
creative in performance of the self: put together these three facets give shape to 
Avatar activism in China, and provide us a nuanced understanding of media 
citizenship in Chinese context.  
 
War on Internet addiction and banal activism 
War on the Internet addiction was one of the most famous online videos of 2010. 
The 64-minute machinima spoof video was created among a small community 
within the virtual World of Warcraft (WoW) land of Azeroth100. The video is a 
many-layered creation that takes a good bit of unpacking and requires 
“multi-literacies” (El Refaie, 2009) to understand the details and the subtle 
messages embedded in the video. As Shao & Guo put it, you need to be “a 
near-native Chinese speaker, WoW player, and total Internet junkie” at the same 
time to follow the video without background materials (Shao & Guo, 2010).101 
However the main storyline is simple. The video tracks the fight between The 9 
and Netease over the renewal rights to WoW, the requirement of the 
government that skulls be removed from the game, the bureaucratic battles 
between General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and the 
                                                        
100The video is available at http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/qe-lW8lffVY/. The 
production of the video is discussed in Chapter Four. YouTube has a version with subtitles at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=emVhTjBYchs. Azeroth is the name of the world in which 
the World of Warcraft (WoW) takes place. 
101The background material, including the script, is available on Google Docs at  
https://docs.google.com/Doc?docid=0AWO369Kx_1-7ZGMyM2txcnhfMjhjcjM0eHJjbQ&hl=en 
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Ministry of Culture over the re-approval of WoW in China, the greedy Uncle 
Yang and his Internet addiction camps and electro-shock therapy, and the 
attempts to impose “Green Dam Youth Escort” software on Chinese web users. 
The movie concludes with an impassioned speech calling for Chinese WoW 
players to end their silence and raise their hands in protest to fight attempts to 
harmonize China’s Internet, which are keeping them away from their beloved 
games. On the sideline, references are made to malpractices of Internet service 
providers, entrapment (“fishing police”) in law enforcement, bootlegged 
products, fake ads, among other issues. There are many inside-jokes, including 
ones about Brother Chun and “river crab”, which can be easily passed over 
without an understanding of online and games culture.  
 
The main issues raised in the video, that is, the watering down, delayed 
approval and release of a new version of a popular game and the stigmatizing of 
the so called “Internet addiction”, and those referenced on the sideline, are 
mundane compared to such grand terms as freedom and democracy, economic 
prosperity and civil liberty. However, it is through this kind of “banal activism” 
(Postill, 2008) that citizenship is enacted and practised. Here “banality” should 
be understood as “an ordinariness not only partaking of that richly trivial 
sociability without which people cannot really live in the everyday, but also 
creating elements of the common and the communal”(Morris, 2010, p. 158). It is 
concrete issues and lived experiences, rather than lofty ideas and 
grand-yet-empty terms, that really matters to people, and it is concrete issues 
and the ways they are dealt with that define the relationship between the state 
and its citizens. Specific ‘banal’ issues that are of relevance can vary greatly from 
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one community to another, from one locale to another, however these 
differences are no obstacle to the formation of a “discourse community” (Cavalli, 
2007) . As Corndog, director of the video says when reflecting on the success the 
spoof, “This video makes people who don’t understand games shed tears 
because all of us on China’s Internet are under the same situation” (Lu Qiuluwei, 
2010).  
 
Various cases of banal activism, and the discourse communities forming and 
growing around them, signal the emerging of active citizenship among Internet 
users in China. It doesn’t matter that their voices may be varied and weak. What 
counts is the fact that they speak up. A point wrapped up nicely by Kannimei, 
the main character of War on the Internet addiction. Toward the end of the video 
when ridiculed by Uncle Yang, the evil expert on Internet addiction, of the 
futility of his urges, Kannimei refutes, “How can one stop shouting simply 
because his voices are weak”! He continues to argue that while we are weak and 
powerless facing injustice in our society, the least we can do is to show our 
support for each other. With this he calls upon all audience of the video to fight 
together for the game, 
All WoW players watching this video now please raise your hands, 
I need your help. I know you didn't raise your hands when they 
came for YouTube. You didn’t raise your hands when they came 
for Twitter, and then Fanfou.102 Now they are coming for WoW. I 
know we are all commoners, and considering all the injustice in 
                                                        
102 Fanfou was a microblogging service platform launched in 2007 and one of the most popular 
one. It was closed down in late 2009. In December 2010 it was relaunched. Its website is 
http://fanfou.com/ 
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our society there is nothing we can do to save our beloved game. 
However, the least you can do is to raise your hands in front of the 
computer, lend me your voice and your strength, and pass them to 
me through the nationwide LAN.103 
 
Many players don’t speak up as Kannimei does, but their strength pools 
together into a magic force, with which Kannimei defeats the powerful Uncle 
Yang. The war on Internet continues. The playful, banal activism as showcased 
in War on Internet Addiction gives primacy to voice and participation. It believes 
that speaking out on “questions of genuinely communal concern” and “you will 
have the ear of the community”(Stevenson, 2007, p. 256). In War on Internet 
Addiction this access-driven rather than ends-oriented activism achieves its 
ends. In this sense the video serves as a good metaphor for banal activism.  
 
Spoofing as everyday making 
“When I see something unfair, my impulse is to make a video to criticize and 
laugh at it”, this is how Hu Ge’s videos relate to social reality(Hu Ge, 2009). 
Jiaoshou approaches political engagement in a similar way, making funny videos 
to air his views (Jiaoshou, 2010). Since his video gained recognition within and 
beyond the WoW communities in early 2010, Corndog hasn’t had another video 
out in the past year. Improved media access is believed to blur the boundaries 
between media producers and consumers, and afford a tool of active citizenship 
to those traditionally invisible and voiceless. However, their way of civic 
                                                        
103. China has a firewall to separate itself from the World Wide Web, and is joked by users to 
operate the biggest LAN (local area network) in the world. 
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engagement stands in stark contrast to old models of participation and strategic 
communication of expert citizens. As is represented Hu Ge, Jiaoshou and 
Corndog, their participation is much more fluid, and non-planned, in line with 
what Henrik Bang (2005) calls “everyday making”, the principle of which he 
sums up as  
 Do it yourself 
 Do it where you are 
 Do it for fun, but also because you find it necessary 
 Do it ad hoc or part time 
 Do it concretely, instead of ideologically 
 Do it self-confidently and show trust in yourself 
 Do it with the system, if need be.  
(Bang, 2005, p. 169) 
 
As shown in the cases discussed above, the everyday-making model of 
citizenship, while appearing egocentric and banal, has democratic 
potential residing inherently in its practices because its communal 
concern and its networked nature facilitate “association among 
strangers”(Hartley, 2010), and thus may “lead to networked forms of 
collective identity and social action”(Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 228).  
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Chapter Four: Producing spoofs videos: Skill hubs, 
liquid networks and cultural co-production 
 
I would go to a guild and shout that I need people to run errands 
for my game video, and guild members who could find time just 
came and helped.  
                              Corndog (2010a) 
 
When I first met Hu Ge in Shanghai for an interview, I could hardly associate 
him with the person in and behind the witty and funny spoof videos and the 
emergent spoofing culture with which he was identified. He was the precise 
opposite of the image I had from his videos. Instead of laughing and joking, 
mocking and ridiculing as he did in his videos, in real life he struck me as nerdy, 
reserved, and even a bit shy. His answers to my questions were terse, 
economical, and straight to the point, which forced me constantly to prompt him 
for details.  
 
Hu Ge is a surprise package. He read automation at university, but felt more 
interested in music. In 1998 he got his first desktop, which he soon turned into a 
musical instrument, experimenting with computer music production on it. In 
2002 he started an online forum on audio skills,104 applications and equipment 
and up till today it has remained among the most popular of its type. Hu Ge gets 
bored easily and is always seeking something different. He worked as a music 
                                                        
104 http://www.audiobar.net/ 
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radio host in Wuhan of Hubei Province before quitting for an audio processing 
job in Beijing, “selling music equipment to music professionals who don’t know 
how to use it”, as he said in an interview(Q. Wang, 2006) . After a short stay 
there he moved to settle down in Shanghai writing music for an electronic 
musical instruments company. When he made the video clip The Murder Caused 
by a Bun, he was a freelance audio engineer, and in time of need he sold music 
production equipment to make ends meet.  
 
At that time he had come to terms with the fact that he was better at sound 
effects and audio treatment than music writing (Hu Ge, 2009), and was eager to 
experiment with something new. Chen Kaige’s “awful but awfully expensive ” 
(Goldkorn, 2006) movie The Promise (Wu Ji) afforded him an opportunity. Hu Ge 
did not expect the fame that came with the video. The story concerning the 
motivation, production and distribution of the video was typical of early video 
creators and YouTubers (Burgess & Green, 2009; Cornelio, Pagès, Ardèvol, & 
Roig, 2007). He made it on his two desktops, alone, for fun, to “practise some 
video production skills”, to be shared with his friends (Hu Ge, 2009; Q. Wang, 
2006). At the beginning of the video, there is a note that reads, “The thing you 
are to see is what I made for self-amusement; the content is purely fiction and 
all made up. It is for personal enjoyment and dissemination is forbidden”.105 
But the warning didn’t stop his friends from posting the video online. As a result 
Hu Ge became a household name among the young overnight. According to Feng 
Yue (2006) from China Youth Daily, a search of the video on Baidu.com, a 
                                                        
105 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xIU4udZRKEY. The translation is mine and the original 
is in Chinese，“以下你看到的东西是本人自娱自乐之作；内容纯属虚构，全是瞎编乱造的。本
东西仅限个人欣赏，禁止传播”。 
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popular Chinese search engine, generated 1,660 related web pages on 6 January, 
2006. Ten days later the number skyrocketed to 978,000. The un-amused Chen 
Kaige threatened Hu with a lawsuit,106 only to drop it later. If anything, this 
“ant-elephant fight” (People.com.cn, n.d.) served to add to Hu Ge’s popularity. 
Multiple sequels followed in ensuing months, including the Troubles Caused by a 
Bun, The Day the Master Meets the Bun, Bun Case Continued, all spoofing the 
farce between Hu Ge and Chen Kaige; and The Murder Caused by a Chopstick, 
featuring clips from Hero (Yingxiong) as well as silly/satirical allusions to Bin 
Laden.107 These spoofs, together with The Murder Caused by a Bun, and many 
other derivative spoofs in the making, are popularly known as the “Bun series”. 
Since then Hu Ge has been a “meme” creator in spoof videos (Burgess, 2008). 
His videos are mimicked by other users, generating multiple send-ups and 
making headline news in print media.  
 
Hu Ge is just one of the spoofers in China who are the focus of this chapter. The 
purpose here is not only to understand spoofers themselves; but also, through 
them I aim to get a glimpse of the spoofing subculture emerging around them 
and their videos. As Frank Barron (1999) says, all creation is a collaboration. In 
chapter one, I argued that the rise of user-created content is the function of both 
technological advances represented by digital affordability and the 
socio-cultural changes manifested as the rise of popular culture. I propose here 
                                                        
106 Times Online had a report on this the spoof and the related lawsuit, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article733376.ece . 
107 Hero is a 2002 Chinese wuxia film, directed by Zhang Yimou. Starring Jet Li, the movie is 
loosely based on the legendary Jing Ke in Qin Dynasty who failed in his attempt to assassinate 
the First Emperor Qin Shihuangdi.All these spoofs are available at YouTube or Tudou.com, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Hmnv5_w7Nc&feature=related, 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/VHjTZPseDAk/, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nwAwgrfbl0M&NR=1, and 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/lgPLBa3Rbok/ 
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that spoof videos as user-created content have not only to do with the advent of 
information technology; more importantly, it is the continuation and extension 
of subversive writing in pre-YouTube era, such as “hooligan culture” (Barmé, 
1992; Yao, 2004) and “silly talk”(“mo lei tau” in Cantonese) movies(Yan Feng, 
2001; Wilkins, 1998).108 By looking at spoofers, their users and the “social 
containers” (Fiore, 2007) in which their interactions and practices are 
embedded, I seek to shed light on three questions about spoofs and spoofing 
culture.  
 
The first question concerns identity formation. According to Paul Ricoeur, we 
build our identity through storytelling, not only those of ourselves but also 
those we meet and read (Albrechtslund, 2010). Thus identity formation is a 
dynamic process of interaction, co-creation and re-creation. The act of identity 
co-creation is not confined to the process of “making and circulating media 
content and experiences” (Banks & Deuze, 2009), it is also present in the 
process of consumption, traversing the whole process of cultural production. In 
the case of spoof videos, this process of co-creation doesn’t only involve 
multiple players (spoof creators, users and non-users), it also relates to 
different platforms (online and traditional media). Through a close reading of 
the textual and cultural practices in the process, I hope to understand the 
mechanism by which identity is built and constantly reconfigured in spoofing 
culture. 
                                                        
108 “Mo lei tau” is a Cantonese slang term used to describe a way of doing things that is odd 
irrational and nonsensical. BBC’s film critic Jonathan Ross uses “Silly talk” to describe the “mo lei 
tau” style of Stephen Chow’s movies. Read more at Suite101: 
http://asian-films.suite101.com/article.cfm/kung_fu_hustle_hong_kong_style#ixzz0mZ3LePvF. 
It is also referred to as “nonsensical” movies(Tao, 2007; Yam, 2009) . 
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The second question is about the ways in which social networks and 
communities are formed and managed among creators and users. Stories don’t 
just construct identities, they also build networks around themselves (Knox, 
Savage, & Harvey, 2006; Mische & White, 1998). Networks and communities are 
“written into being”, by egocentric friendsters in social network sites (boyd, 
2006), and by more close-knit social groupings such as music fans (N. K. Baym, 
2007), collaborative archive generators (Flinn, 2010), and users of online 
multiplayer games (Albrechtslund, 2010; Wirman, 2007). There are numerous 
spoofers and users online and there are rich and diversified ways in which they 
engage and associate with each other. I try to understand the contexts in which 
these social groupings are formed, the ways in which they work, and the 
strategies, both cultural and textual, that creators and users apply to manage 
these groupings to meet their social and production needs.   
 
The third question goes a step further from the second and links the social 
configurations of spoofers and users with their creative practices. Fiore (2007) 
proposes that different social configurations are related to different innovation 
styles and thus have great implications for social change. Venturini (2007) 
argues through an empirical case that the nature of media available to different 
groups, dependent on their social configurations, bears on the type of 
innovation of which they are capable. The question I have in mind here is 
whether and how the social containers of spoofers and users are related to their 
creativity.  
 
Spoofing culture in China is not organized around an all-purpose go-to site that 
177 
 
comes with the name “networkedspoofvideos.com.cn”, where all spoof videos, 
creators and users gather and engage with each other. Rather, they are 
distributed on multiple platforms from video sharing sites, blogs, personal 
websites, Internet portals and BBS forums to social network sites (Haomin Gong 
& Xin Yang, 2010), organizing themselves in forms from distributed “egocentric 
networks” (boyd, 2006) to closely-related online communities (N. K. Baym, 
2000). As is the case with most online-based networks, spoofing culture is in a 
permanent state of flux, with users and creators joining in and leaving it all the 
time. However, as Suitor, Wellman and Morgan (1997) observe, networks 
usually have a “core” that remains relatively stable. This insight is confirmed by 
Paolillo (2008) in his empirical study of YouTube producers. Following this line 
of thought, apart from major platforms which will be dealt with in Chapter Four, 
a logical step to study spoofing culture would be to look closely at the core of its 
networks: creators and “lead users” (von Hippel, 2005) serving as “affective 
hubs” (Casciaro & Lobo, 2005) that attract around themselves large cohorts of 
users. 
 
Apart from Hu Ge, this chapter will investigate another two lead users, Jiaoshou 
(Shouting Beast, homophone of “professor” in Chinese) and Corndog (xinggan 
yumi, or “sexy corn” in Chinese). I have chosen them because they are 
“celebrities” among Internet users in China and, as I will show in this chapter, 
have been influential in one way or another among spoofers and users. Jiaoshou 
caught my attention when his clips were constantly cited in other videos in a 
online debate among youngsters on “non-mainstream” and 
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“anti-non-mainstream” behaviours in early 2009109. He is a prolific video creator, 
with each and every one of his clips acclaimed by enthusiacic users, and was 
voted “the Most Popular Blogger” in 2009 Tudou Video Festival (Tudou.com, 
2009). Corndog rose to stardom with his 64-minute machinima movie War on 
Internet Addiction, celebrated as overshadowing Avatar (Shao & Guo, 2010), 
which was released into the Chinese cinema roughly at the same time when the 
video was first circulated online. The video had attracted 3.2 million views as of 
April 17, 2010, when it landed Corndog the “Golden Potato Prize”, the “Best 
Oscar Movie” of Tudou Video Festival 2010.110 
 
The three spoofers are also representative in their uses of source texts on which 
to base their creative production. Hu Ge mainly used film clips before he shot 
short spoof videos with his own props and actors for fear of copyright 
infringement. Jiaoshou also designs his props, but most of his videos are 
mashups of copyrighted games, anime and manga. Corndog’s videos are mostly 
machinima, an increasingly popular form of spoof videos in China. Another 
reason for choosing them is that they are representative of the continuum of 
social containers in which user networks fit in and of the broad spectrum of 
                                                        
109 The debate surrounding “Non-Mainstream (非主流)” and “Anti-Non-Mainstream (反非主流)” 
started in 2008 as a generational spat between those born in 1980s and 1990s. In a spoof video 
Superwell used “moronic douche bags” (脑残) to refer to the “Non-Mainstream” culture, a 
subculture of the post-90s. Superwell characterised them as speaking text-speak (Huoxing Wen
火星文, literally language from the Mars. It is a mixture of Chinese, English and symbols known 
only to the members of a particular group or subculture), playing Audition Online Dance Battle 
(a game from South Korea), sporting exotic clothing and indulging in material culture. His 
accusation was countered by a camgirl video of Kululu, in which she called the post-80s 
“arrogant, indoory and useless”. The debate soon crossed generational boundaries and engaged 
with all forms of media format and platforms, including music, videos, graphics, BBS, blogs and 
dedicated websites. For the two videos, visit: 
http://v.ku6.com/show/ncA9G3Z6uTP4JVWT.html, and 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/mpXCp6iG35s         
110 For the live video of the prize awarding ceremony and Corndog’s acceptance speech, visit: 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/0BfPzP5VMIw/ 
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creator-user relationship. Hu Ge is in the image of traditional novelists or 
directors, a” lone creator” (Barron, 1999, p. 59), and his relationship with his 
users falls into the traditional author-reader dynamic (Skains, 2010). Corndog 
and his team are typical of co-creation and participatory culture (Jenkins, 2006). 
He is at the centre of a close-knit community of user-creators, where each 
member can contribute to the final product. Jiaoshou stands in the middle of the 
two extremes.  
 
There is an obvious gender imbalance in the spoofers who are presented in this 
chapter. This should not lead to the conclusion that women and girls play a 
lesser part in spoofing culture. Their lack of presentation here has more to do 
with my lack of access to them. For example, Murong Xuan is one of my 
favourite video bloggers on Tudou who writes and sings songs to comment on 
current affairs.111 Her videos have attracted over eleven million viewings as of 
February 20, 2011. I tried everything in vain to contact her for an interview. 
However, they are not totally absent in the chapter, many girls took part in the 
production of Corndog’s video and I have provided information about them 
where possible. And since the focus of my discussion is not gender difference, 
this is a limitation I can live with.   
 
The data on which the analysis of this chapter is based are collected through 
participant observation and interviews. In his ethnographic research on 
unofficial political writers in China’s cyberspace, Zhou Yongming (2005) 
analyses the complexities involved in Internet-related research: The 
                                                        
111 Her page at Tudou.con is at http://www.tudou.com/home/murongxuan/ 
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intrinsically “multi-sitedness” (both the virtual and the real world) of 
Internet-related fieldwork (Green, 1999; Hine, 2009) makes it imperative to 
explore both the virtual and real worlds so as to understand the dynamics of the 
two. The “multilayered” subjects and contexts commonly present in online 
ethnography mean that methods adopted should be case-specific. While I have 
tried my best to collect data about both the online and offline life of the three 
creators mentioned above, information about their offline life is sketchy and 
minimal, not least because Internet users regard it essential to keep their online 
identity anonymous, for security and privacy reasons. Apart from following and 
closely reading their creative productions and personal development on video 
sharing sites, blogs and fan forums, I have conducted interviews of various 
forms. With Hu Ge I conducted face-to-face interview in his house in Shanghai 
and have exchanged email messages ever since. The interview with Corndog 
was done with Skype voice call and emails. War on Internet Addiction has not 
only brought him fame, but also fears. Fearing being censored in one way or 
another, he declined politely my first request for interview in early February 
2010 for the reason that I am based overseas. He came back to me in March to 
accept my interview and has been very cooperative in answering my follow-up 
email questions. I got into contact with Jiaoshou through Corndog. They got to 
know each other in the 2009 Tudou Video Festival and realized that they went 
to the same primary school and have created a spoof video since then. I have 
talked with Jiaoshou through emails and QQ, a popular local instant messaging 
tool in China.  
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SPOOFING, IDENTITY CO-CREATION AND CULTURAL CO-PRODUCTION  
Corndog, OTMT and the co-creation of War on Internet Addiction 
Like Hu Ge, Corndog became famous overnight with the distribution of a widely 
acclaimed Internet video, War on Internet Addiction. However, in contrast to the 
trope of a lone hero making a hit video singlehandedly in his bedroom or garage, 
as Hu Ge has been portrayed, Corndog has a team behind him. It is a 
self-organized group of gamers and machinima fans called OTMT, or Oil Tiger 
Machinima Team. Before I come to details about the production process of the 
video, I think it worth a detour to elaborate the name of the group.  
 
I love you and I love games  
Their English name may sounds weird and awkward. Its Chinese version, ai 
laohu hou (爱老虎游), literally “Love Tiger Games”, is definitely interesting, 
indicative of the popular ethos of the Internet in China. The name plays on a 
popular term “ai laohu you” (爱老虎油), literarily “love tiger ointment”, which 
first appeared as a joke in martial art movies The Invincible Shaolin featuring Jet 
Li as the martial art master Wong Fei-hung. In the movie, Aunt Yee, who came 
back from the West and fell in love with Wong, tried to teach him how to say “I 
love you” in English. To help with pronunciation Wong coined a homophonic 
Chinese phrase “ai laohu uou” (爱老虎油).112 The phrase has since then been 
                                                        
112 Although the story is fictional, the practise of using Chinese characters as phonetic 
annotation for English has been a common practice for English learners in China, in some cases 
even adopted by government for crash courses. For example, in the Bilingual Guide for 
Welcoming the World Expo in Luwan District in Shanghai, English phrases are marked with 
Shanghai-nese dialect, causing controversies among net users and in mainstream media. For a 
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picked up and used widely among youngsters, especially Internet users, as a 
playful way to say “I love you”. In the Chinese name for OTMT, it adopts the first 
part of the phrase “ai laohu” (爱老虎) to mean “I love”, and replaces “you” (油) 
with “you” (游) to mean “games”. The name is thus a word salad of English and 
Chinese, sounding both as “I love you” and “I love games”. This kind of wordplay 
and double meaning, as Zhu Dake (2010) observes, has been on the rise on the 
“linguistic playground” that is the Internet and has become a conduit for 
self-expression, presentation, and rebellion, a point that was discussed in 
Chapter Three.  
 
OTMT is active on the fringe of a self-organized WoW (World of Warcraft)113 
fan forum called NGA (National Geographic of Azeroth)114, where the team 
recruits its most of its members. The members are largely handpicked by 
Corndong based on the skill profiles and congeniality of potential members. 
During his time off work he serves as webmaster on the video panel of the NGA. 
Membership is by invitation only and decided by a deliberative process among 
the group. The team had 53 members at the time of my phone interview with 
Corndog115, some of them are good at music prodcution and singing, others 
graphic design, still others video post production. The members are 
geographically distributed, and play games on different servers. What has 
bound them together is their shared interest in both the WoW game and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
list of phrases marked with Chinese characters, visit 
http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2009-12-31/144219377258.shtml 
113 WoW is a massively multiplayer online game developed by Blizzard Entertainment. The 
game entered China in 2005.For more information, visit its official site, 
http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/beginners/index.html.  
114 With more than two million users NGA (http://bbs.ngacn.cc/) is more popular in China than 
the official WoW site. It was incorporated in 2009 into 178.com, a game portal based in Beijing. 
115 The interview was conducted on March 16, 2010, with Skype voice functionality.  
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NGA Forum. Communication among the team is through QQ Group, a messaging 
tool of choice among Chinese Internet users provided by Tencent, a local 
Internet portal. I asked to observe their intragroup communication but Corndog 
turned down my request after consulting group members, “ They don’t agree, 
saying they would feel weird” (Corndog, 2010a). 
 
OTMT doesn’t have a group ID or collective representation on NGA forum. Its 
members are active on their own there. OTMT exist as a trademark for the 
co-creations of the team. 
 
 
Figure 22：The Logo of OTMT 
(Screenshot from War on Internet Addiction) 
 
Making videos, together 
War on Internet Addiction (WIA) is the third video produced by the team. Both 
of the previous two are machinima videos, but neither of them travelled as far 
as WIA.116 The content of these videos and the reasons for the wild popularity of 
WIA are of great relevance to this thesis and will be discussed in another 
                                                        
116 The other two videos, in temporal order, are The Song of Skeleton Party (骷髅党之歌) at 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/_iBhnbCfW3g/, and To be Released on Another Day (择
日再开) at http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/dTDyF1Mst4k/. Corndog has a video blog 
on Tudou.com where videos by the group and Corndog himself are posted, 
http://www.tudou.com/home/item_u13680759s0p1.html. 
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chapter. My focus in this section is the collaborative way in which these videos 
are produced. The purpose is to shed light on collaborative practices in the 
production of spoof videos and broadly the production of culture.  
 
Their first video under the trademark of OTMT was Song of the Skeleton Party117. 
Private Ryan118, one of the core members of the team, initiated it, and Corndog 
worked as his assistant, co-authoring the script and co-directing the shots. The 
video was well received on NGA. More importantly, the video created a popular 
Tauren character called Kannimei119, which was to become the name of all the 
three videos created by the team. War on Internet Addiction is the third of the 
Kannimei series, and the first of the three that has travelled beyond the game 
community.  
 
According to Corndog in a textual interview with Phoenix TV, the video took 
more than 100 users around 3 months to co-create, with no cost except game 
fees (Lu Qiuluwei, 2010)120. Corndog took the leading role in the process, writing 
and directing the production, with Private Ryan as his assistant this time. The 
script was discussed and revised with Private Ryan before it was circulated 
                                                        
117 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/_iBhnbCfW3g/. Skeleton party is a term in NGA 
forum that refers to users disciplined by webmasters. According to rules in the forum, 
rule-breakers lose reputation points and users with reputation point below zero lose their 
avatar and get a generic skeleton. The rules, however, are largely at the discretion of 
webmasters. As a result their rulings are very arbitrary. Song of the Skeleton Party is a video of 
ridicule and self-amusement.  
118 ID in NGA forum: Ryan 1942.  
119 Tauren is a race in WoW game. For more information about it visit 
http://www.wowwiki.com/Tauren. Kannimei, literally “look at your sister”, is a name of an ID 
on NGA forum. It can also be used as a curse.  
120 The television interview is available from Phoenix TV, at 
http://v.ifeng.com/society/201001/e433c136-a77f-4381-a62a-3dba4b418b7d.shtml. In the 
interview, Corndog’s opinion was read out by a presenter from Phoenix TV because he was very 
fearful of being hunted down by the authority and thought it better to remain anonymous.  
185 
 
among the whole group to solicit ideas and tidy up loose ends. The core 
production crew were from OTMT, with roles and timing negotiated between 
Corndog and team members.  
 
Collaboration and co-creation is not limited to team members. Corndog also 
crossed group boundaries for help with the creation process. One source of help 
is WoW guilds, where OTMT recruit gamers to perform minor roles. “I would go 
to a guild and shout that I need people to run errands for my game video,121 and 
guild members who could find time just came and helped” (Corndog, 2010a). 
Gamers have done this for free. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23：Corndog and Private Ryan 
(Screenshots from War on Internet Addiction) 
 
 
These gamers are not only volutary participants but also a ready fan base for the 
videos in the pipeline. Many celebrity gamers-bloggers outside of OTMT were 
invited to work on the video, contributing to the whole creative process from 
the storyline to the post-production. The dubbing and music of the video is 
                                                        
121 According to Anne-Mette Albrechtslund (2010), guilds are player-generated teams and they 
“vary greatly in size, ambition, and demographics”. “Guilds have a leader and, usually, officers 
who have the authority to decide on important issues such as the recruitment and eviction of 
members. Often, guilds explicitly label themselves after their preferred playing style, such as 
raiding guilds, casual guilds or role-playing guilds”. 
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highly acclaimed and here we see acknowledged at the begnining of the video 
well-known names as Catherine Linlin, Loveqiaolin, tnnaii, and babymavis.122 
Banyun⑨Ke, a video team active around Acfun, an anime fan forum, 
participated as a group in the production of the video, offering suggestions on 
script lines and taking over some dubbing work.123 
 
The list of participants would be too long to be given exhaustively, a point 
Corndog had meticulously made in his introduction to the WIA on NGA forum 
(Corndog, 2010b). I have emphasized here the collaborative practice among and 
across network boundaries, in the belief that the cross-boundary collobaration 
of the sort we see in the production of WIA taps into the best of the “collective 
intelligence” (Levy, 1997)of Internet user networks and brings about better 
content. By enlisting the help of a diverse range of gamer-users and involving 
them as part of the prodution, Corndog made all participants owners of the 
video. As I will argue later in this chapter, this has not only made WIA a better 
video, it has also helped the video travel farthur, reaching more diverse user 
networks and getting more popular along the way. 
 
 
 
Figure 24：The logo of Banyun⑨Ke124 
                                                        
122 Music featured in the video includes Ain't No Rest for the Wicked by the American rock band 
Cage the Elephant; Maybe I Love You by Girlfriend; and a cover version of Karen Mok’s All of a 
Sudden, by Catherine Linlin. Catherine Linlin (http://www.yyfc.com/1771771/) is WoW gamer 
and an acclaimed cover singer in the game community. Both Loveqiaolin 
(http://www.tudou.com/home/loveqiaolin) and babymavis 
(http://www.tudou.com/home/_3944055) are popular v-bloggers, and tnnaii 
(http://u.youku.com/user_show/id_UMTQ4MzgxNTky.html) is a character voice talent.  
123 Banyun⑨Ke has a video list on Tudou.com: http://www.tudou.com/playlist/id/7240262/ 
124 http://acfunwiki.org/index.php/%E6%90%AC%E8%BF%90%E2%91%A8%E8%AF%BE 
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Also commendable in the co-creative process is the level of trust that is 
demonstrated among participants. Corndog cited an example of this in my 
interview with him. The shooting of the video needed several dozen gamers to 
be online at the same time and follow the instructions from Corndog, issued 
through the group chat functionality afforded by Skype voice. In the process of 
shooting some might need to get food or have a break, others may need to get to 
work, and this could slow down the whole shooting process. Their solution was 
to borrow the accounts and passwords of those who couldn’t stay online and 
give them to others who can, and return these accounts to their owners when 
they need them back.  
 
This is the sort of “thick” trust that is generally associated with close-knit 
communities with intensive and daily contact (Kavanaugh, Reese, Carroll, & 
Rosson, 2005). While OTMT is a close-knit and relatively stable network, as I 
will argue later in this chapter, the network of participating users in the 
production of WIA is more of an ad-hoc one. In a world where both institutions 
and individuals are still grappling with identity theft in general and virtual ones 
in particular (Sullins, 2006; W. Wang, Yuan, & Archer, 2006; Whitson & 
Haggerty, 2008), the high level of trust as shown among the ad-hoc user 
network in the co-production process is worth taking note of.  
 
The travelling of videos and ideas beyond their production networks will be 
dicussed in more detail in Chapter Five. Suffice it to say that the co-creation 
process and the making of a popular video doesn’t stop at production, rather it 
traverses the whole cultural prodcution process. What follows is another 
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co-creative process that is embedded in and makes up the co-prodction of 
videos, and cultures: the co-creation of identities.  
 
Jiaoshou, identity performance and spoofing culture 
Part of the experience of the “liquid modernity” (Bauman, 2000) in which we 
reside,an age when “uncertainty, flux, change, conflict, and revolution are the 
permanent conditions of everyday life” (Deuze, 2008), is the transient nature of 
the identity and the disorientation of the self. As Sean Redmond (2010) 
observes, 
[T]he body and mind have been rendered borderless and open, on a 
more apocalyptic note, to invasion and continual disorientation. 
The self in one reality, one time zone, with one set of spatial 
coordinates has been torn asunder. 
 
The ubiquity of virtual networks afforded by advances in information 
technologies has added to this “deterritorialisation of the self” (Redmond, 
2010). However, it has at the same time facilitated the “shape-shifting” of 
identities, affording us the opportunity to formulate “decentered and multiple” 
identities (Turkle, 1997), and to produce and distribute “copies” of 
ourselves(Senft, 2008, p. 4). In this process of identity redefinition and 
re-creation, the individual doesn’t necessarily need to be the disenfranchised 
object suffering from “a traumatic sense of fear” (Redmond, 2010). Rather, as I 
intend to show in the case of Jiaoshou, they can negotiate, experiment with and 
take advantage of their multiple identities, to make them more fully known, not 
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only to others, but also to themselves. 
 
Avatar Jiaoshou  
Jiaoshou is a civil engineer by the name of Yi Zhenxing. He works as a project 
manager at a construction company in a second-tier city of Hunan Province, 
Central China. The online Jiaoshou used to be Stupid Dad, an innocuous term in a 
local dialect of Hunan. His first video was a video game commentary, in which 
he called himself a professor-class game commentator. He then played with the 
word “professor” and made a series of game videos in the name of Jiaoshou, 
literally “shouting beast”, homophonic in Chinese with the word “professor”125. 
Jiaoshou was adopted as a user name to replace Stupid Dad in middle 2008, for 
two reasons: He didn’t want his ID to sound like he was taking advantage of 
other Internet users, and more importantly, users preferred to call him Jiaoshou 
(2010). In this sense, Jiaoshou is a user-co-created name.  
 
Jiaoshou is famous not only for his videos, but also the signature mask he wears 
whenever he is shown online. The mask is also a co-creation. In my interview 
with him, Jiaoshou acknowledged that he had drawn upon a funny comic series 
by Ludougao (literally Green Bean Cake) for the mask .The series, known as 
“face paralysis”, attracted a large following and became a fad among Internet 
users in early 2007126. Although there had been popular video bloggers in Japan 
                                                        
125 It should be noted that “shouting beast” was created as a derogative term to refer to 
university teachers on the Internet long before it was adopted by Jiaoshou as a user ID. The 
popularity of the term online is an indication of the damaged reputation of the whole university 
sector, not least because of academic and moral corruption.    
126 Ludougao has a blog (http://blog.sina.com.cn/lvdougao) where a lot of similar funny comic 
pictures are available. The “paralysis” series are available in many forum and BBS, for example, 
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and Shanghai wearing animal masks or medical masks, he was the first video 
creator to wear a paper mask (Jiaoshou, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 25：Jiaoshou’s mask and his avatar online 
The character on the mask is “beast” and the line reads: I can’t even be bothered to tell you off 
 
 
The online Jiaoshou has double identities. He is at once a popular video creator 
and a persona in the videos he creates. By this Jiaoshou has become an avatar, a 
“performed character” not limited to a fixed corporeal self (Goffman, 1971, p. 
245). He can be both and one at the same time, speaking to and connecting with 
users across age, educational and cultural boundaries, though users rarely 
realize this or make distinctions between those two identities. To a certain 
extent, the double identities have afforded a “third space” (Winnicott, 1971) for 
Jiaoshou and his fan-users, a space where reality is intermingled with fantasy 
and makes possible multiple modes of interactions.  
 
When asked about his purpose behind these multiple identities, he said:  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
at http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=370949019, and 
http://dzh.mop.com/topic/readSub_7888162_0_0.html. 
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Well, (Charlie) Chaplin was a movie-maker and actor at the same 
time; he was at once the clown with a moustache on the screen, the 
director with a speaker in his hands, and the grey-haired old man 
off the screen. Multiple identities are very common… for people 
with a strong sense of self-presentation… For me, my main purpose 
is to build my own brand, my own identity. I want my audience to 
recognize my videos at the first sight. So I have tried to be 
consistent with my mask. Even if I (the video creator) am absent 
from the video, I want (the persona) to be there. (Jiaoshou, 2010) 
 
In what follows I will discuss how Jiaoshou has negotiated these identities, and 
maintained the balance between the online and offline, private and public 
aspects of these identities through his interaction with his users.    
 
Masquerading, performing and community-building 
As Lawler observes, it is an old and widespread theme in storytelling that we 
need to wear a mask to show our true selves (2008, p. 103). Jiaoshou wears two 
masks: the facial mask he uses as part of his online avatar; and the other, 
invisible mask which he—as well as anybody else— wears to project a more 
favourable self-image. According to Erving Goffman, that mask, or, rather, 
masquerade, is what makes us as we are. In his seminal text The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life, Erving Goffman (1971) compared identity to theatrical 
performance, during which actors tailor self-presentation to foster favorable 
impressions based on audience and context. The self and identify emerging out 
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of this process is “a product of the scene that comes off” (p. 245), a project of 
collaboration and interaction between the performer and his audience.  
 
Theresa M. Senft (2008) has conceptualized identity formation in the Internet 
space in a Goffmanian fashion. She proposes to approach it through the lens of 
“micro-celebrity”, which she defines as a style of performance that “involves 
people ‘amping up’ their popularity over the Web using techniques like video, 
blogs, and social networking sites” (Senft, 2008, p. 25). These techniques are 
“strategically” interactive in nature, because, as Senft observes, “On the Web, 
popularity depends upon a connection to one’s audience, rather than an 
enforced separation from them” (p. 26). Thus in the online setting, as the offline 
world, identity performance is a collaborative, interactive and continual 
process, constantly co-creating and re-creating at the same time. It is conducted 
on multiple platforms (SNS, blogs, BBS, etc.), and by various means (textual, 
visual, audio, etc.). Its success depends on strategic choices of one’s multiple 
identities in response to changes in context and audience. 
 
Jiaoshou knows very well the importance of connecting with his users. He has 
tried to build a sense of “ambient affiliation” (Zappavigna, under review)127 , 
togetherness and co-ownership with his users, making them part of the creative 
process and appealing to shared experience with them. In his reception speech 
for “the Most Popular Blogger” in the 2009 Tudou Video Festival, he cited users 
as essential behind his creativity, “ Were it not for you, I would not have 
                                                        
127 Leisa Reichelt(2007) uses a similar term, “ambient intimacy”, to refer to this type of bonding. 
She explains, “Ambient intimacy being able to keep in touch with people with a level of 
regularity and intimacy that you wouldn’t usually have access to, because time and space 
conspire to make it impossible”. 
193 
 
bothered to make videos”128.  
 
Jiaoshou doesn’t only make videos for his audience, he makes video with them. 
He has a good sense of how new media works and has invited his audience to 
participate in the creative process.  
I place great emphasis on communicating with fellow Internet 
users, and I take their opinions seriously. I think this is the biggest 
difference between old and new media. I constantly adjust my 
production according to the majority opinion of my audience. 
(Jiaoshou, 2010) 
 
As his connection with his users and his identity performance is enacted and 
reinforced through co-creative story-telling, Jiaoshou has consciously and 
conscientiously chosen the right format to tell the right stories. As Jiaoshou says, 
As you can see in my videos I use some anime footage from 
mid-1980s classics, some from post-2000s popular ones. My 
purpose is to invoke the nostalgia of the post-1980ers and appeals 
to the novelty craze of the post-2000ers at the same time. My fans 
are generally in the age group of 14-24. I choose this footage on 
purpose, partly to accommodate my audience, and partly to 
entertain my own interests. (Jiaoshou, 2010) 
 
Jiaoshou is connected with users on multiple platforms. He calls himself “Pope 
of Vulsar” (猥琐教主, literally “Pope of the Religion of the Vulgar”), a group with 
                                                        
128 The video of his speech is available at Tudou.com at 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/p4h68mr7oVs/ 
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a membership of about 30,000 on mop.com129. He has a video-blog with 
tudou.com that is constantly updated130. He posts his new videos there, shares 
stories behind and beyond those videos, and constantly communicates his new 
plans and new ideas to users. He has a blog with sina.com largely to share and 
recommend videos by others,131 a BBS on Baidu.com initiated, maintained and 
populated by his user-fans,132 and his own website that integrate all these 
links.133 These platforms are interfaces between Jiaoshou and his users, and 
among users themselves. Jiaoshou’s Tudou blog are subscribed by nearly 5,0000 
users, and in its comment area there are more than 51000 messages talking to 
and about Jiaoshou as of August 2010. The Baidu BBS has over one million posts 
on more than 86,000 threads134. Since some of the users are active across 
platforms, stories and ideas posted on one platform are quickly shared and 
distributed among the whole network of interested users. As a participant 
observer, I was able to witness on one occasion of the real-time sharing of 
information across these platforms. 
 
As instant messaging tools can’t accommodate group talks of big teams, 
Jiaoshou has turned to “web chat” (版聊) to communicate at once with large 
                                                        
129 Vulsar sound similar to the Chinese word for “vulgar”. It is common on the net in China to 
playfully call a group, a belief, or a pattern of behavior “religion” (教). For example, Li Yuchun, 
the winner of the 2005Happy Girl talent show, jokingly called “Brother Chun” on the net, is 
spoofed to be the pope of “the Religion of Brother Chun”. A lot of stories have appeared online as 
of the omnipotence of “Brother Chun”, of which the catch phrase is, “Believe in Brother Chun 
and get immortal”. They even have versions of the “religion” in different languages 
(http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E6%98%A5%E5%93%A5%E6%95%99). According to 
Jiaoshou(2010),Vulsar is one of the biggest groups on mop.com. Formed around year 
2002-2003, the group is still affiliated to mop.com but has also established its own website: 
http://www.vulsar.com/vcode.htm 
130 http://www.tudou.com/home/yzx119/ 
131 http://blog.sina.com.cn/jiaoshouxiaoxing 
132 http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kw=蠢爸爸 
133 http://www.jiaoshoutv.com/ 
134 As of 27 August, the numbers are 86041threads and 1003853 posts.  
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groups of fan-users. He uses the commenting function of blogs and BBS to 
conducts these group talks irregularly at the request of users (Jiaoshou, 2010). 
He usually posts a notice on the time and venue of the chat before it happens. 
The chat I observed happened on his Sina blog in late April 2010.135 After the 
chat started, substantive content was relayed to his Baidu forum simultaneously 
by interested users136, where comments were exchanged on the chat. The chat 
lasted about 2 hours and generated 800 posts at the blog. Among these 800 
posts more than 300 were relayed to the Baidu forum.  
 
These posts, though mostly casual talk and gossip, serve an important social 
function by being “community-constituting”(N. K. Baym, 2000, p. 5),137 
reinforcing connections and social bonds, as Li Shubo(2010) observes, they 
“play an important role in building up trust and a shared common sense within 
online communities”. Moreover, when these chats and comments are shared 
across platforms, they become archived information accessible to users both 
present and absent138, thus help to create an ambience of “connected presence” 
(Licoppe, 2004), or “presence-in-absence” (Howard, et al., 2006), among 
distributed user-fans and contribute to the feel of a shared experience and an 
collective identity. As Lisbeth Lipari (2010) observes, “We become one when we 
listen together—to the voices of god, to a singer, to a speaker, to the wind 
blowing through the trees… Thus, in listening, we become” (Lipari, 2010, p. 
                                                        
135 http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_64d63a8c0100ifh5.html.  
136 Visit Chunbaba Forum on Baidu at: 
http://tieba.baidu.com/f?z=756066150&ct=335544320&lm=0&sc=0&rn=30&tn=baiduPostBro
wser&word=%B4%C0%B0%D6%B0%D6&pn=0 
137 The importance of casual talk and gossip as phatic communication will be discussed in 
chapter 3. 
138 In the Baidu forum, users are constantly advised to refer to archived chats for information. 
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350,original emphasis). 
 
Of course, the shared experience and collective is shaped and formed not only 
through connection through chats and video formats, it is also—and maybe 
more importantly—done through the content of the videos themselves. After all, 
the users get attracted to Jiaoshou in the first place because his videos make 
them laugh, and think. As messages left by users show: 
Hi, I am a 90er from Taiwan. Your videos can really take away 
people’s stress. Hope to see more of them, Jiaoshou. (See Figure 26 ) 
 
Really the works of Jiaoshou are deep and profound…he doesn’t 
want to show that because that would appear shallow…I hope we 
don’t stop at the vulgar look of his videos…I have just blurted out 
my feelings. Ha-ha. Jiaoshou is matchless.”(See Figure 27) 
 
 
Figure 26: Comment by lineage205ph, a Taiwanese user 
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Figure 27: Comments by users about the works of Jiaoshou139 
 
Celebrity Jiaoshou and his dilema as a pop idol  
Fame comes with both perks and pitfalls (Geraghty, 2010). The issues stars 
commonly face are the “obsessive and incessant” questions of “really” (P. David 
Marshall,quoted in  Senft, 2008, p. 25), the constant “gaze” they are subject to 
(Marshall, 2010) and the tension between publicity and privacy. Marwick and 
Boyd’s (2010) research on Twitter shows that users try to retain and attract 
audience by displaying a level of authenticity, balancing personal/ public 
information, and changing the mix in response to audience feedback. Apart from 
nagging question of “what’s next and when”,140 the overarching question 
Jiaoshou constantly need to face is: What does his face look like behind the 
mask?   
 
While active online, Jiaoshou has been very careful to put up a firewall between 
his online and offline lives, for privacy as well as security reasons, because 
posting unsanctioned views online is a risky business in China. There seemed to 
                                                        
139 Unless specified otherwise, textual screenshots in this chapter are all taken from the 
comment area at Jiaoshou’s tudou.com blog: 
http://www.tudou.com/home/yzx119#comment_area 
140 In the comment area of Jiaoshou’s video blog in Tudou.com, there are pages of comments, 
even curses, by users urging him for the next video (http://www.tudou.com/home/yzx119/).  
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be a tacit agreement between Jiaoshou and his fans on this issue. For a long 
period of time Jiaoshou’s offline identity was a guarded secret, and any attempt 
of users on his Tudou blog to leak information about his really name and place 
of residence would be stopped by other peer users. When I searched online in 
early 2009, information on him was patchy and sporadic. In a sense this added a 
feel of mystery about him and contributed in part to his popularity. Fan-users 
have plenty of space to imagine the real person behind the paper mask. Each of 
them could have their own image of Jiaoshou, meeting all the standards of their 
heroes at the same time. Jiaoshou is at once the same and different persona for 
fan-users. This changed with the Tudou Video Festival in April 2009, when he 
received the award of “the Most Popular Blogger” without his signature mask. 
 
The reaction of users to his appearance on the festival was a mixture of 
excitement and disappointment: Excited because their hero came off from the 
screen at last and was as humorous as he was online; disappointed because the 
corporeal Jiaoshou dispersed many imaginary ones and denied numerous other 
possibilities. The ambivalent and varied responses of users are evident online, 
where fans expressed their disappointment to see their hero fail to live up to 
their imaginary:  
It really hurt to see that he is better-looking from his back than 
from his front... (See  
Figure 28) 
 
However, I found Jiaoshou less handsome after I saw his real face. 
(See Figure 29) 
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Figure 28: Mask off—--reaction on Jiaoshou’s mask-less appearance141 
 
 
Figure 29: mask off----reaction on jiaoshou’s mask-less appearance 
 
Others were more celebratory: 
How cool… I can’t take it anymore. 
Jiaoshou, BUMP, has content and humour 
Jiaoshou… I LOVE U 
Jiaoshou…he himself is witty too… commendable. (See Figure 30) 
 
 
                                                        
141 Figure 7 and Figure 9 are screenshots of comments for the reception speech video on 
Tudou.com at (http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/p4h68mr7oVs/), taken on 17 august 
2010. 
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Figure 30: Mask off-----Reaction on Jiaoshou’s mask-less appearance 
Jiaoshou’s face behind his paper mask was still regarded as a secret by some 
users more than a year after he appeared on the Video Festival. On May 18, 
2010, a user called Cloud (云) suggested that Jiaoshou should block (河蟹，or to 
harmonize, as is said by Chinese Internet users) the girl called Benben, who 
posted Jiaoshou’s front shots on her online album, “Brother Beast, actually your 
front shots are already available on Benben’s album… You should river-crab 
(harmonize) the lass” (See Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31: Message by Cloud 
 
Since it was impossible to keep anonymous anyway, Jiaoshou began to share his 
personal information with his fans after the 2009 Tudou Video Festival. 
Through his Tudou video blog and Sina blog, he talked about his work, his 
wedding, his travels, and his decision to go to graduate school. In 2010, when 
his daughter was born, he even made a spoof video of her. In the video titled 
Shouting Beast on Baby Feeding142, he wears his signature facial mask, holds his 
daughter in his arms, and lectures on how to feed her with her own fingers to 
stop her crying before baby formula is prepared. Fans offered all sorts of 
                                                        
142 http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/Vca2iBet7Fc/ 
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nicknames to the baby: Little Loli, Shoushou (兽兽，the Beast)143, Little Beasty 
Girl, and Lollipop…. The baby has become a popular topic on Jiaoshou. However, 
not all fans have such as good sense of humour. A user by the name of nie663988 
was so upset with the jokes made about the baby that he spammed the whole 
comment area of Jiaoshou’s Tudou blog with accusations and criticism of him, 
urging him to reflect on his responsibility as a son, husband and father, and stop 
making videos altogether. In one of the messages, nie663988 suggested: 
Mr. Yi Zhenxing (易振星, jiaoshou’s real name), you should stop 
making videos now. Look at your fans. You’ve got a daughter, and 
they don’t watch their tongues about what they say about her… 
She is so young, yet she is spoofed. Aren’t you ashamed of 
yourself? You would better reflect on how to be a good father, and 
how to be a decent man doing decent work. (See Figure 32) 
When asked about the rise in personal information in his interaction with fans, 
Jiaoshou(2010) confessed consideration of fans’ prying tendency, 
I have maintained on purpose a firewall (between my online and 
offline identities). However, fans are usually interested in the 
appearance of their idols as well as their private life. That’s why 
gossips about celebrities have a ready market. 
 
                                                        
143 Shoushou (兽兽) is also the nickname of a car model that got famous in China because of a 
sex video of her uploaded online by her ex-boyfriend. A report of the scandal is available at: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/90872/6907835.html 
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Figure 32: nie663988: Jiaoshou should stop making videos 
 
In a different vein, he denied any utilitarian consideration and cited 
fraternal feeling as the main reason behind the personal discourse.  
I share some of my personal information with my fans because I 
want to treat my fans as friends. I don’t need people looking up to 
me. I would be happier if I get sincere blessings and friendly smiles 
from them. Not everything should be based on utilitarian 
calculations.  
 
This uncertainty about the relation between Jiaoshou and his users, the 
conundrum of users as fans and peers, are the defining features of 
cyber-celebrities I interviewed in my fieldwork. Whatever the motivation, the 
recourse to personal topics has helped to shift Jiaoshou’s image from an aloof 
celebrity towards a user among “us”, increased his authenticity, “amped up” his 
popularity (Senft, 2008), and contributed to the successful projection of an 
203 
 
authentic and charismatic personality of Jiaoshou online.   
 
The Shouting Beast beyond Jiaoshou 
The multiplicity of Jiaoshou’s identity has made it possible for Jiaoshou to be 
independent of the corporeal self and become a symbol and character itself. 
Two markers of this independence are the fan journal featuring Jiaoshou and 
the commodification of his facial mask.  
 
In May 2009, an ad was posted for the sale of Jiaoshou facial mask in a BBS of 
Jiaxing, a city in the highly successful commercial province of Zhejiang. The ad 
reads, “Facial mask of Cyber-celebrity Jiaoshou for sale, professionally made.” 
The seller quoted five RMB Yuan per mask and provided delivery service for 
local customers144. It is impossible to get the selling number of the mask as the 
seller didn't identify himself and there was only an IP address related to the 
post. It is not even possible to tell whether the ad itself is meant to be a spoof or 
a truly smart business plan. However, the very idea that the Jiaoshou can be a 
sellable product shows that Jiaoshou as a character can stand on its own, more 
of the persona who pops out in the spoof videos to tell people off than the 
person who creates these videos.     
 
Jiaoshou as stand-alone persona is more outstanding in a fan-created comic 
journal called Jiaoshou Weekly. Edited by a user called “the King whose ID gets 
blocked” (被封号的国王，hereafter King), the journal was a fan co-creation. King 
                                                        
144 See the ad at: http://bbs.sogou.com/179396/elbbGEWIt8VIBAAAA.html 
204 
 
set up several QQ groups, such as the Comic Group, the PS group, and the GIF 
group, to solicit ideas and enlist help. Unlike Corndog’s QQ group for his gated 
community, King’s QQ groups were open to any interested fans. The journal had 
an official website145, which spoofs of the news agency Reuters and calls itself 
Toulushe (透露社，literally Disclosure Agency, it is the Chinese translation of 
Reuters read backwards). The journal was not published on a regular basis and 
up to now only three issues are available. King has cited censorship for the 
dysfunction.    
 
 
Figure 33: Cover Pages of Jiaoshou Weekly146 
 
The three issues of the journal have roughly the same structure, including 
columns such as Genesis, Special Report and Shout Weekly. At the beginning of 
each issue there is a statement claiming that the journal is authorized by 
Jiaoshou, though Jiaoshou himself admitted not knowing King well, having only 
chatted with him several times online (Jiaoshou, 2010). In the journal, Jiaoshou 
becomes a comic character born out of an egg, an omnipotent manga icon that 
                                                        
145 http://www.tlshe.com/ 
146 The three issues of Jiaoshou Weekly are available respectively at: 
http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=681022052 (issue 1); http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=685630038 
(Issue 2); and http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=707741349 (Issue 3). 
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spices his talk with profanity, fights all evils and ignores all established social 
norms. In issue three, it even fights Kongfu Bunny, a comic character created by 
Vincent, a lecturer and an anime professional at Communication University of 
China. The journal also incorporated in its offerings new developments in the 
Chinese cyberspace and commented social issue through the comic Jiaoshou. On 
the cover page of the second issue, the two animals leading the Santa Claus 
sleigh are not reindeers, but Grass-Mud-Horses, a legendary animal created by 
Internet users to mock government talk and vent frustration caused by 
censorship. 
 
 
Figure 34: the Tombstone of Toulushe (Disclosure Agency) 
 
In the editorial of the second issue, the creators complained about censorship 
and included a page on the grave of Toulushe (See Figure 34). The epitaph reads, 
“Harmonize your harmony, but don’t be harmonized by harmony. Buried here 
are comrades from Toulushe”.147 After burial, the group created the third issue 
in February 2010, and that seems to be the end of the journal. On its official 
                                                        
147 As shown in the picture, the epitaph is in Chinese: “和谐你的和谐，不要被和谐所和谐”. The 
translation is mine. 
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website there is a short notice by King, apologizing for letting down the 
supporters of the initiative, without giving a reason for its termination, “I am 
sorry to the people who have worked hard for Jiaoshou Weekly and Toulushe. I 
am sorry that I have let you down”. 148  
 
Although short-lived, the journal as a cultural creation is significant in many 
ways. If the activities of Jiaoshou the spoof creator connect him to “personal 
branding” (Marwick & Boyd, 2010) and “micro-celebrity” promotion (Senft, 
2008), where social media are employed to assure immediate and proximate 
access to personal information, private thought, mundane routines as well as 
spectacular activities of the would-be celebrity, then the creation of Jiaoshou as 
a comic character by his fan-users, while it confirms the effectiveness of 
Jiaoshou’s strategy, is a process of negotiation and co-ownership, and an 
initiative of active participation, appropriation and re-creation. It is act of 
co-branding and wiki-celebrity, where users apply social media and digital 
technologies to co-create a pop icon by and of themselves. Everybody can tweak 
it the way they like, and own it. Jiaoshou and the co-created journal provide a 
peep show not only into the ways spoofing culture emerges and grows, but also, 
broadly, into how innovation in culture takes place: how ideas come into being, 
travel, get experimented, tweaked, accepted or rejected, renewed and retained, 
and start a new cycle of dissemination. 
 
In his conceptualization of celebrity in liquid modernity, Redmond(2010) 
argues that as communion between the celebrity and the fan will bear the 
                                                        
148 http://www.tlshe.com/?page_id=2 
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“runny” and transient nature of our liquid modern society, celebrities are bound 
to be liquid and will ultimately disappoint. Jiaoshou has constantly reinvented 
himself to reinforce his bonding with his user-fans. If he were to disappoint, he 
has at least provided an opportunity for his users to co-create and experiment 
with spoof videos, identities, and spoofing culture, and has left behind a hero to 
last: a matchless funny shouting beast.  
 
SKILL HUBS AND LIQUID NETWORKS 
Hu Ge and his egocentric network 
Unlike Corndog and Jiaoshou, Hu Ge currently uses the Internet mainly as a 
distribution channel for his spoof video ads. After his success with the Bun Series, 
he shot several long videos using amateur actors, with mixed success.149 When I 
interviewed him in 2009, he seemed to have lost interest in the idea of fun 
videos for their own sake. He decided not to make new episodes for his widely 
acclaimed and mimicked “Hourly news of a group-rental house” because it was 
“too time-consuming”. 150 He aims for something bigger—to direct his own 
films(Hu Ge, 2009). He has been making commercial videos to make a living, 
cashing on the idea of online viral marketing. In May 2009, he made a video ad 
                                                        
149 A list of Hu Ge’s videos is available at his video blog with 6.cn, another video-sharing 
platform in China: http://6.cn/huge. 
150 The video series is titled “Hourly News of XX district No. XX Group Rental House” (XX xiaoqu 
XX hao qunzu fang). The fake news reports spoof a canonical news program of CCTV—Network 
News Broadcast (xinwen lianbo, 新闻联播), commonly known as Seven O’clock News, leading in 
the news with the same theme song but sporting a slightly different logo “CCAV”. The reports 
adopt the same grand rhetoric in state media to cover mundane issues in everyday life, such as 
fixing a blocked toilet and cleaning the house, while at the same time use everyday language to 
discuss critical issues such as education, public transport, employment and foreign policy. In this 
way the videos are social comments and mockery of bureaucracy and government talk. The 
format has been widely copied among university students to make dorm-based spoof news 
videos.     
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for Alibaba.com, the most successful e-commerce company in China. The video, 
Shoes attack: the counteroffensive of the president, is a spoof of the 2008 “shoe 
attack” against George Bush in Iraq151. In the video, shoes become weapons of 
mass destruction. Rather than dodging the shoes and smiling them off, the 
president lauches a large-scale counteroffensive and has to turn to Alibaba.com 
for sufficient supply of oversize shoes.  
 
After Shoes Attack, Hu Ge made another two ads for Alibaba, Animal World: 
Indoory Animals and Yaxshi, both spoof videos.152 His latest video ad was for 
7-up, shot within two weeks in August 2010. According to Hu Ge himself , the 
video, A man’s tragic life, attracted 30 million views in three weeks. 153 As a 
result he has been approached by 7-Up for another contract. Users may expect 
more video ads from him before he gets investment for his own movie (Hu Ge, 
2010).  
 
After frequent publicity in the media in 2006, Hu Ge has gradually faded out of 
the limelight, only to remind people of his excellence with his videos every few 
months. He had a personal website, Hu Ge Clip Factory,154 where he posted links 
to his videos, recruited volunteers to participate his production, and provided a 
                                                        
151 The ad is available at http://www.youtube.com/user/hugenoize#p/u/1/e5NY0NKnYUI. For 
the “shoe attack” incident in Iraq, read a report by BBC at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7786881.stm. The video of the shoe attack itself is 
also available on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VFX-dKpcDz8. 
152 The two video are available respectively at 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/uHq_FEcYyEU/and 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/sRmg2c339No/. Yaxshi is the Uygur word for “good”. 
It becomes a popular term online with a program on the 2010 CCTV’s New Year Gala. The 
program, Happy Life Yaxshi, sings praises for the policy of the party in Xingjiang. Multiple spoofs 
based on the term have appeared on the internet. Some users have proposed to an English 
translation the term: “Yakshit”. Wikipedia has an entry for the term at 
http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-cn/%E4%BA%9A%E5%85%8B%E8%A5%BF. 
153 http://www.youtube.com/user/hugenoize#p/u/0/MSDsIAo6vvs 
154 http://www.hugedv.com 
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platform for his fans to talk to eath other. The website had little traffic, partly 
because he was not very responsive to his fans (Hu Ge, 2009). It became 
inaccessible in late 2009. In an email Hu Ge cited server problems for its 
dysfunction, though the real reasons might be different.155 He talks to his 
friends through instant messaging tools such as QQ and MSN, and 
communicates with strangers through emails. The production network of Hu Ge 
is largely part of his personal network. Like Corndog’s community, Hu Ge’s 
production network is organized around skills. But unlike Corndog, he adopts a 
more egocentric attitute towards his production network, he asks for help from 
his “friends” when their skills are needed in his videos, and leaves them alone 
most of the time. He claims sole ownship for his videos. His attachment is more 
towards his production than the network or group itself. He doesn't talk to them 
that much on other occassions, and has little offline interation with them (Hu Ge, 
2009).  
 
The network-community continuum  
Up till now I have used community and network in this chapter to refer to forms 
of social organization in spoofing culture without defining the differenes 
between the two terms. I understand that they are often superimposed (Fiore, 
2007), embedded in them conflicting connotations (Amit & Rapport, 2002), and 
                                                        
155 Email communication with the author. I have doubts about the real reason for the problem 
of the website because Jiaoshou mentioned in an online conversation an initiative of the internet 
regulators in 2009 to tighten control of personal websites with interactive functionality, 
including commenting, forums and BBS. Personal websites were required to re-register with the 
regulators and were subject to a screening process before they could continue to operate. 
Jiaoshou’s website was suspended for several months because “the government agency said 
there was porn content there”, citing the appearance of the phrase “sanitary pad” in one of the 
postings by fans. As a result, Jiaoshou has scrapped commenting functions on his website 
(http://www.jiaoshoutv.com/).    
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that the very applicability of the terms to the social relations on the Internet has 
been called into question (Postill, 2008). It is not my intention here to engage in 
the theoretical debate about networks and communities. Rather, my focus is on 
understanding and describing forms of relation in networked spoofing culture. 
In so doing I hope to explore the link between its orgnizational forms and its 
creative productivity.  
 
In this chapter I regard network as Internet-mediated social institutions, as 
links of people as well as knowledge (Wellman, 2001a; Wellman, et al., 1996), 
and community as links that are closely weaved and tightly bounded. So 
communities are embedded in networks. In this sense, network and community 
are more of a continuum than a pair of clear-cut terms. At one end of the 
continuum stands densely-knit communities, on the other end egocentric 
networks, that is, networks defined and managed egocentrically around the core 
member. 
 
The distinction between network and community is based on three criteria: the 
sense of common identity, intensity of interation, and level of commitment and 
engagement. In setting these criteria I have drawn on works of three theorists: 
Raymond Williams, Barry Wellman and Caroline Haythornthwaite. 
 
According the Raymond Williams, community has to do with a sense of 
“immediacy”, of “hoiding something in common ”, “a sense of common identity 
and characteristics”(Williams, 1988, p. 75). Barry Wellman and Barry 
Leighton(1979) have defined community by interaction. In theorizing 
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Internet-based collaboration, Caroline Haythornthwaite (2009)identifies two 
models of peer production based on contributors’ commitment and engagement 
with the production and with each other. In the crowd model, which she terms 
lightweight peer production, contribution is oriented towards the product , not 
relationships. In the community model, or heavy-weight peer production, 
contribution is made with a committment to enterprise as a whole, not only 
products and processes, but also “social and emotional experience of the 
community, and its continued existence”.  
At the beginning of the chapter, I claimed that the three spoof-creators to be 
discussed are representative of the continuum of social containers in which user 
networks fit in and of the broad spectrum of creator-user relationship. Based on 
the above criteria, Corndog and OTMT sits at the end of the community, Hu Ge’s 
production network sits on the other end of the continuum, the egocentric 
network, and Jiaoshou fits in between them (See Figure 35).  
 
 
Figure 35:The continuum of social relations in spoofing culture 
 
Corndog and his OTMT is a densely-knit and tightly bounded community. The 
members identify themselves with the team OTMT. War on Internet Addiction is 
known as a team production. When it won the “Digital Language Honour Award 
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Prize” in the FILE PRIX LUX156 in June 2010, Corndog posted the news in a 
forum of WoW to thank supporters of his team in the game community157. The 
team chat with each other on many issues other than games and videos. Though 
geographically dispersed, they meet offline when opportunities arise. Hu Ge’s 
production network is need-based and ad hoc. He organizes a group for a task, 
and it dissolves after the task is finished. He defines the terms, rules and shape 
of the groups according to his needs. They are egocentric “professional” groups 
rather than communities.  
The network-community distinction made here is not intended as a typological 
mapping of current social groupings in spoofing culture. Rather, I use the 
distinction to understand the diversity of social relations at work among spoof 
creators and users. In most cases the two social forms overlap or embed into 
each other. Egocentric networks may exist on top of or alongside a tightly 
bounded community. In the making of War on Internet Addiction, OTMT formed 
around itself an ad hoc network that included volunteers in the WoW game 
community as well cyber-celebrities beyond the game community.  
 
Lead users as skill hubs  
Addressing the importance of informal social networks in today’s knowledge 
based and collaborative working environment, Casciaro and Lobo (2005) draw 
attention to the brokerage role of “affective hubs”—amiable individuals around 
whom large groups agglomerate. These individuals serve as “critical connectors” 
                                                        
156 FILE PRIX LUX is an international prize for professionals in the area of electronic-digital 
languages, organized by Electronic Language International Festival (FILE) in Brazil. Information 
about the award is available: http://www.fileprixlux.org/awarded-digital-language.aspx 
157 http://bbs.ngacn.cc/read.php?tid=3434286&_fp=161&forder_by=postdatedesc 
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(Valente & Fujimoto, 2010), linking people from different parts of an 
organization and bridging gaps between groups that might not otherwise 
collaborate or even interact with one another.  
 
Casciaro and Lobo(2005, p. 98) propose that we are drawn to such people not 
necessarily because their similarity or familiarity to us. Rather it is more likely 
that we are fascinated by their “attractive personality traits, sophisticated social 
skills, and old-fashioned ‘chemistry’ ”. They are more likely to be “lovable fools” 
than “competent jerks”, because the extra time they devote to interacting with 
people and brokering across structural holes in the organization may endear 
them with others but at the same time may make them lag behind their peers in 
terms of measurable performance. Casciaro and Lobo argue that affective hubs 
are not only good advocate of collaboration cross organization boundaries, they 
are also good evangelist of new ideas because they have a ready audience. Thus 
they are instrumental in the generation of new ideas as hubs, bringing people 
together, opening up new lines of communication and facilitating 
cross-fertilization of ideas. They are also central to the diffusion of innovation as 
bridges between distinct groups, linking groups together, helping to expedite 
the flow of new ideas and practices among and across networks.  
 
While the magnetism of social hubs in the offline world comes from their 
amicable personality, the gravitational pull of hubs in the cyberspace comes 
mainly from their “scientific charisma” (Thrift, 2006, p. 294), that is, technical 
prowess. The three spoofers I have discussed may be pleasant and sociable 
people in their offline life, but that would not translate into popularity online. 
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They are known by their creative content and technical skills rather than 
agreeable personality. Hu Ge and Jiaoshou are popular because they make funny 
videos; Corndog becomes a hub in his machinima community because of his 
literary and graphic skills. All the three of them give expression to 
personal-but-shared sentiments through their creative content. Their charisma 
is a construct, a facade. They are known by their “front stage” images or 
theatrical performance of the self, mediated by stories and skills imbedded in 
their videos, chats and media reports, as opposed to the “backstage”(Goffman, 
1971), where affable personality has a role to play. In this sense, they are less of 
“affective hubs” than “skill hubs”. However, they play the same role online as 
that of “affective hubs” in the offline networks, as both hubs and bridges. For 
fan-users in the cyberspace, there are no “competent jerks”, only lovable stars.  
 
Liquid networks in liquid modernity 
In Bauman’s conceptualization of modern society, the dis-embedding of the self 
and that of society are mutually reinforcing, “locked in a veritable perpetuum 
mobile” (Bauman, 2005, p. 12). In liquid modern society, he writes, 
[T]he conditions under which its members act change faster than 
it takes the ways of acting to consolidate into habits and routines. 
Liquidity of life, and that of society, feed and reinvigorate each 
other. Liquid life, just like liquid modern society, cannot keep its 
shape or stay on course for long (Bauman, 2005, p. 1)  
 
This vortex of uncertainty and un-rootedness is accompanied and exacerbated 
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by the “fading of human bonds and the wilting of solidarity” in our society 
(Bauman, 2006, p. 146), and the move towards “individualized, fragmented 
personal communities”, or “networked individualism” (Wellman, Haase, Witte, 
& Hampton, 2001, p. 451), a trend reinforced and amplified by the growth of the 
Internet. As observed by Wellman (2001b) , 
This is a time for individuals and their networks, not for groups. 
The all-embracing collectivity has become a fragmented, 
personalized network. Autonomy, opportunity and uncertainty 
rule today’s community game. 
 
This autonomy and opportunity could also be a point of vulnerability because of 
the waning of long-term commitment, as Wellman and his colleagues noted, 
“People now go through the day, week, and month in a variety of 
narrowly-defined relationships with changing sets of network members” 
(Wellman, et al., 2001, p. 451,my emphasis). Each individual is now a 
switchboard of a unique set of ties embedded at the same time in different 
networks, capable of shifting easily between them. However, as Mary 
Rees-Nishio observes, “Each person sups from many tables, but experiences 
only a single banquet of life”(cited in Wellman, 2001b, p. 248). Networks are 
necessarily transient and ad hoc, in a permanent state of flux and shape-shifting. 
With liquid modern society come liquid networks.  
 
In cyberspace, current bonds and commitments are increasingly perceived as 
“momentary snapshots in an ongoing process of renegotiation, rather than as 
steady state bound to last indefinitely”, ready to be effaced, rewritten or 
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overwritten (Bauman & Rovirosa-Madrazo, 2010, p. 165). The virtual, as an 
embed and extension of the everyday (Malpas, 2009), is becoming “a mosaic of 
criss-crossing diasporas” of variegated interests as opposed to territories in the 
offline world. As these interests are “shifting and short-lived as a rule”, virtual 
communities are necessarily liquid, with “intermittently exploding and 
imploding constituencies” (Bauman & Rovirosa-Madrazo, 2010, p. 166).  
 
Liquidity features all the three user networks I studied in this chapter. Hu Ge’s 
production is based on his egocentric network, formed according to needs of 
each task, thus is bound to be ephemeral. Jiaoshou’s user network is based on 
“ambient affiliation” through mediated online communication, retained by the 
suspense of “To be continued”, with the criss-crossing of user-fans as a norm 
(think Toulushe!). Even the densely bounded OTMT shows high level of 
transience. Members can opt in and out of the production process. On top of and 
along the team is a temporary and fluid network of cyber-celebrities and users 
in the broad game communities, invited to contribute to the cultural production 
of OTMT. The ad hoc network, together with the more stable community of 
OTMT, comprises the overall production network of the machinima team that is 
called OTMT. One note to take is that in the user networks I have discussed, the 
liquidity is both spontaneous and coordinated by the skill hubs. Based on skills 
needed in a production process, boundaries of their networks are redefined, left 
porous on purpose to let in new skills and possibilities. To appropriate Mary 
Rees-Nishio’s metaphor: Each person sups from many tables, and gets to choose 
their single banquet of life (cited in Wellman, 2001b, p. 248). 
 
217 
 
Liquidity as a source of creativity? 
Engraved on the other side of the coin that bears the stamp of liquidity is 
openness. Liquidity, both spontaneous and coordinated, keeps networks 
shapeless and open, locked in a state of “infinitely becoming”(Thrift, 2008) and 
constant redefinition, thus fending off group decay and inertia while bringing 
multiple possibilities.  
 
The value of liquidity in networks lies in its generation of weak ties, which, 
though often denounced as causing alienation, are indispensable to both 
personal opportunities and the societal creative system. As argued by 
Granovetter (1973, p. 1366), “Whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger 
number of people, and traverse greater social distance, when passed through 
weak ties rather than strong”. 
 
Together with weak ties also come heterogeneous information and access to 
disparate networks, ideal for the generation of new ideas and practices. 
Affective hubs, or skill hubs in online networks, serve as bridging ties who 
“routinely cross the spaces between existing groups and so maximize 
between-group thinking that might otherwise not exist”(Thrift, 2006, p. 294). 
Liquid networks with affective hubs, to borrow from Ronald Burt, “are at higher 
risk of having good ideas”(Thrift, 2006, p. 294), as is shown by the ingenuity and 
creativity of the funny videos produced in the three user networks presented in 
this chapter. In liquidity there is creativity.  
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“ALL CREATION IS A COLLABORATION” 
The subheading above is the title of a chapter by Frank Barron(1999) on 
co-creation and mutuality. In the chapter he uses multiple metaphors to get 
across his message: It takes more than one and the lone creator is not a 
sufficient metaphor. I think it is an appropriate line to conclude my chapter. 
 
In this chapter I have proposed that the spoof video is a co-creation of 
technology and culture, users and fans, hubs and links, an engagement with 
videos as well as each other, imbedded in and enabled by user networks and 
communities. The collaborative process doesn’t not only generate funny videos, 
it also creates and negotiates collective identities, shared experiences and a 
dynamic and creative subculture emerging around spoof videos. I have analysed 
three user networks with a view to understand their social relations and 
creative practices of the spoofers and their fan-users, proposed a continuum of 
egocentric networks to closely-knit communities to conceptualize the diversity 
of social bonds in spoofing culture, and posited agency of liquid networks in the 
our liquid modern society. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the 
micro-level workings of user networks. Meso-and macro networks will be 
discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
Suffice is to say here that spoof videos and cultures are created in collaborative 
active networks. All creation is a collaboration. 
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Chapter Five: The platform of spoof videos: The 
case of Tudou.com  
 
The Chinese Internet companies have gleaned a lesson from this: 
entertainment trumps politics on the Web in China. 
                              David Barboza (2010) 
 
As other forms of participative culture, spoofing practices are subject to the 
regulative regimes of both the market and the state, and operate within a “dual 
economy of freedom and constraint”(Foucault, cited in Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 
227). Spoofing culture offers an excellent case study not only for “the tension 
between the state and capital in the cultural realm” (Mayfair Yang, cited in Zhou, 
et al., 2005, p. 791), but also for the complicated relationship between Internet 
users and service providers. Capital challenges state regulations and empowers 
users by providing alternative channels for self-performance and political 
expression, and at the same time regulates these channels for the best of its own 
interest, in times colluding with the state to make online practices and 
expressions less risky and more acceptable to the state. Then how do these 
relations play out in spoofing culture? How do they condition the travelling of 
spoof videos, the ways in which spoof practices and ideas are shared, picked up, 
transmitted and boosted? It is to these questions that I turn in this chapter. 
Communicative channels— video sharing sites— are where users meet and 
interact with capital and the state, hence focus of my discussion.  
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Video sharing sites in China can be broadly divided into four categories: 1) 
Internet portals, such as sina.com, sohu.com, and baidu.com. They are mostly 
public companies, with obvious government support. To appeal to and retain 
their users and stay ahead in the surge of user-created content, they have 
launched their video channels, with contribution from both professional and 
amateur creators. 2) Traditional media content providers, including of Xinhua 
News Agency and SMG in Shanghai. These media outlets are state-owned and 
are regarded as the mouthpiece of the Party. However, with part or all their 
subsidies scrapped, they have to follow the market logic to chase the fads of 
popular culture so as to keep their bottom line balanced .3) Web sites as video 
sharing platforms. They are very young companies and relatively new to China, 
mostly modelled after YouTube, operating with venture capital money. These 
companies include Tudou, Youku, ku6, 6.cn, to name just a few. 4) 
Comprehensive entertainment companies, such as mop.com and qq.com. These 
companies started as providers of a single service, and after gaining a 
substantive users base diversified into other services. The proliferation of video 
sharing platforms in China is proof of the popularity of Internet videos among 
users, it also the result of the reluctance of Chinese Internet companies to 
specialize (Barboza, 2010). In this chapter I will choose Tudou as a case study 
rather than going through each and every category of these websites. The 
reason of my choice lies in both the homogeneity of these websites and the 
obvious leading position of Tudou as a video hosting platform.  
 
In what follows I will first give a brief introduction about Tudou as a 
video-sharing site. Then I will discuss its role as both enabler and constraint of 
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user creation and “vernacular creativity” (Burgess, 2007) with concrete 
examples from its evolving trajectory from a “community” website to a media 
company. 
 
TUDOU.COM  
Tudou means "potato" in Chinese and Tudou.com (hereafter Tudou) is a play on 
the idea of couch potato (Wang, cited in Balfour, 2006). When the website went 
live on April 15, 2005, two months after YouTube, it was known as Toodou.com, 
because the domain name – Tudou.com – was owned by a cuisine website (see 
Figure 36). Tudou changed to its current domain name in September 2006, 
when the cuisine website ceased to operate (Wang Wei, 2006a).  
 
 
 
Figure 36: Toodou and Tudou 
 
The success story of Tudou conforms to the trope of visionary, young and cool 
Internet entrepreneurs. The company started in a flat in Shanghai with a staff of 
seven in April 2005. The number of staff has since then doubled every 10 month, 
reaching over 1000 in 2011, in response to the rising popularity of the website 
(Blog, 2011).  
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In its early days, the website attracted only about 5 clips a day. The number rose 
fast to about 250 in January 2006, with about 40,000 visitors a day (Balfour, 
2006). By 2007 Tudou had become by far China’s most popular video sharing, 
multimedia podcasting and social network site. According to an OCED (2007, p. 
104) report, in mid-2007 it had 4 million unique users a day, accounting for 47% 
of the time Chinese Internet users spent on all video sharing websites. With 
later comers catching up, Tudou is narrowing its lead. However, it remains 
among the most popular video entertainment sites (Nielsen, 2010). According to 
statistics from Tudou itself, as of September 2010, it hosted over 40 million 
videos, and served around 200 million visitors per month (Tudou.com, n.d.-a) 
with 71.7 million registered users (Spears, 2010). By August 2011, the video 
clips in Tudou’s content library increased to over 50 million and registered 
users reached over 90 million (Tudou.com, n.d.-b). Starting as a sharing site for 
amateur videos, Tudou has grown into a comprehensive video entertainment 
destination hosting user-generated videos, licensed content, and in-house 
developed programs, available on the web as well as through mobile and 
portable devices. Tudou’s success has gone beyond the Chinese border. 
According to a report by Nielsen in February 2011, Tudou was second only to 
Netflix by time per viewer among online video brands in the U. S. (Nielsen 
Company, 2011).  
 
Although recognized as synonym of video platform in China and hailed as 
“China’s YouTube”(Wang, 2009), Tudou and its investors have yet to embrace 
the moment of commercial success. By 2011 Tudou has raised at least 135 
million dollars in venture capital investment through five rounds of funding, but 
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has yet to make a profit (Spears, 2010). The financial viability of the website, 
and with it, the need to monetize its success as a media platform and social 
network, has been a dominant theme in the development of Tudou. 
 
FACILITATING THE SELF  
When analysing the strategies adopted by video-sharing sites for both cultural 
purchase, political leverage and economic viability, Gillespie (2010) uses 
YouTube to show how video platforms position within the broad connotation of 
the term “platform”—“open, neutral, egalitarian and progressive support of 
activity” so as to appeal to users (p. 352). According to Gillespie, the claim of 
these video intermediaries to provide for and empower ordinary users to speak 
and be heard fits neatly with the rhetoric about the democratic potential of the 
internet and the enthusiasm for user creativity, and explains in part the fast rise 
of YouTube as a metaphor for video-sharing sites.  
 
The rise of Tudou can be cast in similar light. From the very beginning Tudou 
knew that its success hinged on its ability to ride on the tide of the times, which 
its founder Garry Wang defines as “the era of the individual and the visual” 
(Wang 2005c), an era when “the watchword is personality” and the young 
generations “have a strong desire to show themselves” (Wang, cited in Fan 
Meijing, 2006). While YouTube invites you to “Broadcast yourself”, Tudou 
proclaims to “help you know yourself and set yourself free” (Chen Weijia, cited 
in Fan, 2006). Through its catch phrase, “Everyone is a director of life”, Tudou 
tries to present itself as a video destination where users can enjoy what they 
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want to see, share what they create, connect with people they like, and in the 
process (re)define and perform individual as well as collective identities.  
 
Nurturing literacy 
Since its early days, Tudou has claimed to be “the stage of a theatre” (Schlaikjer, 
2006) for grassroots creativity, for ordinary people to “show off themselves” 
and realize their celebrity dream. According to Garry Wang, co-founder of 
Tudou, quality of work is the least important concern on this platform of 
self-publication because each and every video has its own value, “even 
programs with no viewers are valuable because they have entertained the 
creators themselves” (Wang, 2005a). His job is to let people realize the power of 
“the platform” and help them to make visible the creative ideas that were 
invisible because of the huge barrier —political, economic as well as legal—of 
publishing in the era of mass media (Wang, 2005b).  
 
However reality doesn’t always goes the way of the rhetoric. As Wang suggested, 
“[i]nitially it’s all crap because no one knows how to use the medium” 
(Schlaikjer, 2006). Although Wang claimed that he expected to get crap before 
“high-quality stuff”, as a startup video-sharing site it needs good videos to 
attract users and can’t afford to wait for their natural emergence. What Tudou 
has done is not only to launch massive media campaigns to drive home the 
message of Tudou as a synonym for user creation in the digital age, but also to 
promote digital literacy among media users.  
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This was done first online through the website itself with “how-to” videos. As 
Wang Wei recalls, the major purpose of these videos is to “dispel people’s fear” 
by driving home the central message that podcasting is not that complicated. A 
typical one was a program on the first page of Tudou called “Teach you how to 
make DV in five minutes” (Fan, 2006). The video itself is now nowhere to be 
found on Tudou, and in its place is a comprehensive toolkit covering the whole 
process from recording, dubbing, editing, splitting, and transcoding to 
uploading158. However, the practice of sharing skills and know-how remains. All 
the three famous video bloggers discussed in this thesis, Hu Ge, Jiaoshou and 
Corndog, have posted similar programs online (Corndog, 2010a; Hu Ge, 2009; 
Jiaoshou, 2010). After the success of his machinima War on Internet Addiction, 
Corndog uploaded a video series on how to make machinima videos, which was 
well received in both his game community (where he is webmaster now) and on 
Tudou159. Apart from online know-how videos, Tudou has organized training 
workshop to promote digital literacy. One such training session was held in July 
2009. The session, themed on “creativity and realization” and covering topics 
such as subtitles and the use of editing software, attracted more than 30 Tudou 
bloggers who came to learn how to turn creative ideas into engaging videos 
(Tudou Blog, 2009).  
 
Creating as connecting 
While training does seed and foster literacy among video users, a more efficient 
and cost-effective way of literacy cultivation is to facilitate connection and 
knowledge sharing among video users and creators. To this end Tudou has 
                                                        
158 The toolkit is available at http://www.tudou.com/my/soft/toolkit.php#edit  
159 The video series is available at http://www.tudou.com/playlist/p/l8046545.html  
226 
 
utilized its own website as well as other platforms of social media to create 
online interest groups and organized offline get-togethers. Tudou’s BBS, or, as 
Tudou calls it, Tudou Community, is organized around topic groups160. Each 
thread starter is identified with a group. Users can join these groups, or create 
their own ones and invite their friends in, where they can discuss whatever 
topics they like, or send private messages using Tudou’s on-site mailing tool. 
Bloggers’ homepages are another channel for users to connect and converse 
with each other. As was discussed earlier in this thesis Jiaoshou is a skillful user 
of this channel to develop and maintain his fan base. It is also a good platform of 
troubleshooting for Jiaoshou’s users regarding video-creating and sharing skills, 
where they to raise questions and ask for help from Jiaoshou, or chat, debate, 
and share knowledge with each other. Outside the website Tudou has created 
QQ messaging groups for active video creators to get connected with each other. 
Both Jiaoshou and Corndog have joined groups sponsored by Tudou, friended 
and maintained links with like-minded video creators in these groups. Jiaoshou 
contributed his voice to Corndog’s War on Internet Addiction and dubbed the 
video for 2 minutes. They even co-created remotely a spoof song You know too 
much161.   
 
Another way of fostering literacy and maintaining connection is offline 
get-togethers. From earlier on, Tudou has been organizing various bloggers’ 
parties all over China, alone or in partnership with other businesses. Among the 
most famous partners is Intel, which sponsored a series of gatherings and 
                                                        
160 Tudou’s BBS is at http://www.tudou.com/groups/index.html.  
161 Jiaoshou’s dubbing for War in Internet Addiction is available at 
http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/3Dhh-aZ1LBE/. His is the second voice. The co-created 
song is available here at http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/pFgySW9p18Y/ 
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workshops on the fringe of its joint events with Tudou, “Intel Centrino Creative 
Videos Competition” (Digital Weekly, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). For video 
enthusiasts, the appeal of these events is obvious. They get free training 
sessions. They meet peers, show (off) and share their skills with them, and put 
their creative ideas to test among like-minded people. To make it even better 
winners of these events are offered opportunities to work together with 
professional teams to produce its video commercials (Xie & Zheng, 2007). 
Tudou’s Video Festival — the commercial campaigns to promote it, and the 
fringe activities around it — to which I will turn in the next section, is another 
series of events that provide opportunities for video users to meet and befriend, 
to learn and share in the offline world. 
 
While some of the learning and sharing are predominantly online or offline, 
most of them are both. Jiaoshou engages his Tudou peers on Tudou website and 
through messaging tools, he also meet them on offline occasions organized by 
Tudou. “Creative Workshop”, a Tudou-based group of amateur video creators, 
works and grows mostly online. However they also meet constantly offline to 
shoot videos together, and to take part, as a group, in Tudou-organized events. 
Through these meetings, the group gets to know and team up with other 
creators in video production (Ding, 2007; Yuan, 2007). 
 
Intermediating for the self 
In 2007, Jiaoshou was a part-time net jockey known by the name of “Silly Dad” 
on mop.com, a popular entrainment portal, and his mask was still to be designed. 
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When Jiaoshou created his first video and wanted to find a streaming site to 
host it, he turned to Tudou (Jiaoshou, 2010). In the video, Jiaoshou (or 
Professor)-class Commentating of Game Videos (jiaoshou ji youxi shipin jiangjie), 
Silly Dad mimics football analysts to commentate video games. The video was a 
big hit. Boosted by its popularity, Silly Dad decided to make more videos of 
similar kind. The single video developed into a series, and the name Jiaoshou 
became more well-known than Silly Dad162. Tudou began to feature him on its 
home page, which gained him more hits and fans. In 2008, Jiaoshou decided to 
adopt his current name (Jiaoshou, 2010). A year later in the 2009 Tudou Video 
Festival he won the title of “the Most Popular Blogger”. 
 
A stage to perform the self, a forum to exchange and share ideas, and a space to 
producing new sociality and forge new connections: Jiaoshou’s rise to fame 
shows the use and “power of the platform”. In Chapter Four I analysed how 
Jiaoshou developed and maintained his connections with his peers and fans 
through self-performance, and how ideas are kept flowing within, between and 
beyond user networks. In last section I referred briefly to connections made 
possible between video creators and Tudou’s business partners when 
discussing how links among users are encouraged and facilitated by Tudou. In 
this section I expand on discussion of these connections and their implications 
for video creators like Jiaoshou, with a view to cast light on the role of the 
platform as an enabler of the self. The focus will be on the how Tudou helps 
users with better access to audience and businesses, thus serving not only as a 
stage inviting and hosting user performance, but also as an intermediary 
                                                        
162 In Chinese, 《教授级游戏视频讲解》, the series of videos are available at 
http://www.tudou.com/playlist/p/l2965101i6975058.html. 
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through which users can reach out to and link with other platforms and 
networks.  
 
The creativity business 
When Jiaoshou decided to use Tudou as his outlet of choice for his videos, he 
was looking for access to a large user base, but wasn’t expecting access to 
advertisement money and business opportunity. In 2006 Tudou launched an 
initiative called “Tudou Ad”, inviting creators to imbed ads in their videos to 
make money and promising to give the lion’s share of its profit to users (Wang 
Wei, 2006b; Yang, 2006). There is no way to know the details about the division 
of profit between Tudou and video creators. What is told is that on average 
popular creators or groups can make up to ten thousand RMB yuan a month 
(Tudou Blog, 2010a). For Jiaoshou, a civil engineer and project manager by 
trade, ad money from videos might not be the most appealing in the 
arrangement. More important is the fame he gained through Tudou Ad among 
advertising agents and thus the indirect access to the business world, which 
turned into a direct one after the success of his videos, when he was invited to 
shoot together with Tudou an ads series of 12 videos for Master Kong, a popular 
Taiwan-owned brand for noodles, bottled beverages and pastries163. The current 
series, An Alternative Version of the Duke of Mount Deer, is sponsored by Tudou 
and Changyou.com, the online games platform of the internet portal Sohu. It has 
entered season two and generated more than 20 videos, and Jiaoshou gets to 
work with other famous creators recommended by Tudou such as Hank and 
                                                        
163 The ad series is available at http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/zePGKI5bCOc/ 
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Panda Lin164. These videos generate revenue for Jiaoshou, incentivise him to 
work harder, put him among creative yet critical peers, and in the process 
constantly build up his skills and creative capacity. Tudou has also changed his 
career path. Jiaoshou is now being committed to shoot more videos for many 
more businesses and is contemplating of starting up his production companies 
to serve the market for internet video ads (Jiaoshou, 2010).  
 
Tudou Ad might be the first and important step to get Jiaoshou close to 
businesses and generate for him business opportunities. A more critical and 
powerful link the process is power of the Tudou platform that might be called 
the Tudou machine, including its curating practice (to which I turn in the next 
section) and its business promotion schemes, the best showcase of the latter 
being the annual Tudou Festival, a signature video streaming industry event 
held every spring.  
 
Tudou Video Festival 
The original idea of the Tudou Festival was, as Wang Wei (Wang, 2008) outlined 
with a grain of idealism, to create a regular and continuous occasion for 
grass-root creativity where: 
 Creators and distributors or sponsors can find each other; 
 People can talk face-to-face in the real rather than virtual world; 
 It is beautiful and rarely frequented by tourists so that participants can 
stay quietly with peace of mind 
                                                        
164 The video series is available at http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/vNgMsNNNdpY/; 
and Panda Lin’s home page at Tudou.com is 
http://www.tudou.com/home/linxiongmao/#comment_area 
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That was the how the first festival, then called Moganshan Movie Festival, 
happened on April 15, 2008. The festival was housed at an old church, attended 
mostly by video enthusiasts travelled long distance to a mountainous 
hard-to-reach scenery resort that is the Monganshan Mountain. There were no 
build-up events before the event and little media coverage afterwards. 
 
In 2009, the festival changed to its current name and was moved to Shanghai, 
where it could get better attention from both the media and ordinary users. To 
promote the festival, shortlisted videos were shown offline in Beijing and 
commented by Chairmen of the festival, Lu Chuan, a famous film director in 
China, with wide media coverage by popular as well as traditional media165. 5 
million users took part in online voting. In 2010, the event moved to be 
permanently based in Beijing. Screening events of shortlisted videos were held 
in more cities to include Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing. Countdown events, 
news conferences were organized to build momentum for the festival. 
Celebrities were invited to attend these events to maximize fan participation 
and media fanfare. Jiaoshou and Corndog became household names among 
video enthusiasts before they appeared on the podium of the festival to claim 
the title for “the most popular video blogger” and smiled proudly in front the 
audience online and offline, “It’s our turn to get famous!”   
 
The festival is more than a video streaming event. It doesn't only get Jiaoshou 
fame, but also career opportunities. On the fringe of the event Tudou has 
                                                        
165 A collection of the report is available at Tudou at 
http://www.tudou.com/about/moreinfo.php. Scroll down to media report to find coverage from 
April-June 2008.  
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organized project promotion activities for creators to seek potential 
cooperation with media companies. Starting in 2009, China Film Group, China’s 
most influential movie company, has put a module in the festival to identify and 
recruit movie talent. Winners of the module are given project and funds to 
experiment and grow. Beginning in 2010, Tudou launched Orange Box to make 
its own “made-for-Internet” drama series. With it Tudou started a project called 
Warehouse No.6, a talent recruitment program for its in-house content 
production, including actors, actresses, directors, screenwriters, editors and 
producers (Tudou.com, n.d.-b). These initiatives, like Tudou Ad and Tudou 
Festival, are meant to help with Tudou’s business viability. However, they also 
help more people like Jiaoshou get to connect with each other and with 
businesses, and open up new possibilities for their creation, even for their 
career. In this sense Tudou is not only a platform but also an intermediary for 
the increasingly creative and loud self of the tech-savvy young growing up with 
the internet. 
 
CURATING TUDOU: NEGOTIATING USERS, CLIENTS, AND THE STATE  
Online content providers are generally regarded as “curators of public discourse” 
(Gillespie, 2010). However, this role of curatorial authority is up for grabs and 
there is competition between users, the advertisers and the platform itself (Gehl, 
2009). The latter in China’s case acts also as the proxy of the state in censorship. 
There is an inherent tension between users and the platform as of the 
ownership and autonomy of the space. In the case of Tudou, curating of display 
has not only to do with user preference (to display the content in a way that 
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appeals to users and gets more traffic) and financial viability (to cater to the 
needs of advertisers as they help pay the bill), but also political survival 
(non-compliance of or insensitivity to political rules may lead to shutdown of 
the website). Curating Tudou means to maximize and monetize the success of 
the website by keeping the users, advertisers and the government happy at the 
same time. Rhetoric of user experience and sense of community is all about 
increasing the exchange value of website as indicated by the selling price of its 
advertising slots. At times of conflicts of interest between these stakeholders, 
users are always the first to be dropped.  
 
Users as curators  
In the early days, when the intermediate task for Tudou was to expand the user 
base rather than to figure out a revenue model (Pacific Epoch, 2005), it adopted 
rather liberal way of curating the display of its video content. The fundamental 
way to organize the content was through tabbing (Pacific Epoch, 2005). The 
prime section of Tudou’s home page was reserved for user-created videos (Yang 
Yang, 2007). However, there were no special sections, such as “featured videos”, 
which were reserved for staff favourites or recommendations. Some videos are 
ahead of others on the “most” lists purely because users have clicked on them. 
Users speak with their mouse as of what they like (A Yu, 2007), and if there 
were enough clicks, the video ended up on the home page and brought fame, 
passing or permanent, to its creator.  
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However, this utopia users-as-curators way of content organization didn’t last 
long. It burns money to operate a website like Tudou, and there is a permanent 
urge for it to generate revenue to offset the operation cost and make profit for 
its investors. Starting in 2005, Tudou experimented with a virtual currency 
called Potato Skin, which users could earn through uploading content or gain by 
purchasing with real money, and with which users can auction the opportunity 
to be featured on the home page (Xue Tong, 2005). This was a blatant statement 
of “money talks” and was a long cry from the democratic rhetoric that Tudou 
tried to get users to believe in its publicity campaigns. The idea never took off 
and the virtual currency was scrapped shortly. In June 2007, when Jiaoshou for 
the first time uploaded his video to Tudou, it was already a different website. A 
contingent of web editors were put in place to choose videos that are “healthy” 
in nature and put them on its home page (Yang Yang, 2007). It was through 
recommendations by these editors that Jiaoshou got to be known by a large 
number of users in a relatively short period of time. And star users like Jiaoshou, 
Hu Ge and Corndog are thus jointly manufactured by users and video-streaming 
sites like Tudou. 
 
Platform as curator  
The need for Tudou to create star users like Jiaoshou has in part to do with the 
need to generate revenue through commercial advertising. Obviously famous 
creators like Jiaoshou attract much more clicks and thus their advertising time 
can be sold more easily to businesses, with a high price tag. The role of Tudou 
editors is more than that of facilitators or hosts. They are also similar to sports 
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scouts, trying to find the next stars among a huge crowd of videos and their 
users. However, finding emerging big stars doesn't necessarily mean stable 
advertising revenues assured. As Gillespie (2010) says about YouTube videos, 
most user-created content on Tudou could not be paired with advertising, not 
least because average videos get few clicks, but because user-created videos 
were not categorized in a way make it comfortable for advertiser to pair their 
ads with them, partly out of their fear to be associated with the wrong content, 
partly out of uncertainty as of the target audience of their ads, and partly 
because of potential copyrights issues with UCC generated with copyrighted 
movie footings or music.  
 
When Tudou was founded in 2005, it was very upbeat about its future of being a 
UCC community website. As its founder Wang Wei said, “I think there will be a 
big enough market for us to succeed as a pure multimedia user generated 
content website” (Pacific Epoch, 2005). However, his hope has bumped against 
reality. May’s (2010) research on YouTube videos suggests that large sustained 
YouTube audiences are built by corporate media. Gillespie (2010) holds a 
similar view, stating that commercial media “dominate the lists of the most 
popular and most viewed”. A survey by China Internet Information Centre 
(China Internet Information Center, 2010) shows watching online videos is 
among the most popular applications for internet users in China, and movies 
and TV drama, instead of user-created content, are the videos of choice for most 
users. Teaming up with professional content providers seems a logical move 
under these circumstances. Tudou’s cooperation with traditional media content 
providers started with SETV, a local satellite channel in the southeast Fujian 
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Province. In January 2007 the two parties jointly launched a television program 
broadcasting popular user-created videos from Tudou (Sheng, 2007). That was 
a rare exception in the flow of content between traditional media and Tudou. In 
most cases we see the other way around: traditional media, including television 
and music labels, find their way into the content library of Tudou, and attract 
most of the traffic, as is the case for YouTube (China Internet Information Center, 
2010; May, 2010). In September 2008, Tudou set up a special HD channel for 
copyrighted movies and television drama purchased from traditional content 
providers. Apart from getting out of copyright trouble associated with 
user-uploaded content, the purpose of the channel, Black Beans, is to attract 
more users and internet traffic so as to generate better advertising revenue (Niu, 
2009; K. Zhang, 2008).  
 
Tudou didn't stop there with movies and television drama. Its cooperation with 
traditional media covers areas ranging from news, sports and entertainment to 
animation and lifestyle. To better align and categorize its diversified content, 
Tudou launch a major strategic reshuffling of its content on 30 June 2009. In the 
move, 14 content channels were set up, with names similar to those of a 
television network. Explaining the rationale for the reshuffle, Ms Jiang Weimin, 
chief content officer of Tudou, admits, “We are funded by advertisers, and they 
like to see clearly the target audience of their video ads. The reshuffle makes it 
easier for them to pair their ads and thus serves that end. We are a business and 
our first task is to survive” (Jiang, 2009).  
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Tudou as censor 
In 2005, when Tudou was still a nascent platform, with traffic incomparable to 
its scale today, the need for censors was minimal. On different occasions, Wang 
Wei talked about a contingent of five to a dozen of censors, composed of both 
volunteers and Tudou’s own staff (Balfour, 2006). At that time most of the 
questions are not about politics but about sex, and Wang Wei regarded 
censorship as “one of the minor things” that he worried about (Einhorn, 2006). 
Wang Wei was obviously either too upbeat or too evasive about the complexity 
of censorship on Tudou and in China. 
 
China has a plethora of directives and guidelines issued by different ministries 
to establish and maintain order in cyberspace (Li, 2010). Thus in China when we 
talk about state censorship, we have to think there are different government 
agencies representing the state. These agencies, who oftentimes don't agree 
with each other, can all issue orders to shut up, or to shut down. These 
ministries and agencies don't police the net by themselves. Rather, the 
responsibility is delegated to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet 
Content Providers (ICPs) (Li, 2010). To comply with these directives and 
regulations and protect its content diversity at the same time, Tudou has 
developed a sophisticated procedure of censorship. It takes three steps to take 
down a video from its website, each step being reviewed by more than one 
censor (Jiang, 2009).  
 
238 
 
However, when it comes to political stuff, the process can be very fast and easy. 
When it finds anything it regards as risky, it blocks it and sends the users 
involved the following message, 
Dear user: Thank you very much for supporting Tudou.com. As a 
provider of internet storage services, Tudou advocates legal and 
civil internet speech, and cannot take any legal and/or other 
responsibilities for illegal, vulgar or other inappropriate content 
by users. Since the content you have published is incompliant with 
current laws, social customs or other relevant regulations and 
policies, it has been automatically blocked by the system. We are 
sorry for this. If you still want to publish your work, you will need 
to make adjustment to the blocked content as of its 
appropriateness and legal compliance. Thank you.166  
(Jiaoshou, 2009) 
 
In the message, Tudou states that it is the automatic decision of the system 
rather than Tudou to block the risky content, thus it should not take the blame. 
In most cases users do understand the need for Tudou to protect itself. For 
example when Jiaoshou’s videos got blocked, he posted the above message on 
his video log and blamed relevant stage agencies rather than Tudou (Jiaoshou, 
2009). His fans take similar stand on this issue as Jiaoshou. In May 2010, when 
Jiaoshou’s homepage on Tudou was blocked by Tudou, users all over China 
showed their support by posting on the comment area of the page messages like 
                                                        
166 Original in Chinese. My translation. 
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“Beijing people can’t access Jiaoshou’s homepage; Jiangsu people can’t access; 
Fujian people can’t either… (See Figure 37). However, none of these users 
blamed Tudou for the shutdown.  
 
 
               Figure 37: Users all over China show support for Jiaoshou 
 
Tudou complies with state directives to protect itself as a way to maximize its 
own business interest. An example cited by Wang Wei to explain the relativity of 
censorship also shows how Tudou can take advantage of the loopholes in the 
state censorship system and ignore censorship for its own benefit. 
[A] TV reporter in Hunan did a story for his local station about a 
middle-aged woman who adopted 20 homeless kids in a poor 
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county, but his boss wouldn't run the story. So the reporter put it 
on Toodou. Then a producer in Shanghai saw it, got in touch with 
the reporter, and sent a team to Hunan to do detailed reporting. 
The broadcast was extremely popular. (Balfour, 2006) 
 
If in these cases Tudou censors on behalf of the state, there are many occasions 
where Tudou censors for itself. In the build-up to the 2010 Tudou Video Festival, 
Corndog was the amateur blogger favoured by Tudou. Obviously it didn't want 
the same person to win the title of the most popular video blogger two years in 
a row. Jiaoshou found that he disappeared from the Tudou’s home page, literally 
censored him. And a lot of his votes didn't get counted. Jiaoshou called the 
editors and complained about foul play. “They were very embarrassed when I 
called. But they didn't stop it. It was obvious that they didn't want me to win” 
(Jiaoshou, 2010).  
 
In other cases Tudou censors for its clients. An anecdote told in my interview 
with Jiang Weimin chief content officer of Tudou shows that Tudou in times 
needs to bow to business pressure when curating its content. In early 2009, a 
video about the spat between Nokia China and its distributors was posted on 
Tudou and attracted attention immediately. The editors noticed it and featured 
it on its homepage. Nokia was furious to see the video and threatened to 
withdraw its sponsorship and ads from Tudou. Tudou decided to cave in and 
take the video off its homepage despite protest from its editors (Jiang, 2009). In 
times of conflicts of interest between revenue-generation and editorial 
independence, Tudou is always ready to accept an offer for the latter. What 
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matters is the price tag.     
 
THE MAINSTREAMING OF TUDOU AND THE FUTURE OF UCC 
Although the founders of Tudou promise to remain a community website and a 
video-streaming platform rather than a media company (Zhou Ting, 2009), the 
mainstreaming of Tudou, as its Western counterpart YouTube (May, 2010), 
seems inevitable. The mainstreaming of Tudou started with the introduction of 
professional content of traditional media companies into its offerings, and got 
strengthened when a special HD channel called “Black Beans” in 2008. Through 
these moves, by 2009, the percentage of UCC decreased to account for 30% of 
Tudou’s content (Zhou Yiyi, 2009). In 2010, Tudou launched an initiative called 
“Orange Box” to produce its own “made for the internet” movies, and recruited 
more than 40 people for the initiative (Si Han, 2010). Before that on January 18, 
2011 Tudou’s own news channel had already gone online (Tudou Blog, 2010b). 
Tudou finally found its own voice and became a media company hosting 
user-created content, self-produced programming and professional copyrighted 
content.  
 
Facing the competition from both professional content and the content of 
platforms that are tamed and driven by the financial demand of the market, 
what is the future of user-created content? 
 
User-created content was supported by Tudou because it wanted to generate 
revenues. In 2008, when faced with pressure of copyright issues from old 
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traditional content providers, Wang Wei called the traffic brought about by UCC 
using copyrighted content as “industrial waste water”, useless because it 
wouldn't make any money (K. Zhang, 2008). Starting in 2009, Tudou started to 
encourage original content by amateur users because it realized that Tudou 
couldn't compete financially with established internet portals such as Sohu in 
purchasing premium copyrighted content, and user-created content might be a 
way to differentiate from its competitors (Xu Jieyun, 2011). Thus the 
importance and future of UCC depends on its ability to make money for its 
hosting platforms and on its potential to be turned into a competitive advantage. 
In 2011, Wang Wei, who invented the “waste water theory”, reiterated the 
importance of user-created content as one of the “entry barriers” into the video 
streaming industry (Xu Jieyun, 2011). 
 
Video-sharing platforms are still evolving. Thus the future of UCC, to borrow 
from Hartley (2009), remains “an open future”. 
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Concluding Remarks: The canonization of the 
jester: Spoof videos and culture renewal 
 
Like high art, pop, too—contra Adorno—has a conversation both 
with its sources, which it revises and transforms, and with 
cultural authority as a whole, which it also revises and 
transforms.  
                                  Perry Meisel (2010, p. x) 
 
THE USES OF SPOOF VIDEOS: THE MICRO-MACRO NEXUS 
In Chapter Two I proposed a micro-meso-macro nexus as a conceptual 
framework to approach spoofing culture in China. I followed this nexus to take 
stock of the uses—political, social and economic—of spoof videos for each of the 
stakeholders in this process of cultural emergence. As is shown in Chapters 
Three and Four, users and creators are found at the micro level. They use spoofs 
videos for self-performance, networking, and playful citizenship. At the 
meso level are the platforms that host these users and user networks. They 
nurture users as a revenue source and at the same time guard against 
them as potential troublemakers, who may endanger their very existence, as 
is teased out in Chapter Five. At the macro level, I discussed in Chapter Four the 
uses of spoof videos for alternative memory and their political implications for 
the state, the uses of spoof videos for phatic communication and their 
possibilities for knowledge production of our society. As I made clear in 
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Chapter Two, the micro-meso-macro nexus is not a linear, one-way, static 
process; rather the micro and macro are in permanent dialogue and interaction, 
mediated by meso-level institutions. Considering the players (individual, 
network and system) and factors (social, economic and political) in play in 
spoofing culture, the interaction of players in, and uses of spoof videos may 
better be accounted for as a dynamic matrix than as a nexus.  
 
I started my analysis of spoof videos and spoofing culture with a discussion of 
the self, and I would like to end with another one. In Chapter One I 
conceptualized the rise of user-created content in China and with it the search 
and fight of the young for their own voices in both pleasure and politics as “the 
return of the self”. As I have intended to prove all along, this return conditions 
the configuration of spoofing videos in China and thus is the first step to 
understand spoofing culture in China.  
 
THE SELF AS THE JESTER 
Similar to the trend in western democracies the “demotic” (Turner, 2006) or 
“participatory” (Jenkins, 2006) turn in media culture in China, aided by 
increasing affordability of Internet technology, is increasingly taking the form of 
“silly citizenship” (Hartley, 2010). However, the performance of the self with a 
mask of the jester in China is not only a strategy of choice to gain more fans and 
web clicks in the era of “commercialized” and “commercializable” public life 
(Goodman, 2001, p. 247), as was demonstrated with examples in Chapter Four, 
but also a tactic of necessity to speak truth to power, a point I discussed in great 
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length in Chapter Three. When “[t]ruth naked is not a sight for the eye of the 
Bishop”, it is wrapped with “a veil of gaiety” to be representable (Lin, 1935, p. 
224). Against such a setting, spoof videos are the best way to appeal to 
commoners (Internet users) while avoid antagonizing bishops (the 
establishment). This has made the life of internet users and creators much 
harder, and at the same time made their work more creative and interesting.  
 
THE JESTER AND CULTURAL GENERATIVITY 
Jonathan Zittrain (2008) attributes the seemly endless source of 
innovation in internet technology to the “generativity” of the internet 
itself: its “capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered 
contributions from broad and varied audiences” (p. 70, my emphasis). 
According to him, it is the openness that has made the Internet 
generative. Spoofing culture in China, though operating in a repressive 
and thus relatively closed rather than open setting, is, surprisingly, very 
generative in nature. Spoofers are not only generating new videos all 
along, but also new communities and new ways of political engagement, 
and with them new ways of relating to the established and to each other. 
As I have shown in Chapter Four, on micro-level, the source of this 
generativity comes from the liquidity of the networks around which 
spoofing culture is organized. The questions follow, then, are: Where 
does this generativity come from on the macro-level? And what are the 
implications of generative spoof videos and pop culture as a whole to 
cultural renewal of a society? 
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SPOOF VIDEOS AND CULTURE RENEWAL  
In the Myth of Popular Culture, Perry Meisel (2010) enlists three representative 
pop traditions—the American novel, the history of Hollywood, and history of 
jazz and rock music to prove the dialectical relationship between high and pop 
art, between the centre and periphery. He argues that while “each tradition has 
a conversation with a different set of resources, and a different way of 
addressing cultural authority”, they have one thing in common: in the process of 
these dynamic conversations, they transform both their own histories and the 
cultural authority as a whole (2010, p. x). Meisel’s argument can be read as a 
delineation of a model of cultural innovation that echoes and complements what 
the Russian formalist theorist Viktor Shklovsky calls “law of the canonization of 
the junior branch”. According to him, 
In order to renew itself, literature periodically redraws its 
boundaries, so as to include from time to time elements, motifs 
and devices regarded until then as ‘peripheral’ or ‘junior’ in 
relation to the ‘mainstream’ of literary endeavours. (Hawkes, 
2003, p. 72) 
 
The “law” of Shklovsky implies that that all art exist in a continuum, with 
emphasis on the dynamic relationship between the high and pop art, 
mainstream and fringe culture. Meisel’s deconstruction of “the myth of popular 
culture” points to two dynamic paths of evolution for pop and high culture: Pop 
culture renews itself while at the same time renewing and transforming high 
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culture. To a certain extent this has made the matrix of high and low, centre and 
fringe lose it validity.  
 
In the cultural realm of China, there has been an ongoing conversation the 
centre and the fringe, between difference forms of pop culture, and between pop 
and official cultures, against the rigid political context. Leo Ou-fan Lee (1991) 
discusses “the cultural meaning of periphery” with a movement in the 1980s’ 
literary circles of China called xungen, or searching for roots, in which the quest 
for cultural roots led the younger literary generation away from Beijing or other 
urban centres and into the countryside. He argues, citing Han Shaogong, a 
prominent writer at the time, that the orthodox Chinese culture “can only be 
revitalized if it is able to absorb the magma” of unorthodox cultures (p. 224). He 
put forward a vision that boundaries between different cultures “will no longer 
close them off but instead crisscross each other to form interlocking networks 
in which there is no single centre” (p. 225).   
 
Tu Weiming (1991), a prominent philosopher from Harvard, conceptualizes the 
impact of geographical peripheral on the culture of China proper as the 
“periphery as centre”: in Culture China, it is the societies in the periphery – 
Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore–that exert pressure and 
lessons for change in the centre, the PRC.  
 
Spoof videos offer us a good case study for the dynamic dialogue between the 
centre and the margins. As a form a subversive writing, spoof videos have 
drawn on the rich history of subversive expression, such as rock music and 
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“mou lei tau” movies, and changed the way discourse of subversion is conducted 
by adopting new media technology and new textual strategy in the face of 
changing censorship regime. Spoof videos are now on offer in official 
mainstream media, and have become an everyday practice for users as well as 
media companies. However, how will spoof videos “revise and transform 
cultural authority as a whole” (Meisel, 2010, p. x, my emphasis) remains to be 
seen. In formalist theory, when the “strange” becomes itself habitual, it need to 
be replaced, thus cultural renewal continues (Hawkes, 2003). To “revise and 
transform” the cultural authority it converses with, and to get replaced after 
being canonized, that would be the most important use of spoof videos.  
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